

**THE PROBLEMS
OF THE
COMING PEACE**

BY

FELIX MLYNARSKI, Ph. D.

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
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By

FELIX MLYNARSKI, Ph. D.

Delegate of the Polish Supreme National Committee to America

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COMING PEACE

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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTION

There are two examples in history which could be compared with the present European war. They are: the struggle between Rome and Carthago and the war of England against Napoleon. The ancient Carthago is the England of our day; Rome of yore is the present Germany. These were the wars of the greatest power on land with the greatest power on the seas. Only the conflagration of Carthago, when its walls crumbled under the pressure of the Roman legions and centuries later the burning down of Moscow, the smoking ruins of which broke Napoleon's sword, can be compared with the political importance of the present war. This war has deep reasons, employs frightful means, and it is bound to yield most important results.

No comparison in history can be found for the way in which the present war is conducted. No longer armies are facing each other as was the case in former years, but entire nations are lined up against each other in battle array. No longer thousands are fighting, but millions. There is no longer such a thing as a decisive battle in which one attack is able to crush the enemy. The present efforts present something rather superhuman; the individual becomes drowned in the mass of armies of millions of men, having no possibility of overlooking battles fought over hundreds of miles and lasting for months. The soldier becomes an ant rather than an eagle. His consciousness does not seem to exceed the consciousness of a cell in the midst of an organism. The heroism of the individual decreases while the

heroism of a nation grows proportionately; the individual character plays only a secondary part, while the weight of the national character increases in importance. Not armies but entire nations have entrenched for the last year and deluge each other with fire. Above them all the aeroplane has spread its wings and has been pressed into regular army service. On the seas the submarine has come to the front and changed the technique of naval warfare. Thus, the two supreme triumphs of human ingenuity, the conquest of the air and the conquest of the deep seas, were first enlisted as weapons of wholesale murder before they could serve purposes of human happiness.

The sacrifices caused by the present war are enormous. The first nine months have cost the warring nations five millions in killed and wounded, not including those who were taken prisoners.* During the same period the expenditures of the principal warring nations amounted to \$12,000,000,-000.† Thousands of villages and cities were reduced to ruins; all that were spared by the artillery fire were destroyed by trench digging; these were the traces which the hurricane of war left behind when it swept the countryside. Famine, misery, contagious diseases followed the warring armies as jackals follow a caravan. The prosperity of nations which were leaders in civilizatory work has been ruined; ruined was also the happiness of millions of families from whom the war tore away father, husband and brother. Who will tell how many tears have been shed? Who will describe the suffering and the agony?

The world is horror stricken.

* According to the estimates of Senator Henri La Fontaine of Brussels, Chairman of the International Peace Union.

† According to the estimates of the British Prime Minister, Asquith.

The consciousness of responsibility for the present war grows every day. Slogans of the liberty of nations and permanent peace appeared on the banners of the warring armies. According to the general opinion, this is perhaps the last act of the human tragedy—to some extent, a “war against war itself.”* The idea of peace, but of permanent peace, becomes slowly something positive. It ceases to be an idea and begins to acquire the form of an actual political goal. The world begins to feel the weight of its own guilt; the majesty of humanity requires some kind of satisfaction. Human society begins to look for a guarantee that this frightful orgy of blood shall not again be repeated. Should war always remain the supreme manifestation of the life of nations just as the death of an individual is the supreme manifestation of his life? Is the heroism of labor going to outweigh, on the scale of history, the heroism of war?

The present war is immense, but the coming peace must exceed it in its immensity.

The condition of the coming peace must be the principle of justice. This principle, however, is denied by those, who by their actions prove that according to their opinion the coming peace has to be based on the fact of physical victory. The shadow of every victory is a defeat of the vanquished party, and the resonance of defeat is the thirst for revenge. Justice alone can mitigate this danger and, therefore, the idea of justice can be the only permanent basis for a future peace treaty. The defeat of Austria at Sadowa in 1866 did not sow the seed for a desire for revenge because Bismarck did not take advantage in a brutal way of the physical victory of Prussia, but he limited himself to negotiating a just peace. Austria lost at that time Venice to Italy, and this was

* E. Vanderwelde.

in conformity with the theory of nationality which was the tendency of the history of these days. Austria, however, did not lose an inch of her territory to Prussia. The result of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 was different. Prince Bismarck basing himself on the fact of physical victory exploited peace to the disadvantage of France. Germany has occupied not only the portion of Lorraine which was nearest Germany in spirit, but has also occupied Alsace, which showed a marked political inclination towards France. A huge contribution of war did not fail to increase the spirit of animosity; all these elements were the seeds of the coming war of revenge. The entire policy of France and the education of the young generation was conceived and developed from this ultimate point of view of revenge against Germany. The fruits that grew from these seeds are ripening in the present conflagration. This example is frightful enough to prove the correctness of the contention that only just peace can be a permanent peace. No permanent peace can be based on blind hatred, on the brutal fact of physical superiority; and, thus, the saving of humanity from the disaster of war can, just as permanent peace, be brought about only by the principle of justice.

An army can be defeated, but a nation which consciously and bravely goes to war cannot be defeated. A soldier dies on the field of glory, the sword breaks, the rifle in the dying hand does not send out any longer the deadly lead, but the elements of heroism as far as they manifest themselves in heroic acts cannot perish, because they are immortal. They cannot disappear in the conflagration, nor can they be drowned in the deluge of shrapnel. They must outlive the defeat and become the songs of hatred for the future generations, and the flags of future war for revenge. Both parties in the present war are guilty of wholesale murder,

but on the other hand, both parties, and not only one of them, have to be credited with boundless heroism; both sides can claim for themselves a capital of heroism and national enthusiasm. The Germans have astonished the entire world with their smashing march through Belgium and northern France, but France also will have a source of eternal national pride in the battle of the Marne. Amazing are the victories of the allied German and Austro-Hungarian armies over Russia, in the eastern theatre of war, but still Russia too can boast of a series of successes in the beginning of the war. All nations which hitherto led Europe in civilization are ablaze with war-like spirit. The heroism that these nations displayed in a sufficient number of cases insures these nations against eventual downfall and decay; national honor is safe since it covered itself with new laurel of glory. No Joffre and no Hindenburg shall ever be able to destroy it; this national honor is a weapon which shall survive even the ultimate defeat, and it shall continue to be sharpened in the arsenal of national life for the future war of revenge in case one of the warring parties should brutally take advantage of her physical victory and thus create in the other nation the feeling of injury. Let us beware of all illusions. The Germans will never be able to destroy France, the beautiful; nor Britain, the proud; nor Russia, the resourceful. It would be, furthermore, rather naïve to think that Germany can be smashed and annihilated as one of the leading powers of the world. Not even Napoleon was able to destroy Germany, and Joffre certainly is not a Napoleon; in the same way, Hindenburg shall never be able to crush any of the nations which are fighting today against Germany. The armies of the one or the other of the warring sides may and undoubtedly will be defeated, but the nations are not going to suffer defeat. The fighting

power of the army may burst, but the force of the national consciousness shall never break, particularly after going through the hardening process of this gigantic struggle. The defeated armies will take the honor, the tradition of accomplished feats of heroism home with them, and this will give them the possibility of a speedy regeneration after defeat. This is a fact of most decisive importance, because it determines the ability of preparing for revenge should the future treaty of peace be a treaty of brutality and injury to any of the two sides.

The problem of permanent peace requires that the idea of physical victory should yield before the idea of justice. Therefore, neither the hatred against England nor the hatred against Germany can form the basis for mutual concessions and demands. Hatred is nothing else but a form of moral blindness, and blindness can never lead political wisdom. Blindness bears errors, and an error can never be a substitute for truth. Hatred, moreover, is a powerful breeder of lies, and nothing undermines national health as much as an orgy of lies. This is a weapon which is no less deadly to the interests of civilization than the firearms, and the barbarism of lying is one of the greater, if not the greatest barbarism. The program of future peace must be free from this method of fighting. Truth and actualities must be the slogans of just peace; this is the only way to be taken in order that the interests of humanity could dominate over the selfishness of states and nations.

Over the window in the large meeting room of the Peace Palace at The Hague, the following inscription can be read:

"Si vis pacem, para iustitiam."

Let us hope that the victory in this frightful war will be the victory of the idea of justice. It is possible that the

future peace congress, which will sit as a tribunal over the sufferings of nations and which will construct the foundation for the history of the twentieth century, will meet in this very room of the Peace Palace at The Hague. Let us hope that when the peace congress disbands the world will be able to exclaim:

“Glory be to the humanity and peace to the nations of good will.”

Chapter II

THE TURKISH QUESTION

CHAPTER II.—THE TURKISH QUESTION

The present European war was started for the sake of the freedom of nations. The permanence of future peace must also be based on the same principle. This, however, is a difficult and tangled question with regard to its just solution.

In the beginning of October of last year, the British Prime Minister Asquith proclaimed the principle that "the weak have rights and that the strong have duties."* This, however, did not prevent England from joining hands a month later, in November, with France and Russia for the purpose of destroying the independence of Turkey, in spite of the fact that Turkey was and still is "weak." The present European war is conducted in the name of the liberty of nations, nevertheless, the partition of Turkey for the purpose of destroying its liberty has been decided upon. There must be, therefore, some tragic misunderstanding in the entire matter.

As a matter of fact, the world fails to understand Turkey as a nation. Turkey is not a European nation; different historical elements were active in making up Turkey. Turkey is the last wave which the Islam has thrown on the shore of Europe. Turks were the same element in the Balkans as the Arabs were in Spain; the Turks have selected the shorter road to Europe which was in vain tried by the Arabs; this road led through Constantinople, which was the capital of the Eastern Roman empire and which survived, while the migration of nations destroyed Rome itself. The idea of the Roman empire, the "Holy Empire," was since so much more identified in the eyes of the Asiatic nations with the throne of the Sultans of Constantinople. The day when Constantinople fell was an epoch in the

* Speech of October 3, 1914.

history of the Islam, which thus conquered the crown of Constantine the Great. The traditions of Rome and those of Mecca became thus united and the conceptions of the Khalif and of Cæsar amalgamated themselves in the political consciousness of the Asiatic masses and began to form a close historical relationship. A racial relationship, however, was close enough not to hamper these processes.

The Turks were very well aware of the charm which this imperial crown had for the people of Asia. Soliman the Magnificent assumed the title of Emperor and denied the right of this title to Charles V, although in the latter's domains the sun was never setting. "His successors were once preceded through the streets of Constantinople by twelve officers bearing straws aloft, a faint semblance of the consular fasces that had escorted Quintius or Fabius through the Roman forum."* This was in the middle of the sixteenth century, or, in other words, almost a thousand years after the downfall of Rome in the West, and fifteen hundred years after the victory of Cæsar over Pompeius at Pharsalia. Asia has recognized the new condition of things; in her eyes this incident meant nothing else but a change of the dynasty on the throne of the emperors. There was even triumph and rejoicing over the fact that the Islam, the child of Asia, was able to get a hold of the imperial purple. From then on Constantinople became still more holy, because it became the "garden of the Khalif." The importance of Turkey as a state grew immensely; the Sultan was, prior to the conquest of Constantinople, only the "shadow of the Prophet." In Constantinople the glory of the imperial crown fell on the Sultan's head and in this new character of its majesty,

* James Bryce: "The Holy Roman Empire," page 421, New York, the Macmillan Company, 1911.

Turkey, situated on the shore of Europe, survived the entire period of modern history.

Needless to say, this did not fail to have influence and deep effect on the political consciousness of the Asiatic masses. All those who are familiar with the conditions on the Asiatic continent are well aware of the fact that the Sultan even in our day is not only the Khalif, but also the "shadow of Rome" for the people of Western Asia.* When, during the Balkan war, a rumor reached Asia that the Bulgarians had entered Constantinople, it seemed for a while that complete anarchy and ruin would sweep Turkey from the surface of the globe. The victorious battle on the Tjataldja lines which was won by the Turks saved not only Constantinople as a strategical point, but also saved the Turkish state in Asia and insured its existence as the continuation of the empire of Rome. Soon another triumph came to the Turks, the retaking of Adrianople, which contained the tombstones of the first European Sultans. Thus, the prestige of Turkey was saved from destruction and once more the "shadow of Rome" was victorious. The peace treaty of Bucharest did not kill Turkey as a state, but healed it, because it solved the problem of nationalities in the Balkans. Since this problem of nationalities in the Balkan peninsula became exclusively a Bulgaro-Serbo-Greek problem, Turkey has to some extent ceased to be a European country notwithstanding the fact that Constantinople still lies on the European side of the Bosphorus. Turkey can be wounded mortally only by losing Constantinople, because this would be at the same time a blow to the political consciousness of Asiatic Turkey, and because it would destroy the synthesis of the Khalifat and of the Cæsarian purple of the Sultan. The Turkish state was based on this very synthesis and can-

* "Turkey in Europe and Asia," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 11

not do without it; it is, therefore, necessary to kill first the "shadow of Rome" before killing Turkey.

Previous to the Turks' entering Constantinople, the latter had been the seat of eastern Asiatic—Christian separatism and thus became the seat of the schism, and the forming place of the Oriental Church. At the head of this Church was the patriarch of Constantinople, and just as there were two Roman emperors for a while, there were now two popes; one of them was the legal successor of St. Peter, while the other one resided closer to Palestine, the cradle of Christianity. One of them prevailed in the West, while the other held sway over the East. It was in itself the same historical process, the combination of the cosmopolitan Christianity, with a universal Roman empire. The idea of the "world-church" and the idea of a "world-state" completed each other, both in the West and in the East. The division which sprang from this was only a division of territory in the conception of the "Holy empire," and not a division of the idea itself. In theory this process was the same, but as far as its results are concerned, the break proved to be a deeper one. The Orient has never questioned the priority of the imperial crown before the mitre of the patriarch. In the West the papal tiara struggled against the imperial crown for priority of the "spiritual sword" before the "lay sword." The eastern patriarch was the shadow of the emperor.* In the West the Roman emperor had to make pilgrimages from time to time to the papal Canossa. When Rome fell, yielding to the flood of the migration of nations, the papacy was able to substitute the glory of the papal tiara for that of the imperial crown; Odoaker succeeded in liquidating the material side of the western Roman empire, but the charm

* James Bryce, l. c., page 338.

exercised by the idea of this empire was stronger than all the invasions of the barbarian nations. This charm was so strong that even Bonifatious VIII, in 1300, when thousands of pilgrims assembled in Rome for the famous jubilee year, appeared before the people wearing a crown on his head, a sword attached to his side, and a sceptre in hand, and publicly spoke from the height of the papal throne, "I am Cæsar—I am Emperor."* Under these conditions a peace between the tiara of the popes and the crown of the re-established Roman Empire could never be a permanent one, and, therefore, the struggle between the empire and the papacy was the main characteristic feature of the Middle Ages in Europe. On different occasions the pope in the name of obedience to God publicly demanded the people to disobey emperors and kings. The result of this was the defeat of the papacy, and the political expression of it was the creation of a modern state, which gave birth to all the European nations. All these elements, however, which were the source of the emancipation of European states and nations, did not exist in the East and, hence, the European nations are so different from the states and nations of the Orient.

This is to a certain extent a paradox, but it still contains a lot of truth—that the Islam in its political psychology was closer to Constantinople than western or central Europe. The Islam was primarily a religious movement, from which emanated subsequently political configurations such as Arabia, at first, then Turkey, until finally all of them united under the sceptre of the Sultans of Constantinople. The emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire was not only a sovereign of the state, but was at the same time the head of the

* James Bryce, l. c., page 109.

Orthodox Church. The Sultan, on the other hand, was not only the head of the Moslem Church but also of the Moslem state. In the first case the state was older than the Orthodox Church, in the second case again the militant Moslem Church was older than the Turkish state. This was, however, only a difference of age and not a difference in structure. In both cases the church organization was a component part of the state and remained so. The Church was the state, or the state was the Church. The Orient did not go through the experience of the struggle between the Church and the state, and this fact is the basic feature of the political history of the Orient.

The traditions of Constantinople were preserved until our day by Turkey in Asia and by Russia in Eastern Europe. Russia has taken from Constantinople its religion and the form of state organization. Until our day, the Czar appoints the Oberprokurator of the Holy Synod, who is the chief of the religious life of Russia; the Sultan appoints the Sheik-ul-Islam, who is the chief of the religious life of Turkey. The Turkish Church and the Orthodox Church have essentially the same political character, because they both were influenced by Constantinople. The lay power regulates from the height of the throne the religious life of the country, and the Church is the spine of the state. "The Russians who are as much a religious as a political community, carry with them over the vast space of Northern and Central Asia the traditions of an Empire conterminous with the Church, an Empire which is at once the offspring and the guardian of the Orthodox faith."* This is the characteristic feature which differentiates Russia from Europe and brings the former closer to Asia.† Europe was

* James Bryce, l. c., page 351.

† "The Eastern Question," page 4, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914.

brought up in the traditions of Rome, while Russia, the Balkan Peninsula and Asia were brought up in the traditions of Constantinople. If the Russian nation already is so much different from the rest of Europe, there is hardly any reason why one should wonder that the Turks are so much more different. No one can say that Russia is not a nation, although her civilization is so much different from the civilization of Europe, its origin being exclusively Constantinople and not Rome. In the same way nobody can say that Turkey is not a nation, although Turkey was the result of historical conditions entirely different from ours. Another fact is to be credited to Turkey, and this is that the Islam has brought a portion of the creative elements into the civilization of the world in spite of the fact that the activity of the Islam traveled over the deserts of Asia and Africa, and not over the fertile grounds of Europe. The Arabian schools in Spain have enabled Europe to absorb the teaching of Aristotle. The Islam has not only burned down the library of Alexandria, but it also made public the philosophy of Averroes. St. Thomas of Aquinas based his philosophy on the system of Aristotle, and he is the one who represents the acme of the scholastical philosophy. Turkey absorbed and digested the entire spiritual products of the Islam. It is erroneous to judge Turkey by our standards. It cannot be concealed that Turkey never learned how to do civilizatory work on a larger, world-embracing scale, but this does not mean that Turkey has ceased to develop as a nation. Nowadays the Turkish nation stands armed to the teeth and fights for the maintenance of its independence. Under the walls of Constantinople the Turks fight better to-day than at Kumanovo, or Lule Burgas in the last Balkan war. The soldiers of France, of England and of Russia are certainly not inferior to the Serbian, Bulgarian and

Greek soldiers, but the Turks nowadays fight for the defence of the principle of nationality and not against it, as they did in the Balkan war, because they fight for their own independence. This is the reason why Turkey proved to be so weak from the point of view of imperialistic policy, and still shows to-day enough strength, health, enthusiasm, sacrifice, and heroism from the point of view of nationality. The Turkey of to-day is young, progressive, constitutional, eager to be regenerated, and triumphant over the internal despotism. During the short breathing spells in this frightful war, when the roar of guns subsides for a while, the conscience of the world must be confronted by the question whether the present European war is in fact a war for freedom and equal rights for all nations?

The main adversary of Turkish independence is Russia. It has been an old dream of Peter the Great to gain for Russia an estuary on the Mediterranean. Catherine the Second strained all the resources of her country in order to bring Russia closer to the realization of this dream. This was the so-called "Greek Project," Russia being the incarnation of the "Greek Church," and as such considering herself a lawful heir to the inheritance that could be left by the Turks at Constantinople. "Professing the creed of Constantinople, Russia claims the crown of the Eastern Cæsars."* This is a statement of a historian and politician of the importance of James Bryce, the former Ambassador of Great Britain to the United States. The Orthodox faith has anteceded the Turks in Constantinople, and Russia is bent at present on wresting the sceptre of the Cæsars out of the hands of the Islam. This is the struggle between the Islam and the Orthodox faith for the inheritance of Rome

* James Bryce, l. c., page 421.

in Asia. Islam is in the defensive, the Orthodox faith is the attacking party. As a program, this is only a variation of imperialism and not of nationality. The idea of religion is the determining factor of Russian ambition. Russia does not have any other points of attack, neither from the historical nor the legal point of view. Constantinople was never a part of Russia and the Turk ruled on the Bosphorus for nearly five hundred years. The conquest of Constantinople was once upon a time the triumph of Turkish imperialism; the conquest of Constantinople by Russia would mean the triumph of Russian imperialism. No illusion of any kind should be entertained as to the terms of permanent peace when considering conscientiously, justly and with a spirit of responsibility.

The general belief of the world is that Russia is prompted mainly by economical reasons. In case of war Russian commerce suffers undoubtedly through the closing of the Straits of Constantinople. The Dardanelles is the only route of export from the Black Sea and the south of Russia, where the latter country's agricultural life is concentrated, and where she keeps her huge stores of corn grown in Podolia and Ukraina. The exportation of oil mined in the enormous wells of Caucasus, particularly the exportation from Batum and Noworossiysk, is made over the same route through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Four and a half thousand ships of a combined tonnage of 7,000,000 tons carry the merchandise over the Black Sea within one year. Owing to this fact the harbor of Constantinople is one of the largest ports of the globe, and can be compared with London, Antwerp and Hamburg. It is sufficient to state that the tonnage of ships which, during 1913, entered and cleared at Constantinople exceeded the gross tonnage of 17,000,000 tons.*

* "The Statesman's Year-book," Macmillan & Co., London, 1915.

This, however, does not alter the facts. In times of peace the Straits are open to Russian merchant ships; the question of passage in times of war, to which Russia is not a party, is a question of the freedom of the seas and Straits for neutral vessels, and is by no means the question of tearing away by force a right, resting with somebody else. The closing of the Straits not only harms Russian commerce, but it also harms American commerce. But does this constitute a title for the United States to take Constantinople away from the Turks? This would be a *reductio ad absurdum*. The damages suffered by the Russian commerce are by far greater and by far more harmful, but this only gives more right to Russia to try to obtain regulation by treaty of the question of the freedom of the seas and Straits for neutral vessels in times of war. The program that Russia chose was a different one; it was the program of imperialism. Russia does not care about safeguarding by treaties the principle of freedom of the seas and of the Straits to neutral vessels, but it tries to occupy Constantinople in order to close it up still more tightly and fortify it for her own benefit and to the detriment of other countries. This endeavor Russia calls her "historical mission"—the religious mission of the tsarate. This, however, cannot conceal the fact that this is a program of conquest and expansion, a program of imperialism, and it is, therefore, in contradiction with the program of the present war.

The Russian imperialism manifested itself as soon as an Anglo-French fleet approached Constantinople. Elated over the first triumphs of the Russian arms in Armenia, Goremykin, the prime minister of Russia, publicly declared in the Duma that the "historical future of Russia acquires more distinct outlines over there on the shores of the Black Sea, and at the walls of Constantinople." This happened on July

9, 1915.* Members of the Duma of all political parties joined in supporting the prime minister. The leader of the Opposition, Milukoff, a member of the Kadet Party, expressed his positive conviction that the "reaching of the main goal, viz., the Straits and Constantinople, shall in proper time be secured by diplomatic means as well as military action." Savienko was applauded for the phrase that—"this great and brilliant achievement is worth living, fighting, and dying for." Their reactionary member, Levaszoff, did not betray any doubt that "the shield of Russia should be attached to the gates of Constantinople and that the Orthodox cross should once more shine over the St. Sophia." The utterances of the press and at public meetings were no less bold and explicit than the speeches of the members of the Duma. According to the "statement of the program," which was read off by F. Aristoff, at a Slav reunion in Moscow,† the consequences of the present war "should be the extending of the Russian territory to its natural geographical and strategical boundary, including annexation of Armenia with an estuary to the Mediterranean opposite the Island of Cyprus, the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, together with Constantinople." Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy expressed himself without any "strategical" circumlocutions that the "idea of St. Sophia is the idea of a Christian Universal Empire."‡ Is there any need for more proofs that the question of Constantinople is the question of imperialism with Russia? Kinglake very justly estimated the political psychology of Russia, when he stated years ago that "the statesmen of St. Petersburg have always understood the

* Reports of the Russian press of the meetings of the Duma.

† "Gazeta Warszawska," January, 1915.

‡ "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 3, 1915.

deep import of the change which the throne of Constantine would bring with it.”*

Prior to the outbreak of the Crimean war, when the Russian armies crossed the Pruth, Czar Nicholas I issued a manifesto in which he stated that, “It is known to all our faithful subjects that the defence of the Orthodox religion was from time immemorial the vow of our glorious forefathers.”† In reply to the intervention of England and France, when the Crimean war had already become a fact, Czar Nicholas I proclaimed in a second manifesto that “Russia fights not for the things of this world, but for the Faith—for the Orthodox faith. But Russia will not alter her divine mission.”‡ Both manifestoes were read in the churches all over the empire. This mission, understood in that way, has created the conception of the “Holy Russia” as a counterpart of the idea of the “Holy Empire.” The imperialism obtained the sanction of the religion; Constantinople as “the capital of the Orthodox Church” shall become the capital of the holy and great Russia. The limits of the “Holy” imperialism must of necessity be monstrous. Domination over the Straits, as Kinglake says, “leads through the heart of an empire into the midst of that world of which men kindle thoughts when they speak of the Ægean and of Greece, and the Jonian shores and of Palestine and Egypt and of Italy and of France, and of Spain and the land of the Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond, and the path of ships on the ocean.”§ This scope of feverish dreams is a very good description, because the limits of Rome reached in fact

* A. W. Kinglake: “The Invasion of the Crimea,” 1863, Vol. I, page 62.

† A. W. Kinglake, Vol. I, page 208.

‡ A. W. Kinglake, *ibidem*, Vol. I, page 298.

§ A. W. Kinglake, *ibidem*, Vol. I, page 57.

as far as the frontiers of India. As a scope of immediate endeavors of Russian policy, it is obviously an exaggeration. But there remains, however, the reality of the enormous extent of the inheritance of old Rome. Constantinople as a point of departure for this inheritance opens up the road even as far as Palestine. The emperors of Rome had among others the title of "Protector of Palestine," and there is a deep reason for the attempt of the Russians to effect an insignificant landing during the present war in Jaffa. Suggestions with regard to the occupation of Palestine can be seen everywhere in the Russian press; these perspectives although distant are unavoidable, because they are the direct result of the inheritance from the Oriental Roman Empire. The question of Jerusalem is a question of historical necessity for Russia, at the very moment when Russia succeeds in planting the double cross on the dome of St. Sophia.

In order to reach this goal, Russia did not hesitate to enlist the services of a legend. The Russian people believe that an Orthodox monk, who was praying in the church of St. Sophia while the Turks entered Constantinople, is still alive in the interior of the walls of this famous church which opened miraculously to receive him. On the day when Christianity regains the church of St. Sophia, its walls will open again and the enchanted monk will be released in order to bless the victorious Czar and "Holy Russia." This is certainly a very clever imperialistic propaganda, because politics joins hands with prayer and the cross closes an alliance with the sword. It is difficult to have a grudge against Russia for this ambition of hers. It is sure on the other hand, however, that the ambitions of Russia, no matter how much hallowed by the aspergill of the Orthodox religion, can't decide the development of the world. The goal of a healthy and just endeavor should be: the lasting peace, the

destruction of imperialism, and supporting the freedom of countries and nations. Russia, unfortunately, does not believe in that; the entire Russia believes at the bottom of her heart that the conquest of Constantinople and the making of the latter the capital of great and holy Russia is a goal which must be reached "regardless of the results for Europe, humanity, liberty, and civilization."* Still there is no need to become indignant over this ambition; it does not bring any dishonor to Russia, although it menaces the peace of the world. The "divine mission" of Russia must rather be understood than condemned. All the worldly ambitions can be subordinated to the interests of humanity and even abandoned for the same reason, but "divine mission" cannot be abandoned under the penalty of a sin and eternal condemnation after death. The poor Russian Muzhik! Imbued for centuries with the idea of imperialism, he is told to wait eagerly under the penalty of hell for the downfall of Turkey. When the Russian armies crossed the Pruth, Emperor Nicholas I spoke of this as the "divine mission of Russia." If Nicholas II ever crosses the Straits, he certainly shall not fail to remember the words of his great-grandfather and undoubtedly will repeat that "Russia will not alter her divine mission." And why shouldn't he repeat these words, since this mission is Russia's tendency for the last three centuries? Nobody ever changes a victorious policy, and only silly people believe in such a possibility. Russia must, whether she wants or not, when victorious, to begin to revive the traditions of the Eastern Roman Empire. The weight of the inheritance of Rome will undoubtedly push Russia in this direction, even against the will of the present or any other Czar. The double cross on the dome of St. Sophia will be-

* N. Danilewskij: "Russia and Europe" (St. Petersburg, 1871). (In Russian.)

come the sign pointing toward Jerusalem. Over the roads traveled by the Roman legions Russian imperialism shall make its way to the frontiers of India. The question of Constantinople is not only the question of the Straits, it is something more than the question of simply driving the Turks across the Bosphorus.

The question at issue is the domination over Western Asia.

In Poland, Russia is busy "annexing purely Russian territory." Under this pretext Russia russified the district of Kholm before the war and Eastern Galicia during this war. In the Balkans Russia conducts a Pan-Slavic propaganda which is nothing else but Pan-Russianism,* because it tends to incorporate all Slavic states and nations into one organism of "Greater Russia." In such a case Roumania would have to fall, in order not to block the "natural" continuity of Slav territory, and Greece would be thrown out of Saloniki, which once upon a time was for a brief period in the hands of the Slavs. In Asia, after occupying Constantinople, Russia will begin at once to "annex Orthodox territory." Nicholas I left an example for Nicholas II, and both have inherited the program from Catherine II. The interests of the Orthodox Church which just happen to originate in the shade of the Basilica of St. Sophia shall play the same aggressive part which they did on the eve of the Crimean war. Historical, racial, and religious claims form a threefold source of Russian appetite and political expedience. All these elements are the tools of an imperialistic policy, which is used according to the needs of the moment; this is by no means degrading to Russia, but it imposes the necessity of caution because the seeds of imperialism were never the seeds of peace.

* Prof. Masaryk: "Zur russischen Geschichte und Religions Philosophie."

The defense of the independence of Turkey, and particularly the defense of the Straits and of Constantinople, from the attacks of Russia, was once a dogma of English policy. The treaty of Paris which terminated the Crimean war, proclaimed this officially because it guaranteed the integrity of Turkey. This was also the reason of the danger of the war between England and Russia in the years 1876-1878, when the Russian army stood under the walls of Constantinople and the English fleet demonstratively entered the Straits, in order to halt the triumphant progress of the Muscovites. Since that time many things have apparently changed. In Paris, Lord Palmerston defended not only the Straits but even the Black Sea and the estuary of the Danube from the appetite of Russia. Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin defended only the Straits and Constantinople. Sir Edward Grey in the present European war discarded not only the treaty of Paris but even that of Berlin. The British army and the British navy attacked Constantinople in order to turn it over to Russia. The policy of Great Britain changed its front and works diametrically against the program of Palmerston. Those times are gone forever, when Beaconsfield, going to the Congress of Berlin, was greeted at every railroad station in Germany by crowds of people and his car was literally deluged with flowers. The "Times" was elated, together with all England, that "Lord Beaconsfield's journey from the German frontier to Berlin was a veritable triumph. Nothing of the kind, however, for Prince Gortchakoff."* To-day the English press speaks of the mistakes of Palmerston and Beaconsfield and suggests that the government of Great Britain make a present of Constantinople to Russia. The enthusiasm running in this direction, or may be blindness, has gone so far that the "Times" of London, an

* The "Times," London, 1878, June 14.

organ of the Tories, representing the good old English traditions of policy with regard to the Oriental question has the courage of printing articles in which the turning over of Constantinople to Russia is considered as extremely advantageous for England, because then Russia is going to be "far more vulnerable."* The English army, and particularly the English fleet, have learned by their own dire experience to what extent the possession of Constantinople makes Turkey "vulnerable." Does Antwerp, occupied by Germany, make the latter also "far more vulnerable" because it brings Germany closer to London? It is still an open question whether the program of Lord Palmerston was a "mistake." This question will be settled at the outcome of the present war; but at any rate it is an astounding fact that nowadays Germany is defending the program of Palmerston while England seems to betray her own traditions.

England is animated by the fear for the future of the Suez Canal. England occupied Egypt "for the defense of the canal," when the internal troubles in the land of the Nile in 1881-1882 seemed to jeopardize the safety of navigation. † At present England seems to be under the illusion that "the elimination of Turkey relieves Egypt and secures communication with India."‡ The idea of the defense of the Suez Canal has always been a national idea of Great Britain. At the time of the Congress of Berlin, the leader of the Opposition, the Duke of Argyll, did not hesitate to support Beaconsfield in so far as the latter's policy involved the principle that "England will never permit at any cost that any power in Europe shall interfere with her direct access

* Sunday "Times," London, 1915, March 14.

† John Morley: "The Life of W. E. Gladstone," Book VIII, page 82.

‡ The "Westminster Gazette," 1915, April 16.

to India.”* Egypt protects the Suez Canal and the Suez Canal forms the communication with India and Australia. Deep silence reigned in the House of Lords on April 9, 1878, when on the eve of the Congress of Berlin, Beaconsfield put up the question to England: “Why not march armies in the same way and hold Egypt and the Suez Canal in the same state of trepidation as Constantinople and the Bosphorus were held at that time?”† This was a hint at the Russian armies, which began to descend the southern slopes of Armenia.

Armenia and Egypt?

At the first glance this fear seems to be far fetched, but it is real when viewed by those who are familiar with the conditions. The possession of Armenia gives the control over Western Asia; Erzerum and Erzingan dominate the northern part of Asia Minor, and Charput and Malatia control her central and southern portion. Through Bitlis and along the upper part of Tiger a road leads from Armenia as far as Mosul; Mosul in turn is the gate to Mezopotamia. Another road leads from Charput through Djarbekir as far as Aleppo, which again is the gate to Syria. Domination over Armenia and Khurdistan means the strategical domination over the main roads leading to Asia Minor, Mezopotamia, and Syria. Russia is perfectly well aware of the meaning of this fact; having conquered Kars, she tries now to conquer Erzerum and from there through the Khurdistan, and Khilikia tries to open a window to the Mediterranean. The estuary of the Russian plans in Armenia is Alexandretta on the Bay of Iskanderun opposite the Island of Cyprus. The occupation of Cyprus by England had precisely the purpose of putting the hand on the approach to Alexan-

* The “Times,” London, 1878, Speech of March 17.

† The “Times,” London, 1878.

dretta and thus barring the Russian access to the Suez Canal. Beaconsfield made the occupation of Cyprus dependent on the occupation of Kars in Armenia by Russia. Without excluding the sovereignty of the Sultan, England pledged herself to occupy Cyprus as long as Kars shall be occupied by Russia. This fact is an excellent illustration of England's fear that the occupation of the roads of Armenia by Russia would bring the latter, through Mosul, closer to Mezopotamia and through Aleppo and Alexandretta closer to Syria and Egypt. The Russian advance through Armenia against Turkey, is equal to the formation of a basis for a future advance against Syria and from there, there is but one step to Egypt. The future of Armenia and of Khurdistan is closely identified with the future of the Suez Canal. Egypt will be sufficient for protecting the Suez Canal from Turkey, but it will be inadequate to protect the latter from Russia, the moment the latter enters Constantinople and breaks through the natural barrier of the Armenian highlands.

England goes at present through a period of her history in which she transforms her colonies into states within a state. India, Canada, and Australia have already reached this stage of evolution. It is now Africa's turn; Egypt in the north and Cape Town in the south form the new political center on the African continent. The railroad connection from Cape Town to Cairo requires an additional railroad connection between Cairo and Calcutta. This plan, however, requires the conquest of Mezopotamia and Arabia in order to gain an immediate connection between Egypt and southern Persia where, by virtue of an agreement of 1907, Russia abandoned all her claims for the benefit of England, and for the price of northern Persia has foregone temporarily her railroad plans in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Under these conditions the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta could

run exclusively through territories subjected to English control. In order to increase the fertility of the countryside, through which the railroad line from Egypt to India was to run, English ingenuity has long before the war elaborated plans of irrigation and improvements through colonization of the neglected, but once upon a time exceedingly fertile stretches of the country alongside of the Euphrates and the Tiger.* The main prompting motives are of commercial and civilizatory nature, but have above all a strategical meaning of facilitating and increasing the ability of self-defense of England's colonial dominions in Asia and in Africa. This is the purpose which is supposed to console England for her abandoning the policy of Lord Palmerston and Lord Beaconsfield. For the price of Mezopotamia, Arabia and of the Cairo-Calcutta railroad, England tries to think actually of the dismemberment of Turkey in partnership with Russia and France. In such a case Russia would fulfill the first part of her "divine mission," and would enter not only Constantinople, but through Armenia, Khurdistan, and Khilikia into the gulf of Iskanderun. The remaining portion of Asia Minor could easily be distributed among Italy, Greece, and—Turkey, because even the latter's enemies cannot conceal the fact that Anatolia is "essentially"† Turkish and the population is "good and peaceful."‡ Syria is intended for France when the contemplated partition of Turkey shall materialize. The Jesuits conducted for a number of years a civilizatory work in Syria for the benefit of France, for which even the socialist, Herve, calls them very reverently "The Fathers." Compared with the shares of Russia and England, Syria is

* Schemes of Willcock.

† "Turkey in Europe and Asia," page 19, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914.

‡ New York "Times," May 9, 1915—Gustave Herve: "What is To Be Done with Turkey?" Reprint from "La Guerra Sociale."

rather a small gain for France, which is menaced by enormous financial losses in case of Turkey's dismemberment, because 60 per cent. of the Ottoman debt represents Turkey's indebtedness to France. The settlement of the bill, however, is intended to be made at the expense of Germany. France hopes to get back Alsace and Lorraine and German colonies in Western Africa. German East Africa is included, however, in the sphere of English interests, because it borders on the Lake of Tanjanjika and strategically menaces the railroad line from Cape Town to Cairo and the continuation of this line from Cairo to Calcutta. In case of trouble, in the Moslem world, because of the dismemberment of Turkey, the public opinion of England contemplates the transfer of the seat of the Khalifat to Egypt.* Cairo is nearer to Mecca than Constantinople. That means to a certain extent the completion of the entire plan, which seems to tally in the eyes of England with the end of the "Oriental Question," while, as a matter of fact, such a solution would mean nothing else but the end of the first act of this drama.

The transferring of the Khalifat to Egypt is an undertaking of a very doubtful nature. The old time fanaticism has died out nowadays in the Islamic world. The importance of the Sultan is not based as much upon his purely spiritual dignity, but on the connection of this spiritual dignity with the splendor of the imperial crown. The transferring of the Khalifat to Egypt would in the eyes of the Asiatic nations mean the dethronization of the Islam. Such a promotion of the Sultan of Egypt at such a price would be nothing else but purely an ornament and political fiction, which is not worth even as much as the bones of one English soldier. The question of the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta pre-

* "Manchester Guardian," Article on the "Future of Turkey," by Sir W. Ramsay, April, 1915.

sents a materially different aspect. Arabia and Mezopotamia would shield Egypt as soon as England would settle in both countries, and it would mean at the same time a uniform stretch of territory for a connection between India and South Africa through Egypt and the Sudan. The whole transaction is very tempting at first sight, although the value of such a railroad is rather doubtful when we consider the lower cost of sea transportation through the Suez Canal. England is confronted by enormous possibilities of colonial expansion and civilizatory work. The only question is whether the entire deal is not a little too expensive.

The railroad from Cairo to Calcutta is not a very safe enterprise in the long run. This railroad can be carried out only at the price of admitting Russia to a partition of Turkey. This means *ipso facto* the admission of Russia to the shores of the Mediterranean, both through the Dardanelles and the Gulf of Iskanderun. The internal necessity of the Russian imperialism will then raise the question of the domination of Western Asia on account of the inheritance of the Eastern Roman empire. The holy pilgrimages of Russia to Christ's grave in Jerusalem and the rolling rouble will at once start to prepare the ground. Owing to the possession of Armenia, Russia will take strategical advantages of the roads to Mezopotamia and Syria. Erzingan, Charput and Malatia will become the key of the situation. Under such conditions the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta shall not have great strategical importance. Russia will be able to destroy at any time the road along the northern boundary of Persia and interrupt the overland communication of India with Egypt. Through northern Persia the attack is very easy because of a long front line. It is so easy in fact that a band of desperadoes can at any time destroy the track or blow up the bridges and tunnels. Money can always be found in

Russia for such a purpose. The defense of the railroad line from Egypt is equally difficult because both in Mesopotamia and in Syria there will always be the danger of a flank attack of the Russian armies through Armenia. After ten years of Russian domination in Armenia, Khurdistan, and Khilikia, the Russian general staff will undoubtedly build a military railroad through the main mountain passes and valleys. An attack on Russia from the side of Syria and Mesopotamia will always be very difficult and very risky owing to the mountain fortifications, while Russian offensive movement down the valley of the Euphrates and the Tiger, or through Aleppo towards Palestine and Egypt, will be easy. Lord Beaconsfield was not mistaken when he feared that the Russian armies might threaten the Suez Canal through Armenia, because they threatened along the same road the entire Asiatic Turkey. The price for which England wants to build the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta is positively too high. It is a very risky undertaking, still more so because Lord Palmerston's political formula of "peaceful penetration" with the maintenance of the integrality of Turkey does not exclude the plan of the railroad Cairo-Calcutta. Russia, on the other hand, after occupying Armenia and Constantinople will at once begin to pray to her Orthodox God to permit her to finish her "holy mission," and plant the double cross on the grave of the Saviour in Jerusalem. The Russian legend shall again place in the walls of the Holy Grave Church some Russian monk anxiously waiting for the day of the Russian troops entering Jerusalem.

There was a deep reason for the Russian attempt to land in Jaffa during this present war.

Turkey is not able to conduct a policy of imperialism. On the east it borders with Persia where the Anglo-Russian

treaty set up the boundaries of their respective interests, excluding Turkey from all participation. Turkey will not venture without absolute necessity and alone a war with Russia and England, on account of Persia, which does not present for Turkey any such benefit that would make it worth while for Turkey to risk her own independence. To the south there is the Persian Gulf, the Arabic Sea, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Turkey does not have sufficient tradition on the seas and she has nothing to gain there. In the West, Constantinople only, together with the fortified line of Tjatalja and Adrianople was left to Turkey. The Balkan war has removed Turkey from the national struggles in the Balkans. Nobody can nowadays conduct a policy against the principle of nationalism for any length of time, and this is still more true of Turkey in regard to Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro. A guarantee thereof is given by the strategical character of the Turkish boundaries in Europe. No offensive movement on a large scale can be started from the line running through Adrianople, Tjatalja and Gallipoli. The strategical character of the frontiers of European Turkey is purely defensive since the treaty of Bucharest. There still remains the Egyptian frontier on the line of contact between Asia and Africa. The geographical conditions of Sinai make the defence of Egypt from the East very easy, and attack very difficult. The conditions of Turkish offensive in the direction of the Suez Canal require enormous sacrifices, particularly if the defense of the Suez Canal rests with a strong and well supplied power. These facts decide the problem of Western Asia in favor of maintaining the independence of Turkey. The domination of the Turks in Constantinople neutralizes to some extent Western Asia with reference to European powers. Turkey does not need and cannot embark on a

policy of imperialism from the shores of the Bosphorus. The conditions are different with Russia. Even a rejuvenated Turkey and with a constitutional form of government cannot become a menace to Egypt. The renaissance of Turkey is at the same time an emancipation of her national strength. Any step in this direction will weaken the tutelage of Germany by rendering it superfluous. The rejuvenation of Turkey means a loss in the first place to Russia and in the second place to Germany, while for England there remains a status quo, because the neighborhood of Turkey will never be as dangerous to the Suez Canal as the proximity of Russia would be after the latter has crossed the Straits and the Armenian mountains. It is impossible to transport the Suez Canal to the moon and, therefore, the one who is less dangerous is the better neighbor, and for this reason the formula of Lord Palmerston does not cease to be binding for England in spite of the fact that Sir Edward Grey apparently has ridden himself of this axiom. For the prize of immediate gain nobody with a sound mind will expose his nation to bankruptcy in the future. So much less England can be directed over this road—England, which gave a decided political character to many centuries and filled half the world with the work of her genius.

The danger in case of a victory of Russia is a very real one. A new, terrible weapon of naval warfare came into prominence in this war. This weapon is the submarine which caused a new era in the technique of naval warfare. Within the next few years the improvement of submarines will become a fact which will make the conditions of competition on the sea equal to all the powers. Never since the battle at Trafalgar had Europe such a chance against the English supremacy on the sea. It is impossible to be blind any longer and not to see the results of this fact for England

the very moment that Russia enters Constantinople and opens a window to the Mediterranean, somewhere opposite the Island of Cyprus. The Dardanelles and the Gulf of Iskanderun shall become the basis of operation for the Russian Mediterranean fleet. Then Russia will become "a great naval power," and even "from the Mediterranean she might be expected to expand her operations to the ocean." These are not empty apprehensions, because they were expressed by a professional man, who many times was minister of the Italian navy, Admiral Bettolo.* In case of a war with England, Russian submarines could attack the shores of Egypt, and the blockade of the Suez Canal would be by far a greater achievement than the present blockade of the English coast line by Germany. Germany gave the example and Russia will not forget it, since she has some experience in making speedy armaments. The budget of the Russian navy has increased in the years from 1909 to 1913 by 302 million roubles or by 154 per cent. At the same time the expenses of England increased only 29.6 per cent. and those of Germany 13.8 per cent. The Russian imperialism, after penetrating the Dardanelles and the Armenian Mountains, certainly will not spare sacrifices, and submarines are comparatively inexpensive.

A word to the wise is sufficient.

Russia, however, has still another weapon which is not less dangerous for England. This is Russia's frontier line in Asia. Pamir is the gate to India, and the Persian agreement made neighbors of England and Russia in the Iran. The neutrality of Persia is nothing but fiction, even in this war, and so much less could Persia separate Russia from England in case of a war between these two countries. For England, which is not a military power, these conditions pre-

* The "Evening Post," New York, April 10, 1915.

sent a very serious menace. England can blockade Germany, it can cut off her military transports and stop them with her guns at Gibraltar, even if Germany succeeds in breaking through the blockade in the North Sea. Germany and England have no frontier line, neither in Europe nor in Asia. On the other hand England cannot cut off Russia, and on the second day of the war Russian armies can start on their march toward Afghanistan, India, Persia and through Armenia over Mosul and Aleppo towards Mesopotamia and Syria. The isolation of Germany permits England to raise an army and postpone the decisive struggle until a favorable date; Russia on the other hand can force England to accept a fight because it is England's neighbor in Asia, and in a war with Russia England has no time for the raising of an army and cannot procrastinate the struggle. On the second day of the war, English troops must bar the road to the Russians in order to defend India, which is the most precious gem in the British crown. In this light, the safety of the Suez Canal becomes more imperative to-day for England than it was at the time of the Congress of Berlin. Sir Edward Grey has greater obligations in this direction than Lord Beaconsfield ever had. Beaconsfield had to defend the Suez Canal from the Russian fleet, while Sir Edward Grey must nowadays defend the Suez Canal from the piracy of Russian submarines, which will not fail to make a lightning-like appearance in the Mediterranean the very moment Russia is able to penetrate into Constantinople and force the entrance into the Gulf of Iskanderun.

It looks like a paradox, but it is a truth at the same time that for England to-day a defeat jointly with Russia is less dangerous than a joint victory with Russia for the prize of Constantinople and Alexandretta. Hence the conclusion

that the purpose of English policy and strategy in the present war seems to be a double game: To defeat Russia through Germany and to beat exhausted Germany with her own army. This is for England the only way of victory and the only way which can secure England's future. The victory of England for the prize of the victory of Russia would be a Pyrrhus victory. Constantinople is entirely too great a price to be sold to Russia by England for the price of a temporary military advantage in the war with Germany. England goes jointly with Russia as far as the military end is concerned against Germany, but politically England cannot afford to go jointly with Russia against Turkey. The question of Constantinople can by no means be a question of compromise but only a question of victory—of England or of Russia, should the liquidation of Turkey become the inevitable outcome. A deep reason prompted the attack of the Anglo-French fleet on the Dardanelles before Russia could menace Turkey from the land side. The attack of England and France on the Dardanelles began simultaneously with the defeats of Russia in Poland. England preferred to attack the Dardanelles than to accelerate the offensive move in France for the purpose of saving Russia. The Dardanelles could not be transferred to the moon for reasons of safety, and all arguments of diplomatic or financial nature cannot possibly conceal the fact that the attack on the Dardanelles after a victory in France would have much greater chances of success. From the point of view of the military situation in France and in Poland, the attack on the Dardanelles was wasting of human life and ammunition. The throwing of the same amount of troops and ammunition on the battle front near Arras, when the majority of the German army was busy attacking Lemberg, could have succeeded in piercing the German front and saving Russia from

an enormous disaster. This is perfectly easy to understand. The interest of England demanded consciously or unconsciously to leave Russia's army to its fate and to attack the Dardanelles in the meantime in order to outdistance the Russians in the race for Constantinople. England has attacked Dardanelles in order to cut the way to Suez Canal for Germans, and not with the view of giving out Constantinople to Russia. Russia has filed artificial and far-reaching claims to Constantinople, while England threw the first blood on the scales in the same question. It is a well-known fact that blood weighs heavier than claims. The program of Lord Palmerston and Lord Beaconsfield was certainly of some influence in this complicated game, although it worked unnoticed by the masses.

The arguments for the dismemberment of Turkey are very flimsy indeed. The argument that the national consciousness in Western Asia is very indistinct, does not give any right for the dismemberment of Turkey. Doing this, Europe would destroy what Turkey did not have time to accomplish. Under the domination of England, France, and Russia the national consciousness of the Asiatic masses must necessarily go back because slavery is never constructive. Why should not the masses be left in the hands of Turkey that dominated over them for centuries, and has already elaborated her traditions? Why take for the benefit of European countries the liberty from the Asiatic masses and deprive them of the hope of ever growing into a nation? In order to sweeten the pill, the Allies are promising to the masses of Asia a better administration. Turkey always had and still has many shortcomings as far as administration is concerned, but the same shortcomings are in existence in Portugal and in the South American republics. Is this, however, a reason for their dismemberment and the destruc-

tion of their independence? The lack of understanding for the autonomous aspirations is not exclusively a specialty of Turkey. Russia has still less of that understanding and a more reactionary form of government than Young Turkey. It should, furthermore, not be forgotten that on the threshold of the twentieth century England found herself on the eve of a civil war for home rule in Ireland. The sin of a centralized government is not an exclusively Turkish sin. Europe has permitted Russia to regenerate and rehabilitate herself in the eyes of the world. Why shouldn't Turkey be given the same chance? Isn't it true that the slogans of the present war are the two principles: "The equality of states," and "the equality of rights."* While the bombardment of the Dardanelles by the English fleet was going on, Sir Edward Grey declared from the speaker's chair that England champions in the present war the freedom of the nations, regardless "whether they be great states or small states."† All this seems to be some tragic misunderstanding, because at this particular moment nobody has a right to say lies.

There still remains the main argument. The Turks represent the Islam while Russia, France and England represent Christianity. Because of an antagonism against the Islam the entire world is silent, when in the name of freedom of nations a partition of Turkey is contemplated. The question of nationalities ceased long ago to be the question of God; the Middle Ages as well as the period of religious wars has passed forever. The calamity of Europe was in times gone by the maxim: "*Cuius regio, eius religio*"; the maxim: "*Cuius religio, eius regio*" will by no means be a lesser evil. This is properly the basis on which Russia is founding her

* L. Cecil Jane: "The Nations At War," London, 1914.

† Bechstein Hall, March 22, 1915.

claims to Constantinople and Jerusalem, because the state religion of Russia happened to originate on the Bosphorus. The domination of Russia never reached these regions, and the population inhabiting Constantinople and Jerusalem has no racial community with Russia. Russia's appetite is nothing else but an imperialistic fever, highly dangerous to the peace of Europe. Imperialism never was a basis for the permanent peace and it never shall be. So much less Russian imperialism because it has donned the vestment of the Orthodox Church, and religious imperialism has always been the worst form. The entrance of Russia to Constantinople would be the crowning feat of the principle—"*Cuius religio, eius regio*," and the ground for future aggressive wars.

The twentieth century cannot afford to propagate the idea of "*Cuius religio, eius regio*." It can do it much less because in Russia the political reaction and the Orthodox Church form the two sides of one and the same matter. The Orthodox Church supports the despotism of the Czar and the latter protects the Orthodox Church from the influences of constitutionalism and the progress of Western Europe. The Russian Duma is but a fiction of the constitution, a fig leaf which conceals the rotten condition of things. The Duma does not participate in government and is, properly speaking, only a consultant body for the government, which without any reservation whatsoever is exclusively subordinated to the will of the despotic Czar. The democratic strata of society have a very limited representation, because the reactionary system of elections bars them from the Duma. These are the facts which war time sentiments should not obscure to the eyes of our conscience. The current of freedom foundered and still founds in Russia—on the rocks of the Orthodox Church. The victory of

Orthodoxy can under these conditions never accelerate the victory of the principle of civic freedom in Russia, because only the defeat of Orthodoxy can facilitate the defeat of the reaction and despotism in Eastern Europe. The day of Russia's entering Constantinople would constitute a triumph for the Orthodox Church and would delay, not accelerate, the day of liberty for Russia's people. Russia is by no means a peevish child that can stop bothering his entourage for the price of a piece of candy. Therefore, is there any sense in expecting that Russia, after having accomplished the dream of Peter the Great, Catherine II and Nicholas I, should change the character of the state? Nobody changes and nobody can afford to change a victorious policy. Peter the Great, Catherine II and Nicholas I not only suffered from the fever of imperialism, but they were at the same time the pillars of reaction and despotism. The entering of Constantinople will mean a triumph for Russian reaction and not the beginning of a change; Orthodoxy in Russia is still strong enough and too strong that the day of its triumph should mean the day of its future suicide. The partition of Turkey prompted by antagonism toward Islam is from this point of view politically absurd.

The participation in the war of England and France against Germany has raised the importance of Russia in the public opinion of Western Europe and of America. Unfortunately Russia has been put on the same level as England and France. Hatred against Germany helped to develop an apotheosis for Russia. This is quite plausible from the point of view of pure hatred towards Germany, but never from the point of view of justice and truth.

I—The program of Western Europe is nationalism; the program of Russia is imperialism.

II—The program of Western Europe is the expansion of the freedom of nations; the program of Russia is the expansion in the name of the idea: "*Cuius religio, eius regio.*"

III—The program of Western Europe is the evolution of the individuality of nations; the program of Russia is the obliterating of the individuality for the benefit of a race or rather of the Slavic Pan-Russianism.

IV—The program of Western Europe tends towards making constitutionalism and progress permanent; the program of Russia is to make political reaction permanent through the triumph of Orthodoxy.

Russia participates in this war in order to gain enough power for destroying what Western Europe promises to bring about at the expense of the blood spilled in this war. For England and France the participation of Russia in the war against Germany is only a matter of passing military alliance. The respective governments are perfectly well aware of this fact and only the interested nations fail to comprehend it. Blind hatred against Germany takes advantage of this situation and drives average public opinion to an apotheosis of Russia on the basis of equality with England and France. In fact, there is no equality of merits, because there is no equality of programs. On the battlefields of the present war not only the question of German imperialism is fought, but also the question of Russian imperialism. Whoever, in order to hurt Germany, wants to turn Constantinople over to Russia, is blinded by hatred and unconsciously plays into the hands of Germany, because he secures for the latter a revenge ally when England succeeds to win the war at the highest price to be paid, which means at

the price of a victory of Russia. It is a political mistake to form political ideas so as to fit the temporary military interests of England and France, and credit Russia in return for her participation against Germany with virtues, which she never possessed and does not possess at present.

Falsehood can never be a torch of progress.

The parallelism of the Russian defeats in Poland and of the wasting of human life and ammunition in the Dardanelles, together with the complete absence of any offensive movement in France, was explained by lack of ammunition and sufficient superiority in numbers. This is, however, a very interesting document. The battle at Arras in the spring was fought at the same time as the battle at Lemberg, where Russia suffered a heavy blow, because the loss of Lemberg undermined the popularity of the war among the Russian masses. It is an exaggeration but it is true to a certain extent that behind the scenes of the war of England against Germany there is an unofficial war going on between England and Russia for Constantinople. The program of Lord Palmerston still molds the future of England just as it used to mold her past. There is no question that the policy of Sir Edward Grey uses at present different ways and different means. It is even hard to suppose that the English government should put the question in this form. The logic of facts, however, is stronger than the logic of Sir Edward Grey. England must defeat Russia through Germany and must herself in turn defeat Germany if she wants to win at all and forever. Whether this materializes under the conscious leadership of Grey or without his being aware of the fact, is of but secondary importance. England has no choice, and must either win or lose in accordance with her entire tradition of Oriental policy. In both cases England will come out of the war with honors. In case of victory it shall

shed new glory on the Union Jack, and in case of defeat it shall appease the English conscience with conviction that duty has been done. The duty of England, however, has two fronts. Its first and official front is the front against Germany. Its second and unofficial one, is the front against Russia.

"Alea iacta est."

The world has grown accustomed to consider Turkey as the "sick man of Europe." It has been overlooked, however, that in Turkey revolution has swept away civic slavery and the peace of Bucharest has abolished the slavery of nations. This fact cannot be obliterated by old journalistic yarns which do not shrink from saying a lie when it comes to facilitate the progress of Russian imperialism. The very moment when the work of regeneration of Turkey was begun, the present war broke out; Russia has decided to finish Turkey instead of curing her. This is certainly a fine example of political therapeutics.

Turkey, however, has passed successfully the examination of her maturity. Not everything in Turkey can be explained by Germany's aid. It is true that Turkey derives a great advantage, as far as armaments, money and professional advice is concerned, from her alliance with Germany, but there is a still greater portion of truth in the fact that Turkey wants to and knows how to derive these benefits. Nobody will derive any benefit from arms supplied by somebody else in case the soldier, who has to use these arms is not fond of them for the sake of the idea that he has to defend with these weapons. Turkey fights consciously and willingly for the defense of her independence and it is a question of luck, rather than of anything else, that she is able to avail herself of Germany's help.

In the face of these facts, the conscience of the world

must pronounce itself in favor of Turkey. It is high time to begin to be honest with regard to the slogans of the present war, which is supposed to be a war conducted in the name of liberty. The permanence and justice of coming peace treaty requires imperatively that :

I—The independence of Turkey be maintained, and Russia not admitted to Constantinople ;

II—That guarantees of autonomy be given to Armenia, Syria, and Arabia within the structure of the Turkish Empire and within the frames of the general Turkish constitution.

There have been and there are unjust wars and unjust peace treaties. History, however, is just in the perspective of the ages. The Nemesis avenges mistakes and faults. The partition of Turkey, in so far as Russia can force it upon Europe, will be one of the acts which will not bring honor to humanity. Following the flag of the liberty of nations one cannot afford to destroy the liberty of the Turkish nation. It would mean throwing the seed of hurricane which may be delayed but which would be bound to come some day and bring revenge for the crime against nationalism.

History is just in the perspective of ages, although at times it is unjust in the perspective of the moment.

Chapter III

THE PART of AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

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The fact that Austria-Hungary co-operates in the military operations with Germany obscures in Western Europe, and particularly in America, the political background of Austria-Hungary's participation in the present war. The entire world looks at Austria-Hungary's part through the spectacles of hatred against Germany. This is the reason Russian diplomacy was able to make the idea of a partition of Austria-Hungary generally popular. Despotism Russia taught Western Europe and America to condemn a constitutional state such as Austria-Hungary. Russia, which even during the present war did not cease to oppress the conquered nations, began to persuade the world that this oppression is done by Austria-Hungary which, for the last half century, has made the principle of the freedom of the nations the basis of her constitution. Russia was able to gain sympathy, while Austria-Hungary lost much although it has granted long ago what Russia is now promising. The latter has, immediately after the temporary conquest of Eastern Galicia, abolished the Polish autonomy although Galicia never belonged to Russia. Almost at the same time, on October 3, 1914, the Russian cabinet decided to suspend the rest of the autonomy of Finland.* Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, spreads the Polish language and the autonomous freedom of Galicia wherever her victorious army dislodges Russian domination. These are facts acknowledged by the press of the entire world. This, however, does not prevent the

* "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 1915.

average opinion from demanding the partition of Austria-Hungary and from making Russia the pioneer of the liberty of nations.

This is far from being just.

The history of Austria-Hungary is the history of the middle Danube. Austria-Hungary is a huge space, formed by the Alps, the Sudets and the Carpathian Mountains, combined into a natural wall. Over this road went at all times the migrations of nations. Traces of passages of Celts can be found as well as traditions of the migrations of the Goths and of countless numbers of German tribes. Through there went the expansion of Slavic tribes as far as the shores of the Adriatic Sea. There also went the invasion of the Mongols. In the territory of the middle Danube there is to be found also the grave of Attila, who was a "scourge of God" for Europe. Here are the graves of the Avars. Finally the Hungarians came from the Far East and by embracing the Christian religion acquired the right of citizenship in Central Europe. The ethnical elements became mixed and the frontier lines of territories became entwined. Nobody was strong enough to dominate the entire valley over the middle Danube and impress its character upon the latter. The Bavarians attempted it and so did the Moravians in the times of Swatopluk; so did the Bohemians under the Premyslides and finally the Hungarians who made several attempts to attack Vienna. These were only temporary historical experiments. Uniform ethnical states came into existence and fell apart, but a combined ethnical state survived and developed for the last thousand years. Uniform ethnical kingdoms fell apart and a combined ethnical empire survived. This empire is the monarchy of the Hapsbourgs. The character of Austria-Hungary corresponds with the character of the historical conditions on the middle Danube,

where nobody was strong enough in order to dominate permanently the valleys of the Alps, the Carpathians and the Sudets and to mold the multicolor ethnical material into one national body. The territory of Austria-Hungary was for centuries a country through which the nations of the world marched; it is a mixed ground, and every wave sweeping through it has left a certain amount of sediment.

The seed of Austria-Hungary was planted by Charles the Great during his expeditions into the valley of the Thais. The road he followed from West to East was cut later by German armies when Otto I, the Great, crossed the Alps to go to Rome for the imperial crown. Through there crossed the papal messengers going to the imperial court far back in Germany, or to the banks of the Vistula, where the kingdom of Poland was in the course of construction. Through the valley of the Danube, the echo of the struggle between the empire and the papacy, between the spiritual and the lay sword, penetrated into Northern Europe. This was in the Middle Ages. At the threshold of modern history the Turks appeared on the bank of the Danube and through old Buda tried to make their way to Vienna. Christianity had to confront the Islam in the valley of the Alps, the Carpathians and the Sudets; for two centuries, until the peace treaty of Carlowitz, the valley of the middle Danube was the battlefield of a bloody struggle. As late as 1683 at Vienna, when the king of Poland, John III, Sobieski, combining his army with that of the Hapsbourgs, secured victory for Christianity in Europe. Since then the Orient had to recede to its native heath.

The traditions of Rome founded Austria on the Danube. The period of struggle with Turkey has established Hungary of to-day. The imperial crown of the Hapsbourgs, an inheritance from Charlemagne and the Ottons, combined both

epochs and both of their political offsprings. The idea of Austria-Hungary as a state materialized into historical reality. Both elements, the traditions of Rome, and the traditions of the struggles with Turkey, impressed their stigma on the character of Austria-Hungary and made of the latter a complete, natural state, although apparently the ethnical differences would seem to contradict the above contention. This ethnical variety is a natural, historical element in the valley of the middle Danube, and, therefore, Austria-Hungary is for these territories a natural form of political existence. Austria is a child of Rome, while Hungary originally came from the Orient, but she matured on the field of glory of centuries-old battles with the Turks. Under the walls of Vienna was enacted the history of both elements and here it is where the synthesis in the form of the imperial crown of the Hapsbourgs was established. The first act of this synthesis was the dowry of the daughter of the Jagellons, when, after the battle of Mohacs she brought the crown of Bohemia and Hungary into the house of the Hapsbourgs. The battle with the Turks under the walls of Vienna was the day of common glory. The covenant between Austria and Hungary in 1867 was the act of their political maturity. To dismember nowadays Austria-Hungary and to destroy this historical synthesis would mean to create a bloody chaos in the valley of the middle Danube.

History would have to go back for a thousand years in order to dismember Austria-Hungary.

From the political point of view, Austria-Hungary has solved on the continent of Europe the same problem which England has analogously solved in her colonial policy. This problem is a problem of co-existence of various national elements within one state. Thus, Austria-Hungary forms to some extent the united states in the valley of the middle

Danube. Section XIX of the constitution of Austria-Hungary of the year 1867 provides that "all the nationalities in the state have equal rights and every nationality has an intangible right to defend and develop its own nationality and language. Equal rights of all languages in school, office, and public life is acknowledged by the government."* Any encyclopedia can tell that for half a century all the provinces of Austria-Hungary have their own parliaments, or in other words, an autonomy not only as far as administration but also as far as legislation is concerned. In spite of that, English publications have the effrontery of writing about "military slavery" in Austria-Hungary or to predict that after the partition of Austria-Hungary her "domination will cease; racial equalities will be established."† It is hard to say what to wonder at? at the injustice or at the ignorance? The fact that in Austria-Hungary national strife is in existence does not alter the truth that Austria-Hungary constitutes an asset of the principle of nationalism in Central Europe, and not a liability. In Austria-Hungary there are dissensions among individual nationalities, but there is no oppression of nationalities by the government. No logic of any kind permits to deduct the conclusion that nationalities are oppressed by the government from the fact that strife among nationalities exists in Austria. In Austria-Hungary the government is the arbiter in national dissensions and not an organ of oppression. The nationalism of Austria-Hungary is in a process of evolution which of course has its defects and shortcomings, but this does not alter the fact that Austria-Hungary is a state in which every nationality has its autonomy and the possibility of development.

* Dr. Edmund Bernatzik: "Die Oesterreichischen Verfassungsgesetze," Leipzig, 1906.

† "New York Times," April 23, Report on the Lecture of G. L. Travelyan, "Grand-nephew" of Macaulay.

On the eve of the present war England found herself on the brink of a civil war for the home rule for Ireland. Englishmen armed themselves against their fellow countrymen in order to prevent the granting of autonomy to Ireland. Can we conclude from that, that England should be dismembered, or that Ireland represents a centrifugal element in the British Empire? The proof was given by the attitude of Ireland after the war against Germany broke out; it has been shown that the movement in Ireland is only a movement for internal reform and not a movement of treason. Austria-Hungary showed the same symptoms in her internal life, except for the fact that in Austria-Hungary there is nowadays no more to be found any Ireland, because not one province of Austria-Hungary is without its autonomous parliament, nor is there any nationality within the state which would not have its own national schools. The tendency of increasing the autonomous liberties proves the vitality of the nationalism in Austria-Hungary and not its lack. The Poles were striving before the outbreak of the war for an increase of the autonomy of Galicia; the Tchechs tried to increase the scope of the competency of their parliament in Prague. The Croats are struggling for an emancipation of their parliament from the tutelage of Hungary; the Hungarians in turn tried to secure for themselves greater freedom of elbows in their relations to Vienna. The basis, however, for all these aspirations always has been, and always is the existing constitution. The whole movement is the movement of reform and not a movement of disruption. It is a purely internal struggle between the principle of centralization and the principle of federalism, on the background of the already existing autonomy, both political and cultural, of all the nationalities in Austria-Hungary. The discontentment in Austria-Hungary has the same character as the discontent-

ment of the Irish nation in England. It is a movement of reform and not a movement of treason. The present war has proved this contention not only as far as England is concerned, but also with regard to Austria-Hungary. The old monarchy of the Hapsbourgs has demonstrated the strength, vitality and loyalty of its nationalities. There never was nor is there any rebellion. The Russian rouble which demoralized the Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia and the Serbs on the south was unable to influence the masses. It is easy to influence individuals in order to provoke artificial symptoms of discontentment for the use of a mendacious press, in case masses of the people participate in the political life, and there is no difficulty at any time to find corrupt individuals. In spite of the endeavors of Russia and its agitation in the name of "brotherhood of Slavic nations," the Poles, the Tchechs, the Croatians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Moravians, Silesians, right along with Hungarians, Germans and even Roumanians, came forward loyally to the defence of their national freedom against Russia. It is still an unknown fact what the definite physical result of the war will be, but nothing will change the importance of the fact that the nationalism of Austria-Hungary demonstrated in the present war a much greater political power than the Pan-Slavism of Russia. There is nothing astounding in this fact. Nationalism is a program of the liberty of nations, while Pan-Slavism is a program of imperialism. Nationalism is the wave sweeping through the twentieth century, while imperialism is the current running against this wave.

Austria-Hungary has solved the problem of autonomous co-existence of many nationalities under the sceptre of one monarch. Germany failed to solve this problem and became guilty of oppressing the Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians,

although this oppression was superfluous, to say the least, for the power of Germany. Russia never even attempted to solve this problem and exterminated mercilessly the remnants of autonomous life in Poland, in Finland, and in the Caucasus. England was unable in the twentieth century to introduce home rule in Ireland without a civil war. France and Italy have a clear conscience—but they do not have other nationalities under their sway in Europe. Looking impartially and justly one must come to the conclusion that the idea of the partition of Austria-Hungary is in contradiction with the idea of nationalism and with the idea of permanent peace. There are, however, opinions which, in the name of the liberty of nations, would like to destroy precisely what the idea of this liberty of nations succeeded in building up in the valley of the middle Danube.

The program of Russia is Pan-Slavic, or, in other words, the uniting of all Slave nations under the sceptre of the Czar. The capital of Russia thus conceived of shall be Constantinople; it is an idea of a great and holy Russia, and a materializing of this idea requires both the partition of Turkey and the partition of Austria-Hungary. "The road to Constantinople leads through Vienna," said General Ignatieff after the Congress of Berlin.

Pan-Slavism is a program of race. The conception of race, however, is not synonymous with the conception of national consciousness, because a race is nothing but crude material on which history works. A nation is determined by the community of language, but above all other things by the history of common existence as a state. The community of language is a tool of economic and civilizatory activity. The community of political tradition is a tool of a collective will directed toward the development of national independence. The community of language admits exceptions but the

history of common existence as a state is an absolutely necessary feature. In Switzerland there is no community of language but there is a tradition of common independence, and this tradition decides the fate of Swiss nationality. A nation is formed by the existence of a state of its own, and vice versa a nation must perish through lack of the common political existence as a state. Such a lack permits for a while to preserve the ethnographical features of a nation but does not permit the preserving of political features; it denationalizes politically, although it permits for a while to oppose ethnographical denationalization. Religion, language, art culture, customs can subsist, but the ability for political independence is bound to be exterminated. It is a law of sociological evolution and no phrases about "racial brotherhood" can extenuate the results of this law. Pan-Slavism and Pan-Russianism must consciously or unconsciously form the two sides of the same matter. Pan-Slavism must necessarily be anti-national because it is imperialistic. The public opinion in Russia certainly regrets nowadays that Russia has agreed to establish an independent Bulgaria. To Poland Russia has promised only autonomy, but she refuses to recognize Poland's right to an independent existence. "Slav banquets" which during the present war busied themselves with the question of the partition of Austria-Hungary, pronounced themselves against the independence of Croatia and even against the independence of Bohemia. This was the cause for a scandal because the Bohemians protested against being denied the right to aspire to political independence. The Russian agitator Saveloff declared that the "Russian nation shall not spill its blood for the formation of a new Bulgaria." This happened in Moscow in the first days of March, 1915, at the meeting of Tchechs and Slovak organizations of Russia. The details of the discussions were pub-

lished by the *Utro Rossii* and the majority of Russian and Polish newspapers reprinted them. Pan-Slavism is an imperialistic allegation that "even though there are other Slavic princes, kings, and even czars, yet there is only one and only ruler of Slavdom, Russian Lord and Emperor."* Pan-Slavism attempts to destroy national individualities in order to help the race. No wonder, therefore, that even the Tchechs, in contradiction to all the press stories about revolutions in Prague faithfully perform the duties in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The natural instinct of the masses cannot be deceived as easily as eccentric individuals which are not lacking in any nation. The actuality of the nations, however, is manifested by the attitude of the masses and not by the attitude of such eccentric individuals.

The means which Russia can throw on the scales are enormous. The population of Russia amounted in 1912 to 166,000,000. During the years 1897 to 1912, Russia's population increased 47,000,000, while at the same time the population of Germany increased only 12,000,000. Professor Masaryk, a noted Tchechs scientist, has figured out that at the end of the current century the population of European Russia will reach the 400,000,000 mark and, together with Asiatic Russia, the 500,000,000 mark.† Growing at the same rate of increase, the population of Russia will already in 1930 reach the figure of 220,000,000. These are calculations based on facts as they were before the war. Let us suppose now that Russia will win and impose upon Europe the partition of Austria-Hungary, and even of Turkey. The number of Slavs in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary amounts

* "Russian Orthodox American Messenger," second issue, Vol. XVII, page 29.

† Masaryk: "Zur russischen Geschichte und Religions Philosophie," I, page 275.

to almost 30,000,000. In spite of the losses suffered during the present war, Russia will be able to become, within fifteen years, a reservoir of 250,000,000 of people, not counting Constantinople and Armenia as far as Khilikia and the Gulf of Iskanderun. Russia was and is a military country. As far as armaments are concerned, she was by no means second to Germany and in certain respect has even outdone the latter. The peace footing of the German army, according to the last military law which frightened the entire world, amounted to about 800,000 officers and enlisted men. The peace footing of the Russian army in the summer of 1914, that means at the moment of the outbreak of the war, amounted to 1,415,000 men. In the winter 1915-1916 the peace footing was expected to reach the enormous figure of 1,900,000 rifles and sabres. The amount of reserves in Russia is, of course, inexhaustible. The Russian budget was able to stand such enormous burdens only owing to French loans, because the financial strength of Russia, particularly after the Japanese war, was infinitely inferior to the financial resources of the western powers. France has invested in Russia something like \$4,000,000,000. Another advantage of the Russian treasury consisted of two years of exceedingly rich crops. In the future, on the other hand, there will loom brightly the results of an agrarian reform and of the colonization of Siberia.* Since the times of Stolypin and until the end of 1912 almost 1,000,000 independent peasant farms were established in Russia, and the municipal ownership of ground which kept Russian agriculture back and made of the Russian peasant an illiterate individual was abolished. The agrarian productivity was increased. In Siberia almost two and a half million colonies were settled in the years 1907 to 1912. Siberia, according

* F. Nansen: "Siberien ein Zukunftsland."

to the explorer of Polar regions, the Norwegian geographer, Nansen, is the country of the future. The colonization of Siberia increases the wealth of Russia and makes of Siberia a reservoir for military conscription, which eventually will facilitate the Russian offensive in Asia. This is, however, only the beginning. Let us suppose now that Russia should dictate peace to Europe. After destroying Turkey and Austria-Hungary, the power of Russian expansion will become the ramrod against the entire west of Europe. The opening of a window on the Atlantic will then become only a question of time. The distance from the Russian frontier to Narvik, the nearest port on the Atlantic in the Gulf of Vest-Fjord, amounts only to 150 kilometers. A railroad line for purposes of Russian offensive is all ready and terminates in Tornea. A second line going through the Lakes of Finland, is also completed. The Russian imperialism having won in the south will strike northward, in order to accomplish, after having entered the Mediterranean, the second part of its mission and gain access to the Atlantic Ocean. The second part "of the testament of Peter the Great" will be easy to execute. Russia will base herself on her 250,000,000 population and economic evolution will permit her to make armaments without the help of France. The Russian imperialism will dominate its military needs and will confront Europe sure of its strength and inexhaustible as to the number of its armies, free to shift its armies from place to place as well as its ships and ammunition.

Nobody thinks of changing a victorious policy. Victorious Russia will not change also her imperialism. Bryce anticipated this in his clever saying that "the doctrine of Pan-Slavism under an imperial head of the Orthodox Eastern Church has become a formidable engine of aggression in the hands of mighty despotism and a growing race, naturally

drawn to expand its frontiers toward the south.”* The power of Germany of to-day shrinks in comparison with the power which a victorious Pan-Slavism might be able to develop some day. Russia will certainly not hesitate to make sacrifices, and the Czar does not need to care about losses of human material. Homer Lea figured out that in the eighteenth century Russia had sent on the field of battle 4,910,000 men.† Only 1,380,000 returned home from this orgy of blood. In the nineteenth century another 4,900,000 marched out and only 1,410,000 came back to their homes. Russia will not suffer any lack of new millions in the twentieth century. Only Pan-Germanism, under the leadership of Berlin, would then be able to combat successfully Russia’s preponderance. In this case Europe will have to change the structure of its power in contradiction of the principle of nationalism and on the basis of the principle of the race. The Czar of the Slavs would have to be opposed by the Czar of Teutons. The example of Russia, however, is liable to become contagious and the tolerance of Pan-Slavism gives right of existence to Pan-Germanism. In such a case Europe would have to take a step backward. Such a step backward, however, is neither of interest to European nations nor to the interest of progress and peace. The world is not swept to-day by the hurricane of this terrific war in order to pave the road for Pan-Slavism.

Gladstone mentioned in his memoirs that after the defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan, “Europe has lost a mistress and got a master.”‡ After a “Sedan” of William II, Europe may get back “a mistress,” but no more France, only Russia, should Russia succeed in dictating the peace. In such a case,

* J. Bryce, l. c., page 421.

† Homer Lea: “The Day of the Saxon,” pages 130-131.

‡ John Morley: “The Life of W. E. Gladstone,” Book VI, page 357.

not only continental Europe but also England shall find her "mistress."

Victorious Pan-Slavism will avenge the Germans.

The imperialism of Russia is the continuation of the struggle between the Orient and the Occident, between the traditions of Rome and the traditions of Constantinople. After the downfall of Poland, Russia aims at Turkey and Austria-Hungary; after the fall of Warsaw she "is pressing on to Vienna."* Pan-Slavism is the ideology of the Russian attack against Austria-Hungary, just as the interests of the Orthodox religion form the ideology of the attack against Turkey. In this light, the question of Serbia shines brightly.

Servia belongs to the Orthodox Church and is a tool in the hands of Russia. Russian diplomacy has supported the ambitions of Servia in order to use them against Austria-Hungary; the agitation of the press and the promises of Russia arouse the passions. Bosnia and Herzegovina became the trump in the hands of Russia; Servia has filed her claims to this territory and Russian diplomacy succeeded in persuading public opinion that the claims of Servia are just.

There are facts, however, that contradict this contention.

I. Bosnia and Herzegovina never belonged to Servia, not even in the times of Czar Dushan, when Servia reached the pinnacle of her development.†

II. Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a part of Hungary before the invasion of the Turks, and at all times were in closer relation with the kingdom of Croatia than with Servia.

* The "Century Magazine," May, 1915.

† "The southern Slavs," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914.

III. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is mixed. The Serbs are Orthodox, while the Croatians are Roman Catholics and form a more cultured element.* A considerable portion of the population is formed by the Moslems of Slav origin. The Croatians and the Moslems form the majority of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the disadvantage of Servian imperialism.

IV. The Servians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Southern Hungary, are immigrants. They were driven into these countries by Turkish oppression from which they tried to escape by going north. This is rather a reason for gratefulness for shelter than a point of departure for imperialism.

V. The Servians in Austria-Hungary have full national rights on the same level as the Poles, the Tchechs, the Croatians, or in other words, freedom of speech, of religion and autonomy. In the Parliament of Bosnia the Serb language has the same rights as the Croatian language, although the Serbs do not have absolute majority in the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of late, Minister Bilinski supported the Serbs against the Croatians and the Moslems in order to satisfy Serbia and avoid war.

Ill-will ignores the facts. The center of ill-will was Petrograd from where Serbia was incited. Servian imperialism was a reflection of the imperialism of Russia and the idea of Greater Serbia was but a shadow of the idea of Greater Russia. The question of rights became a question of secondary nature. Imperialism is the ideology of conquest and, therefore, ignores both the facts and historical truths. The decisive factor is selfishness, which is the arm swinging the sword. Serbia fell for the illusion

* "The Southern Slavs," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914.

that with the help of Russia she would be able to conquer Bosnia and Herzegovina, and she formed her entire policy to suit this purpose. In order to further this policy the arm of a Serb threw the bomb in Sarajevo. For the sake of this idea, Archduke Francis Ferdinand had to give his life, although he was an opponent of the Hungarians and a friend of the southern Slavs. This is admitted even by the war-like and inspired English press.* It is also possible that Francis Ferdinand was killed because every step that Austria-Hungary was taking in the interest of Slav nations brought them nearer to Western Europe and drew them away from Russia.

Somebody in England said after the outbreak of the present war, "it would be absurd to say that Servia is the cause of the war."† It is sufficient to recall the revelations published by the "Matin," of Paris, in 1913, about the federation of the Balkan states in order to become convinced of the fact that this war was planned by Russia long ago. The "Matin" is a friend of Russia and its testimony, therefore, is much more important for the interests of Austria-Hungary. The federation of the Balkan states was directed against Austria-Hungary and not against Turkey. The intrigue of Russian diplomacy had already then planned an attack upon Vienna, but the logic of the internal conditions in the Balkans first prompted the war with Turkey, and then a fratricidal war against each other. Nowadays, when Russia has finally publicly stated that Constantinople is her ultimate goal, one must be naïve to think that Russia was prompted by the desire to defend Servia and that she had attacked Austria-Hungary from sheer Pan-Slavic sentiment. The question of Servia was only a clever pre

* "The Eastern Question," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 18.

† "The Eastern Question," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 5.

text which permitted Russia to pose as a protector of the oppressed. At the bottom of the thing, however, there were deeper reasons in the background of the scenes for many years. A proof for this contention was the attitude of Russia towards Serbia, when the offensive movement of the combined Austria-Hungarian and German armies pushed back the Russians from Galicia. In order to draw Italy into the conflict against Austria-Hungary, Russia has agreed to an eventual occupation of Dalmatia and Albania by Italy, which dealt a painful blow to the aspirations of Serbia to get an estuary on the Adriatic. Serbia was quick to understand the meaning of this movement. A Servian delegation in Petrograd began to threaten to conclude separate peace with Austria-Hungary. At the same time a Servian army invaded Albania in order to save at least Durazzo from the imperialism of Italy. It is, furthermore, an interesting fact that the imperialism of Italy began to be considered in Petrograd as more Slavic than Servian. It is, furthermore, a known fact that at the Conference at London, in 1913, Italy was chiefly instrumental in throwing back Serbia from the Adriatic Sea, more so than Austria-Hungary. Italy has also prevented Greece from getting the southern portion of the Epirus. Italy is stronger than Serbia and, therefore, Russian sympathies move toward Rome, while Serbia was brutally left to her misery, disease, famine, and devastation of the war into which Serbia was driven by nobody else but Russia.

The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not so much united with the question of Serbia, as with the question of the reorganization of the Kingdom of Croatia within the Hungarian state. In the covenant between Hungary and Croatia, of 1868, there is a provision by virtue of which "Hungary recognizes the inviolability of the territory of

Croatia and promises to concentrate her endeavor upon completing this territory.”* In the first covenant this provision related to Dalmatia, which, from a historical point of view, is a part of the Croatian realm. Bosnia and Herzegovina still belonged in 1868 to Turkey; at present, however, they can be included in Section 65 of the Croato-Hungarian covenant and on this basis enter, together with Dalmatia, into the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, to be reorganized after the present war. Until the outbreak of the present war, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not belong either to Austria or to Hungary, but were subordinate directly to the common Ministry of Finances of Austria-Hungary. This was only a temporary arrangement which left the door open for the imperialism of Servia because the claims of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina were temporarily suspended. The reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia permits the solving of the question, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of nationalism, because:

1. The Croatians form together with the anti-Servian Moslems the majority of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina were situated in the sphere of Croatian influence at the time of Croatia's independence.

The claims of Servia to Bosnia and Herzegovina are contradicted not only by statistics but also by the historical fact that these territories never belonged to Servia. Thus, the claims of Servia are contradicted by statistics and history which are the two criterions of nationalism. The immigrant Servian population possess in Austria-Hungary the recognition of their national rights for a half century,

* Dr. Edmund Bernatzik: “Die oesterreichischen Verfassungsgesetze,” Leipzig, 1906, page 586.

and do not run the risk of losing these national rights after the war. In Russia, on the contrary, even the Poles did not have such national rights as do the Servians in Austria-Hungary.

As far as constitutional liberty is concerned, the autonomy of Croatia is greater in extent than the autonomy of other provinces in Austria-Hungary. After Vienna and Budapest comes the Croatian capital of Zagrab (Agram) and not Prague or Lemberg. The Banus (governor) of Croatia is responsible to the Croatian parliament which privilege neither Galicia nor Bohemia possess. As far as the legal side is concerned, there is a former point of attachment for a reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia. Dalmatia does not as yet form a part of Croatia "*de facto*," although she forms a part of the country "*de nomine*." The question of Dalmatia forms a temporary arrangement which is called in legal parlance of Austria-Hungary a "*provisorium*."* The renewing of the question of Dalmatia and its regulation, together with the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, from the legal point of view, perfectly admissible and bears on territories which, historically speaking, are closely related with each other. This would mean the solving of the problem of southern Slavdom. Servian traditions have in former times gone farther south, towards Saloniki, and not towards the Danube. The maintenance of the independence of Servia and the regulation of the frontier line of Albania and Macedonia decide the question in the Balkans. The reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia is liable to create a new and vital political unit on the shores of the Adriatic Sea. The liberty of nations would find a just realization without any

* Dr. Edmund Bernatzik: "Die oesterreichischen Verfassungsgesetze," Leipzig, 1906, page 218.

injury to Servia. All the rumors about Austria-Hungary's pressing towards Saloniki are an anachronism. The peace treaty of Bucharest has solved the question of the Balkans for the benefit of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Servia and Montenegro. The Balkan question in its old anti-Turkish conception disappears and at the same time Austria-Hungary is losing the occasion for imperialistic attempts. Rumors are current that Archduke Francis Ferdinand contemplated a "trialism," or a combination of Austria-Hungary and Croatia on an equal legal basis. It was a very just idea but still it did not protect him from a tragic death in Sarajevo at the hands of a Serb, whose mind had been poisoned by the imperialistic propaganda. It is not Servia's guilt, but the guilt of the party that, behind the scenes, continued arousing artificial ambitions. Servian imperialism, on the other hand, was not directed so much against Austria or against Hungary, as against the Slavic kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, which has serious claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Servia has none. To destroy these claims of Croatia would be a downright injury; it is, therefore, nothing strange that under these conditions the Croats are fighting against Russia and Servia with so much enthusiasm that they have become the heroes of the Austria-Hungarian armies.

The reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia permits at the same time the solving of the problem of the shores of the Adriatic Sea in Austria-Hungary. Fiume, Pola, and Trieste belong, from the point of view of nationalism, to Croatia and Slavonia, and should not belong either to Servia or to Italy. Both statistics as well as history favor Croatia and Slavonia; the Slavs form the majority of the people on the shores of the Adriatic. This is admitted even by the English press during the present war, although

this fact is by no means convenient to the enemies of Austria-Hungary.* The claims of Servia to Fiume or Trieste are unjust, and the same time is the case with the claims of Italy in spite of the fact that the Italian population forms a considerable percentage in the towns on this shore. The country is essentially Slavic and the village population is always an autochthon population, a stratum which is historically original, while the population of the cities is mostly an immigrant one. Italians know this and that is why in their claims before the outbreak of the war they championed the idea of forming a miniature state from Trieste and its surrounding territory. They didn't dare to claim Trieste for themselves because the slogan of the present war is nationalism as well as permanent peace. They felt the lack of a legal basis as well as a statistical and historical basis. They disguised their imperialism by pretext of nationalism—one proclaiming the idea of independence for Trieste and its surrounding territory. The Italian population on the Austrian-Hungarian shore of the Adriatic Sea has perfect freedom of national life, which means liberty of language, religion, municipal home rule and a full share in the constitutional life of the entire state. The only limitations are the equal rights of the Slavic nationalities which form the majority of the population, which is autochthon and native for centuries since those days when there was an independent Croatia on the shores of the Adriatic. From the historical point of view, the domination of Italy reached as far as the shores of Dalmatia only in the times of ancient Rome and then in the time of the Republic of Venice, and finally once more in the times of Napoleon. The frontier lines established by Napoleon were the frontier lines of war, and of

* "Italian Policy since 1870," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914.

this fact England is perfectly well aware because no other state combated Napoleon's imperialism as ardently and as persistently as England did. The frontier lines of Venice were frontier lines of conquest and not of nationality. Whoever knows the secret bridges in the mysterious palaces of Venice will not fail to understand the character of the government exercised once upon a time by the Carthago of the Adriatic Sea. Rome after all owned not only Trieste but also Paris, and the Roman legions extended their triumphal march even as far as the banks of the Thames. Does this fact entitle the Italians to raise any claims to France or to England? From the historical point of view the claims of Italy to Trieste are not at all better than the claims to Tunis. History does not confirm the Italian claims, and statistics decide the issue in favor of Croatia and Slavonia. Trieste should in fact be the natural harbor of Croatia regenerated both as far as her boundaries and autonomy are concerned. The Italian attack is directed more against Croatia than against Austria or Hungary and therefore Italy's attitude is in contradiction with the program of nationalism. Italy may claim at the most some strategical advantages on the frontier of the Tyrol which advantages necessarily must be of a slight significance, but they can never claim with any right either Trieste or Dalmatia which are a territory of Slavic settlement as well as a sphere of Slavic interest for over a thousand years. Austria-Hungary forms a sentinel on the Adriatic; they are the gate through which the thirst of several central European nations for an estuary on the sea is satisfied. These are mostly Slavic nations protected by the wall of the Alps, the Sudets and the Carpathians from the imperialism of Russia, Germany and Italy. None of these nations could independently and without the co-operation

of other nations preserve or defend this access to the sea. Austria could not do it, nor could Hungary, nor Bohemia, nor Croatia, not speaking even of the Slovaks, Moravians, Silesians, and even Roumanians in Transylvania, who are cut off by the natural barrier of the Carpathians from the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube. The question of the Adriatic Sea is a question of first-class importance and of historical necessity for all these nations. A law is nothing else but a form of economic life, and the state is nothing else but an organization of the law. Nations are formed and developed through their own political existence as a state, or, in other words, through the organization of their legal life within which the economical life of the nation has the possibility of evolution. The Adriatic Sea is the condition of economic life of the nations forming Austria-Hungary, and as such, must be the problem of their legal and political life, or, in other words, a question of existence. The shore of the Adriatic is, therefore, a necessity for the nations of Austria-Hungary, which is not the case with regard to Italy. The latter can conquer the shores of the Adriatic by force, but at the expense of the rights and existence of the economical life of the nationalities of which Austria-Hungary is composed. The annexation of Trieste by Italy would under such conditions mean a defeat of nationalism and a victory of imperialism. It can hardly be assumed that Italy should go to war in the name of an imperialistic principle while the present war is fought for the sake of nationalism. There is, furthermore, no doubt as to the fact that the attack of Italy is an attack upon the natural boundaries of Austria-Hungary. Nothing permanent could be built in this way; it is impossible to uphold the principle of nationalism in one place for the price of betraying it somewhere else, because

thus only political errors and historical injustice can be committed.

It is hard to find a greater lack of logic as to try to dismember Austria-Hungary because of the war with Germany. Germany nowadays is a world power. Should Austria-Hungary be dismembered, the German provinces of the Hapsbourg empire would naturally fall to Germany, which would thus gain upper and lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia. From the point of view of national evolution it would mean a triumph for Germany and national unification would be a balm on the defeat, because Germany as a nation is more numerous than Russia, although Russia is a giant when compared with Germany as a state. Ninety million people under the strong hand government of Berlin would constitute a force able to strike soon for revenge. German militarism has a great routine which would enable it to produce from Greater Germany such a force that Pan-Germanism could easily become the real policy of Berlin. Is the present war conducted for the purpose of creating Pan-Germanism through the partition of Austria-Hungary? The road from Berlin to the Adriatic Sea goes through Vienna. The German settlements in Carnia and Carniola are not far from the Adriatic shore. Berlin is very well aware of the fact that it would naturally become the heir of Vienna in case Austria-Hungary be dismembered. On this basis the government of Berlin would at once begin to seek access to the sea. Vienna and Budapest have better claims to Trieste or Fiume than Belgrade and Rome have. Germany could go to the Adriatic Sea over the body of Austria-Hungary, and, upon reaching the Adriatic, would float her flag in the Mediterranean. This would again constitute a grave danger for England, because Germany could then evade the Straits of Gibraltar and transfer the point of gravitation of her

armaments to the Mediterranean. The domination of England over the Suez Canal is safe as long as Germany is cut off from this route. Germany's crossing the Alps would mean the evasion of Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal is the road to India and Australia. This fact is sufficient to make England a friend of Austria-Hungary during the peace negotiations, because Austria-Hungary is a barrier for the imperialism of Germany and does not permit the latter to evade Gibraltar by the way of the Alps and Trieste. Trieste, in the hands of Austria-Hungary, does not constitute any danger for England, because Austria-Hungary does not have and never will have colonial ambitions on the Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary does not have any interest in attacking the Suez Canal, but Germany has. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary is not a toy in the hands of Berlin and shall never become the blind weapon in the hands of Germany. Austria-Hungary will never spend her money for excessive naval armaments for the sake of somebody else's interest. Furthermore, Russia and not England is the enemy of Austria-Hungary, and the monarchy of the Hapsbours armed itself before this war not against England but against Russia; this is one more reason why Austria-Hungary would certainly not arm herself against England after this war. Austria-Hungary, England and France do not have any conflicting interests, and were driven into this war only by the logic of alliances and by the force of military considerations. Any imperialism which Austria-Hungary could possibly display on the Mediterranean would be an abortive movement and besides a very costly one. Austria-Hungary's state reason coincides with that of England and France, but is in contradiction with the state reason of Russia, or better to say, with Russia's imperialism. Austria-Hungary in this war is allied with Germany against Russia, and that the alliance is at the

same time very active against England and France is a mere incident. The note in which Sir Edward Grey declared war against Austria-Hungary in the name of Great Britain states explicitly that England was "obliged" to declare war; the note in question does not contain anything else. No mention is made of any litigious matter at all and only the pure logic of military considerations is set forth. Austria-Hungary and Germany are fighting shoulder to shoulder because the parallelity and not the identity of the interests compel them to do so. England and France are fighting shoulder to shoulder with Russia for exactly the same reason. Parallelity is not identity and geometry defines parallelity as a condition resulting from the lack of points of contact. The military point of view must be strictly distinguished from the political one. The danger from the part of Russia was the main prompting element of the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany. The political genius of Bismarck has taken advantage of the situation, although the memories of the battle at Sadowa did not die out completely as yet. Precisely for the same reason of the danger from the part of Russia, Edward VII did not succeed in drawing Austria-Hungary away from Germany. The Cabinet of Vienna realized it perfectly well that in case of a war with Russia, Austria-Hungary would be isolated and deprived of Germany's help, and London was too far away to help Austria-Hungary in her frontier conflicts with Serbia, Italy and Roumania. England, as a rule, always came late in the present war and it would be so much more late in coming to help Austria-Hungary. This consideration decided the permanency of the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany and at the same time insured Austria-Hungary's safety from Russia's attacks. Any support given to Russia in her threats of a partition of Austria-

Hungary is in the last analysis a work "*pour le roi de Prusse.*"

One must be blinded with hatred if he fails to see through that.

The Hapsbourgs did not forget as yet that the crown of the Roman Emperors was once upon a time resting on their heads. Vienna still resounds with the chimes of the same bells which once proclaimed the glory of Charles V, on whose possessions the sun was never setting. It was a very just remark that was made once that the Austrian empire although dating only as far back as 1806, "became respected as the oldest and most conservative."* The throne of the Hapsbourgs is still overshadowed by the imperial purple, by the tradition of Rome. The force of these memories was not extinguished by the defeat of Austria at Sadowa, nor later on by the brilliant development of Berlin, and the emperor of Austria did not cease until now to pass as a legal heir of the crown of the Roman Emperors. The Roman empire became closely intertwined with the Catholic church; the "World-State" and the "World-Church" were elements which completed each other in the conception of the "Holy-Empire." The Catholics in Germany and particularly the Catholics in Austria-Hungary understand it well and under the penalty of treason to the Church they cannot deviate from this conception. On the basis of the fact that the dynasty of the Hapsbourgs is Catholic, the Catholic party in Germany insisted in 1866 upon Austria being the leader of the Germanic World. The Roman Emperor as a universal monarch cannot be a Protestant; this is a dogma of an ideal and political nature at the same time. William II is a Protestant, and this prevents him from filing his claim to the supremacy of the world. He may endeavor to impose

* J. Bryce, l. c., page 420.

this supremacy by sheer force but he has no title to it; the existence itself of Austria-Hungary is in this respect also a hindrance to Berlin. The fact that Austria-Hungary is in existence means the following:

I—Division of the German nation into two independent states which, however, agrees with the requirements of the principle of nationalism.

II—Does not permit Berlin to file a claim of Germany to the inheritance of Rome and to the supremacy over Western Europe.

Bryce perceived with a keen eye of the historian and statesman of great calibre that "it was the tradition of a glorious past when Germany led the world that made the Germans again a united people, the central power of Continental Europe."* The traditions of Rome did not die out as yet in Central Europe although they died out in France and England, without speaking, of course, of America. The importance of this question was well understood by England when the latter refused to recognize the abdication of Francis II from the dignity of a Roman Emperor. During the Congress of Vienna, England attempted to "re-establish . . . the Empire," but Prussia, "elated at the glory she had won in the war of independence,"† refused to submit to the supremacy of Austria and succeeded to arouse the protest of other German states. It is an almost forgotten fact that England to this day refused to recognize the abdication of the Hapsbourgs from the dignity of Roman Emperors, and the possibility of re-establishing of this dignity did not altogether pass away. The existence of the throne of the Hapsbourgs neutralizes under these conditions the inheritance of Rome in Western and in Central Europe. The

* J. Bryce, l. c., page 503.

† J. Bryce, l. c., page 416.

throne of the Hapsbourgs preserves a greater dignity and does not gain in material strength. A dynastical gap between the Hapsbourgs and the Hohenzollerns furthers the interests of peace and equilibrium. The policy of Austria-Hungary on the other hand is and shall always remain the resulting element of the will of different autonomous nations, and, therefore, can never become anti-nationalistic, but must always co-operate with other nations for the welfare of humanity and peace.

The Allies try, according to a popular version, to strike not as much at the German nation as at Prussia, which is reported to have directed the energy of Germany into a path which is inconsistent with the interests of peace. At the same time, this tendency drives towards the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. This is an attempt of a compromise between the sympathy of England and France and the insinuations of Russian diplomacy which tries to force upon the world the partition of Austria-Hungary. Sound reasoning indicates that in order to destroy Prussia and spare the German nation, the partition of Austria-Hungary would be a nonsense. There is still some truth in the contention that "the Southern Germans look to Vienna rather than to Berlin."* Prussia could be destroyed only by the destruction of the German Empire, which was the result of Prussia's victory over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1871. Should this be done, what could the organization of future Germany be based upon? After eliminating the hegemony of Prussia, it would be necessary to return to the hegemony which Prussia eliminated once upon a time. This would mean the hegemony of Austria which was crushed on the battlefield of Sadowa. The independence and the development of the German nation can do without the supremacy of Prussia but

* L. C. Jane: "The Nations at War," London, 1914, page 192.

could not possibly do without the supremacy of somebody else. Viewed otherwise, from a different standpoint, the entire program of the Allies with regard to Germany is either a fiction or a huge lie. The idea of reorganizing Germany at the expense of Prussia must naturally go hand in hand with the preserving of Austria-Hungary, in order to make the throne of the Hapsbourgs once more the throne of the German nation. Regardless of the point of view, however, it remains a fact that a strong Austria-Hungary is the guarantee of equilibrium in Europe. Austria-Hungary is a barrier for the imperialism of Russia and to some extent also for the imperialism of Germany. Austria-Hungary protects the Bosphorus from Russia and the Adriatic Sea from Germany, and by this fact the throne of the Hapsbourgs goes a good deal towards the re-establishing in Europe of the Roman peace, of the permanent peace of the Cæsars. It is impossible any more for the Roman imperialism to be renewed in Austria-Hungary, nor can the old Roman form of domination over the world be revived, but the mission of old Rome in the world has a chance of being regenerated.

Some day the gates of the temple of Janus will be closed!

It was a mistake on the part of England that she did not protect Austria in 1866 against an attack by Prussia. It was equally a mistake of England not to protect France in 1870, and Homer Lea reproaches England from her own point of view for having failed to do so.* In the eyes of English public opinion, the victory of Prussia was considered even as the "triumph of the principle of nationality."† England failed to see that on the battlefields of Sadowa and Sedan the seed of the present war was sown. Bismarck was not a friend of the sea and this to some extent appeased the fears

* Homer Lea: "The Day of the Saxon."

† J. Bryce, l. c., page 505.

of England, inasmuch as on land England does not have to be an enemy of Germany. It was a mistake of Lord Palmerston and of Lord Beaconsfield that they did not protect Austria and France from Prussia, but at least they protected Constantinople from Russia's appetite. The mistake they made did not lie in the fact that they protected Constantinople but in their failure to protect Austria and France. A purely opportunistic policy has prevented England from championing the cause of Austria and France in their wars with Prussia; the same opportunistic policy lowers England still more nowadays and makes Great Britain sell to Russia, Constantinople and the Slavish provinces of Austria-Hungary for a temporary military support against Germany. Lord Beaconsfield committed the first mistake and his critics nowadays endeavor to commit the second one. All this must be some tragic misunderstanding, because it is impossible to conceive that England should go in such a broken way against all of her former traditions.

The considerations which support the argument of preserving Austria-Hungary as a first-class power form a portion of the conditions for:

I—The permanence of the coming peace;

II—The victory of the just principle of nationalism;

III—The defeat of the imperialism of Russia.

In spite of the aroused passions, there will be a place for the following principles among the conditions of the coming peace:

I—The strengthening of Austria-Hungary as a first-class power against the imperialism of Russia, because Pan-Slavism is the reactionary program of a race and not a progressive program of nationalism;

II—The solving of the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the reorganization of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia in the sense of trialism and in accordance with the teachings of history and statistics, and without injuring Serbia, whose claims against Austria-Hungary are dictated by an imperialistic policy, it being only a reflection of Russian Pan-Slavism and inconsistent with the requirements of a just nationalism.

On the battlefields of the present war, the moral achievement of nationalism in Austria-Hungary won a victory. The world has convinced itself that a structure erected by a thousand years and by a half century of constitutional regime is not a house of cards which can be blown to pieces by the first blow of the hurricane of war.

Chapter IV
THE FUTURE of WARSAW

CHAPTER IV.—THE FUTURE OF WARSAW

The map of Europe contains a great political paradox. This paradox is the line of the Vistula, which is one of the main rivers of central Europe. Its upper part is in the hands of Austria-Hungary; the middle part in the hands of Russia and the lower part in those of Germany. On the upper part of the Vistula lies the town of Cracow where the old Polish Kings are buried; in the middle part of the Vistula is Warsaw, the capital of Poland, while Danzig, the old Polish harbor town, lies at the mouth of the Vistula. It certainly is a paradox which shows geographically the political slavery of Poland. Cut in three parts, the Vistula is a river of slavery and the river of the great Polish suffering.

The paradox of the Vistula is the strategical and economical expression of what Clemenceau has called "one of the biggest crimes in history."*

The present war has been called a war fought for the liberty of nations. Ten millions of troops have been rushed into the valley of the Vistula, and from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains there is one vast struggle going on, a struggle for which there is no comparison in history. The main issue in this enormous struggle is the fate of Warsaw, the capital of Poland. From the strategical point of view it is a question of the Vistula—from the political point of view it is a question of Poland's future. On the banks of the Vistula, justice is meted out for the partition of Poland and

* "L'Homme Libre," August 16, 1914.

the three powers, which once upon a time dismembered Poland, are finally facing each other as enemies, arrayed for a final settlement. The Polish question which hitherto united them began to be a bone of contention; under the pressure of military necessity, both sides were compelled to approach the Polish nation, which ages ago settled on the banks of the Vistula and occupies the theatre of the present war.

The time came for making promises.

The proclamation which a year ago the German and the Austro-Hungarian armies distributed in Russian-Poland stated that the armies of these countries were bringing "Liberty and Independence"* to Poland. This was the first ray of hope for the Polish nation. A few days later another promise came, this time from the opposite party. On August 15, 1914, the late Russian Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolajevitch, proclaimed that the intention of Russia is to unite Poland under the sceptre of the Czar. "Poland shall be reborn under this sceptre, free in faith, in language, in self-government." The armies of the western nations gave the hope of independence—the armies of the eastern power have limited the future of Poland to autonomy. The aforesaid proclamations, however, were proclamations issued only by commanders-in-chief, and not by their respective governments.

Poland knew long ago that the war would practically draw closer, and she prepared herself so as not to be surprised and to have a plan of action. During the war in the Balkans, Poland advanced her preparations considerably. Old and new organizations began secretly or openly to work with fewer in order to be able, in case of a war between Austria and

* "Nowa Reforma," Cracow, August, 1914.

Russia, to form their own military representation and throw it in the game and fight for Poland's independence. Outwardly, Poland made her first political demonstration in European politics in the summer of 1913. Polish military organizations and independence parties sent a delegation to London, where at that time a conference of ambassadors of European nations was in session, and it deposited with Sir Edward Grey and all the ambassadors assembled in conference a memorandum on the question of Poland. This memorandum was nothing else but a program of Poland's attitude in the war which at that time was already anticipated. This memorandum called Europe's attention to the fact that in case of a war, Poland would throw her lot with Austria-Hungary against Russia because under present political conditions such an action means the only real road to independence for Poland. The moment when the anticipated war broke out Poland did not need to make her action dependent on any of the aforesaid proclamations which the armies of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia distributed all over Poland's territory.

On August 5, 1914, the first Polish patrol composed of members of Polish military organizations left Cracow and crossed Russia's frontier, headed for Kielce in Russian Poland. This patrol was followed by other detachments numbering several thousand of men. All of them were revolutionary troops trained in a military organization which for a good many years carried on the work openly in Galicia and under cover in Prussian and in Russian-Poland; in these organizations young men were trained for military purposes in order to be able to form, in case of war between Austria and Russia, a military representation of Poland. The plan elaborated long ago began to work. The frontier posts which for over a hundred years separated Cracow from

Warsaw were pulled down; they were pulled down by the Polish revolutionary soldiers who were the first to cross the frontier in order to bring liberty to Russian-Poland. This happened on August 5th—precisely fifty years after the Russian government in Warsaw, through the hangman's noose, executed the last five members of the last Polish National Government. This date of August 5th was a festival and the day of the beginning of a new fight for independence. At the head of the movement stood Joseph Piłsudski, a Russian subject. The road to Kielce was open for him because the Russian armies retreated for strategical reasons and the armies of Austria-Hungary had not arrived. Neither was there any proclamation from any of the warring powers. The action of the Poles outran the coming events. In Kielce, where for a while no other armies had made their appearance and which was occupied only by the Polish troops, the independence of Poland was proclaimed. The churches resounded with Polish national anthems for which hitherto Russian government deported the people to Siberia. Polish flags showing the historical White Eagle were once more floating over the city showing their white and crimson colors to the eyes of the enthusiastic people. The ranks of the Polish revolutionary army began to swell by a large number of volunteers who were able to escape the Russian orders of mobilization.

One must have gone through slavery himself in order to understand and appreciate the feelings of a nation throwing off the shackles of its slavery.

On August 3, 1914, proclamations of a secret National Government were posted in Warsaw which summoned the nation to rise against Russia and join hands with the detachments of the Polish revolutionary army which was coming up from the Galician frontier. A young Pole, a member

of the Polish conspiracy, was caught by a Russian police while posting the aforesaid bills, and on the next day a volley shot from the rifles of an executionary squad ended his life in the citadel of Warsaw. He was the first victim of the war. About two weeks later the proclamation of the Russian commander-in-chief was issued; in this proclamation, from fear of the awakening revolutionary spirit, a promise of autonomy was made to Poland. It was not enough for a nation that had older political traditions than Russia but, above everything else, the promise came too late. The action of the Poles not only came ahead of the armies of both sides but also of their promises. In Galicia all the political parties succeeded in uniting and in getting into communication with the secret National Government in Warsaw. Because of the freedom of action in Galicia the center of gravity of the entire movement was shifted from Warsaw to Cracow from where the first signal for the war of independence was issued. On the basis of an agreement between the secret and open political parties in Galicia and Russian-Poland, which form together two-thirds of the organized parties in Poland, the Supreme National Committee was organized in Cracow on August 16, 1914; this committee until now has the supreme sway over the destinies of the nation. It is a political representation of Poland in the present war and it is a nucleus of the Polish state, should the conscience of the world awake and should Poland gain her independence. All the detachments of the Polish revolutionary forces which were in garrison in Kielce, received the name of "Polish Legions" from the Supreme National Committee. Thus the actual force of the nation, elements organized openly or secretly, and based on an entirely democratic principle, declared themselves against Russia and formed an alliance with Austria-Hungary. The Russian

promises did not succeed in halting them nor did so the memories of the ill-treatment suffered by the Poles to a great extent at the hands of Prussia.

The policy of every nation must be a real one, that means it must be based on facts, on real conditions of work and not on fantastic dreams. Nobody has any right to condemn republican France for allying herself with despotic Russia, although French money subsidized the struggle of Russian reaction against the progressive movement. Nobody has the right to blame England for going hand in hand with Russia, although ten years ago England perfectly consciously defeated Russia by the Japanese in Eastern Asia. Nobody has the right to condemn Servia for allying herself with Turkey against Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, although grass has not grown as yet on the graves at Kumanowo and Lule Burgas. In the same way, nobody can condemn Poland for allying herself with Austria-Hungary and throwing her forces against Russia. Every nation has a "ratio status" of its own, which determines the direction of its policy. This "ratio status" is the result of historical traditions and of material conditions for action. Positive results can be reached only through positive means. The road to Berlin does not lead through the moon but along the strategical line of the Rhine or the Vistula. The road from Italy to Trentino leads through the Alps but not across the ocean. It is useless to vociferate against the Germans when the ammunition gives out on the road to Berlin. A certain purpose requires positive means and the reality of the means is determined by the facts and the conditions on the theatre of a war or of politics. The alliance of Poland with Austria-Hungary was the result of the Polish "ratio status" and of real conditions which already beforehand decided that only by an alliance with Austria-Hungary and by a war against Russia, Poland

can become free and independent. Whoever thinks that the decision of Poland was influenced by feelings, sympathies, promises or fantastic hope, is mistaken. Poland did not stop to compare the injuries she suffered from Prussia with those she suffered at Russia's hands. This would have been a childish policy or a policy of nervous artists. Not feelings but interest decided the issue. Poland does not fight nowadays because of a desire of revenge against Russia nor because of a desire of showing her gratitude to Austria-Hungary. The anti-Polish policy of Russia was real and sincere, but the Polish anti-Russian policy was in no degree less sincere and less real. Poland understands and respects the "ratio status" of other states and other nations, even that of Russia, but Poland puts on the same basis before the world her own "ratio status" and fights for its realization.

Arms do not terminate war although they decide battles. An army with its blood establishes facts but the conclusions from these premises are drawn by the diplomats when the peace treaties are negotiated. The Polish question is not going to be decided on the battlefield, although battles are decided on Polish grounds. The Polish question shall come up together with the whole mass of political questions during the coming peace congress regardless of the form which the latter shall have. This is the goal for which the Polish hopes are aimed, and the work done by the Polish Legions paves the way to this goal.

One hundred years ago the Congress of Vienna was in session. The Napoleonic hurricane came to an end and then diplomacy started bargaining. The Polish question was one of the foremost among the issues confronting the Congress. Who did revive the Polish question in Europe? Polish troops followed the eagles of Napoleon in his expedition against Russia in 1812. The Polish army was headed by

Prince Joseph Poniatowski. The Polish army commanded by him was the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw established by Napoleon in 1807 at the peace treaty of Tilsit. Poland has established right at the very beginning of the Napoleonic era a military representation on the side of France. Then appeared for the first time the idea of Polish Legions. By way of Italy, Egypt and even Santo Domingo in America the Polish legions began their march to Warsaw. The road was a long one and cost a heavy toll of blood, but finally it led the legions to their intended goal. The Polish legions were not animated only by hatred when combating Russia nor did they help France only because of any feeling of sympathy. There were feelings even very keen, strong and sacred feelings, but they were far from deciding the Polish policy. The decisive factor was the desire of creating a Polish military representation on the background of Napoleonic wars in order thus to create a representation for the Polish aspirations for freedom and in order to confront Europe with the Polish question. Liberty can be gained only by blood and iron and therefore the flag carried by the Polish legions of a hundred years ago was such a flag of blood and iron. The glory which fell upon this flag of the legions became the glory of the Polish nation, and it was because of the merit of these legions that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was established at the peace treaty of Tilsit.

Napoleon was defeated, and his defeat meant at the same time the military defeat of the Polish cause. The commander of the Polish army, Prince Joseph Poniatowski, a hero known very well to-day all over Europe and a field-marshal of Napoleon's army, was drowned in the River Elster while covering the retreat of Napoleon from Leipzig. The Polish cause, however, did not perish. In spite of the military defeat the Polish legions of the Napoleonic army

caused the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland with a separate parliament and a Polish army in Warsaw. The fact that the Polish army helped Napoleon against Russia and thus against England did not obscure the view of the Cabinet of London. England did not hesitate to support the Polish cause against Russia although Russia was an ally of England in the latter's life and death struggle against Napoleon. The attack which in the battle of Leipzig Prince Joseph Poniatowski led against the village of Probstheida occupied by Russian troops commanded by Emperor Alexander I himself, was therefore something more than a mere incident of this "battle of nations." By conquering Probstheida, Prince Joseph Poniatowski "was conquering the capital of the future Kingdom of Poland under the eyes of this Kingdom's future monarch."* Prince Joseph Poniatowski perished and only remnants of the Polish regiments were left when the Napoleonic *epoch* came to an end. The blood and iron, however, have done their work: Polish regiments have compelled Europe to look at them as the representatives of the Polish state. Czar Alexander I had to yield to the opinion of Europe; and the Poles, although they lost militarily, they won, however, a political victory. They won the Kingdom of Poland which was supposed to be the nucleus for the future full reconstruction of Poland. Unfortunately, several years later Russia has broken the treaty of Vienna and abolished the constitution of the young state.

The example set by the Polish legions of a hundred years ago serves to-day as a guide for the Polish legions in the present war. The example of Prince Joseph Poniatowski is nowadays the guide of Piłsudzki in the present war. Regardless of the military result the fact will remain on the records of history that in the great European war

* S. Askenazy: "Książę Józef Poniatowski," 1913, page 292.

Poland created her own military representation to remind the world of the fact of her bloody and heroic existence to force the world to face the question of Polish independence. The future Congress will decide the issue, but the blood of the Polish legions will be the seed of liberty when finally the conscience of the world will awake and "one of the biggest crimes in history will have an end."* This is the basis of the Polish "ratio status" in the period of Poland's subjugation. Nobody had the right to demand that Poland should act against this "ratio status" of hers nor that it should follow the inspiration of the moment or believe in and wait for the fulfilment of somebody's promises. Poland exists between the hammer and the anvil, and every other nation would take the same course that Poland did, and the same course that the Polish legions took in the present war. This road agrees with the Polish traditions against Russia and with the Polish alliance with Austria-Hungary. The reason for this is a very simple and a very real one: the creating of a military representation was impossible in any other way. The first year of the European war has proved this contention by the force of facts. The attempt of Russia to organize a Polish legion in Warsaw against Austria-Hungary and Germany failed sadly and there is no Polish legion siding with Russia. On the other hand, the Polish legions against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary are developing fast and have reached already the figure of many thousands of men. The evacuation of Warsaw increased the numerical strength of the Polish legions considerably. So the actual facts proved which side showed more possibility and actual opportunity: the decision proved to be a practical one against Russia and for an alliance with Austria-Hungary.

* Clemenceau, l. c.

Poland is not a free country. Every male citizen in Poland is compelled to serve in either the Russian or the German or the Austro-Hungarian army. The outbreak of the war came as suddenly as a thunder-bolt from a clear sky. The mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary took about a million men away from Poland within twenty-four hours. The rest of able-bodied Polish men were confronted by the possibility of being called to the colors as the war continued. To-day we can safely say that after the first year of the war is over there remained in Poland only women, children and old people. How could an army be formed under such conditions? The best judgment and the greatest sympathies cannot possibly raise an army when men are lacking. Recruiting cannot be done on the moon nor can officers be made over night and the question of an army is not a question of improvising one. The mobilization of the Polish Legions therefore on the background of the mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary could only be conducted on the basis of the logic of actual conditions and not on the basis of feelings, of sympathies or dispositions. The territory in which the recruiting for Polish Legions was possible was the left bank of the Vistula in the Kingdom of Poland. Galicia and Posen could not furnish an adequate supply of recruits because they form together only 20 per cent. of the historical territory of Poland, and besides the mobilization of Austria-Hungary and of Germany goes quicker than the mobilization of Russia. This is the first fact of great importance, because owing to this fact the Russian mobilization was compelled to leave against its very intentions a large material of men for purpose of Polish policy. It was of no less importance that the Russian mobilization is less exact, that it proceeds more slowly, and that

Russia possesses 80 per cent. of the Polish historical territory and the old Polish capital of Warsaw. Those were the real conditions which regardless of the sympathies or the antipathies decided beforehand that by waging war against Russia only on the territory of Russian-Poland could the recruiting for the Polish Legions have any chance of success.

The map will show that the frontiers of Russian-Poland are flanked on the north by the Prussian frontier and on the south by the frontier of Galicia. In case of war there was a danger for the Russian armies in Russian-Poland that Austria-Hungary and Germany, which have a speedier mobilization, would by a flank attack from the north and from the south, cut them off on the Vistula and destroy them before the reserves from the interior of Russia would be able to reach the theatre of war. Russia was made aware of this danger long ago by some of her best generals such as Dragomirow, Hurko and even Kuropatkin. According to their judgment Russia had to evacuate in the first few weeks of the war the left bank of the Vistula for strategical reasons so that the reserves coming up from the interior of Russia would have a shorter road for getting to the battle line and thus be able to reach the seat of war before the armies of the enemy would be able to move forward from the north and from the south. This was known both in Poland and in Western Europe. France was afraid of this possibility as France was compelled to depend on a speedy offensive movement of Russia in the direction of Berlin and on this plan were based the hopes of France to protect Paris from a violent onrush of the German armies. This was a decisive fact for Poland. The evacuation of the western provinces of Russian-Poland by the Russians meant in case of the outbreak of the war the stopping of the

Russian mobilization in these districts. The western districts of Russian-Poland are chiefly industrial. Here are to be found large coal mines in the valley of Dąbrowa and of Sosnowiec, and besides there is a number of industrial centres such as Częstochowa or Nowo-Radomsk. The outbreak of the war closed the factories and the mines: the masses of laboring men were thrown out of employment, and as Russia had to retreat there was left for the Polish legions ready and very useful material of men. Thus the Polish legions recruited the majority of their soldiers from these sections of the country. Eighty per cent. of the soldiers in the Polish Legions were recruited in Russian-Poland and the majority among them came from the industrial districts which Russia had to evacuate in the beginning of the war temporarily for strategical reasons. This was an anticipated fact but still it played a decisive part in the Polish policy. The mobilization of Poland had to be necessarily directed against Russia if it was to be of any use and if it was to give results.

The rest of the task of organization rested with Galicia which for over half a century enjoyed the benefits of autonomy within the general constitution of Austria-Hungary. "Galicia has not been unhappy."* In Posen there are no Polish schools nor Polish university: in Russian-Poland there was a university, but a Russian one, and all schools were Russian too while private schools suffered from exceedingly heavy restrictions on the part of the Russian Government. In Posen, the Commission of Colonization originated by Bismarck bought up Polish land and settled it with Germans. In Russian-Poland the "Bank włościański" has done the same for over fifty years and colonizes Polish

* "The Germans," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 12.

land with Orthodox Russian peasants. In Lithuania and Little Russia the Poles are absolutely forbidden to buy land nor to sell to anyone except a Russian. Thus a Pole cannot acquire land which actually belongs to the Poles, neither in Lithuania or in Little Russia. Czar Nicholas I invented the system of destroying the Polish nation and Bismarck became his apt pupil. This was done very much to the disadvantage of Russia and of Germany and brought great harm to Poland. The development of the Polish nation thus remained under the most trying conditions, whereby great mistakes were committed in Petrograd with regard to the Polish question and still greater ones were committed by Berlin. The friendship between Germany and Russia was the basis for oppressing Poland. The celebration of the 500th anniversary of the victory of Grunwald, where the combined forces of Poland and Lithuania annihilated the power of the Teutonic Knights, could not be celebrated in Warsaw but only in Cracow in spite of the fact that not Russia but Austria-Hungary was in alliance with Germany. The monument of the victory over the Germans could be erected, and in fact still stands in Cracow but could not possibly stand in Warsaw. This is enough said to the initiated. It is a basis for understanding the policy of Poland in the present war. Owing to her autonomical freedom Galicia was able to become the territory on which the preparations for the future war of independence could be carried on. The best material of men from Russian-Poland took refuge in Galicia where these elements could be instructed militarily in special Polish military organizations. Thus Galicia educated the officers for the present Polish legions and only Galicia was able to do it. The first detachments of the Polish Legions which crossed the Russian frontier north of Cracow were skeleton detach-

ments composed only of officers and under-officers. On the left bank of the Vistula there were waiting for them the Polish recruits who were spared by the Russian mobilization and only too anxious to fight for their own sacred cause of independence.

This, however, was an old program and not a new one by any means.

In the years 1876-1878 when there was a danger of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia on account of the Balkan situation all the political parties of Poland united in order to prepare a new revolution against Russia in alliance with Austria-Hungary. For this purpose a "Confederation of the Polish Nation" was formed which played the part of a political representation of the nation. The movement was headed by Prince Sapieha who was assisted by Rev. Albin Dunajewski who subsequently was Bishop of Cracow and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. In those times England was on terms of friendship with Germany and protected Constantinople from the appetite of Russia. Thus England worked behind the stage in organizing a Polish revolution against Russia. The plan of the revolution consisted of marching armed and well organized detachments of revolutionary armies into Russian-Poland from Galicia: these detachments were intended to be the nucleus of the future Polish army. Russian-Poland was expected to furnish the men and Galicia the officers. The English Government was well informed of the entire plan and even promised to help quietly by furnishing arms and money. Cardinal Manning, who was famous all over England took part in a secret meeting of Polish politicians in Vienna: at this meeting important decisions were taken in case the war should really break out. There was no war, however, but the Congress of Berlin completed the diplo-

matic defeat of Russia. A tradition was left behind in Poland, however, to that effect that England has understood the Polish "ratio status" which prompted the Poles to avail themselves of their liberties in Galicia in order to prepare a revolution in Russian-Poland. For forty years ever since the Congress of Berlin, Poland did not discontinue her policy and constantly instructed young men in secret and in open organizations of military nature. Poland's policy was not altered by the fact that Austria-Hungary entered into an alliance with Germany which has lasted for over thirty years and furnished ample time to reconsider the matter: Poland's policy was not altered even when Prussia began a systematic oppression in Posen and England failed to protest against such treatment of the Poles. Just at this particular time England ceded Heligoland which became the basis for Germany's naval power. Several years later England preferred to threaten France with war on account of the Fashoda incident than to intervene at Berlin for the protection of the Poles although the oppression of the Poles in Posen by Prussia violated the treaty of Vienna of 1815. Bismarck was not fond of the sea and Poland is not Belgium and Warsaw does not face London. Poland felt bitterly over being abandoned to her fate by Western Europe, but she did not deter her from following her anti-Russian policy.

When after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria-Hungary, the danger of war became imminent to Poland, new organizations were added to those which existed since the time of the Congress of Berlin and preparations were going on feverishly. The Polish "ratio status" did not change at all since the time when Cardinal Manning conferred in Vienna with representatives of Poland on the details of a revolution against Russia. To-day Eng-

land is militarily allied with Russia: the English tactics changed, but the conditions in Poland did not. Cardinal Dunajewski is also dead, but another dignitary of the Roman Catholic Church, Bishop Bandurski, is a member of the Supreme National Committee. The only change that has occurred is that Poland's sufferings became greater and deeper. Should this be the reason why England no longer understands the Polish "ratio status," although England has understood it and recognized it forty years ago under analogous conditions for Poland?

Poland has been and is still in a most precarious position. She could not do anything else but fight against Russia, and in order to do this she had to draw her recruits from Russian-Poland and her supply of officers from Galicia. This was not prompted by feelings but by actual conditions of things. Not because of blind hatred but because of absolute necessity was Poland compelled to direct her main attacks against Russia. Warsaw the Capital of Poland and besides eighty per cent. of Poland's territory was in Russia's hands or in other words, Russia held the trunk of Poland's body. It is therefore quite natural that the Polish attack had to be directed against Russia.

On October 2, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Government drafted a diplomatic note addressed to all neutral countries in which the said government officially recognized the Polish Legions as combatants. This important document ended as follows:

"Any action on the part of Russia which would imply a refusal to recognize the Polish Legions as a combatant party would constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Convention of The Hague and against which the Government of Austria-Hungary already now files a most categorical protest."

This note was published by the "Fremdenblatt" of Vienna, which is the official organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus the Polish military representation obtained an official sanction. The Polish soldier became a political factor in Europe because the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government secured for him the protection of international law. The future peace congress has therefore a perfect freedom of action with regard to the Polish question. When some time in the future the hostilities will be suspended this moment will find the Polish Legions in the field. Regardless of the military result of the war this is going to be a fact which from the former point of view will greatly facilitate the reviving of the Polish question at the time of the coming peace congress. According to international law Poland is only a combatant party but is not a belligerent one because there is only a Polish nation and no Polish state. Hitherto only a Polish military representation is recognized in the world-war; nevertheless, the Polish Legions can constitute a material as well as a formal point of departure for the initiative in the Polish question when the future peace congress will meet. Poland hopes that the conscience of the world will awake and that historical justice is going to be done. Poland did everything on her part to organize a military representation of her own, and it is now Europe's turn to bring about the happiness of humanity and the freedom of nations when this awful war will come to an end.

The note of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Polish Legions has greatly alarmed Russia. Petrograd decided therefore at once upon an attempt of organizing in Warsaw of Polish Legions for the purpose of combating against the Germans. It was an intrigue intended for provoking a voluntary fight between the Poles themselves and thus killing

the Polish question from the international point of view. Organizing two military representations is absurd. The danger for Poland was great and because of unemployment, famine and particularly because of the mistakes made by the policy of Prussia with regard to Poland in the times preceding the war it was comparatively easy for Russia to mislead individuals. Poland is an oppressed country, without a government after all, and therefore every individual has a free hand to act as he pleases. Oppression has accustomed the nation to the principle of "*liberum censeo*," which principle permits every individual to consider himself as his own governor. The level of political enlightenment of the masses is not equal in all parts of Poland, where, by the way, the schools are in other hands than those of the Poles and where a general oppression prevails. Russia therefore determined to destroy what the legions of Cracow have accomplished politically. In November, 1914, that means about four months after the Polish Legions have crossed the Russian frontier, Czar Nicholas II has commissioned his Chamberlain, Count Wielopolski, to organize in Warsaw a Polish National Committee as a competition to the Supreme National Committee of Cracow. The right hand and in fact the brain of Count Wielopolski's action was a confidential man of the Russian Government, a former member of the Duma, Roman Dmowski. A portion of the Polish nobility and of the moneyed bourgeoisie supported this movement.

During all revolutions there were loyal parties, which distrusted the sword and were apt to believe in deceitful promises. The French Revolution had its loyalists and so had it American revolution in times of Washington.

The first utterance of the Committee of Warsaw was the proclamation of November 25, 1914, in which a protest was

made against the Supreme National Committee: the authors of this proclamation, however, did not have the courage of denying the fact that Austria-Hungary was "the only state in which our national rights had met with a measure of recognition."* The autonomy of Galicia has been in force for over half a century, while the autonomy under Russian sovereignty was hitherto only a promise of the commander-in-chief. Under such conditions and because of a number of other practical considerations which were explained above, the Committee of Warsaw was necessarily without real backing among the Poles. All democratic parties refused to support the Committee in question: the latter tried to gain in importance by co-operating with the Committee of the Polish members of the Russian Duma in Petrograd. Russian-Poland used to elect to the Russian Duma only fourteen deputies out of a population of 12,000,000. Besides, the election law was of the most reactionary nature and deprived the masses of the people of any influence whatsoever. For these reasons the Poles boycotted the Russian Duma since the reactionary times of Stołypin and only the nobility and certain elements of the moneyed bourgeoisie took part in the election. This condition of things was correctly estimated by the London "Times," which, after the outbreak of the war and after the declaration of loyalty on the part of the Polish members of the Duma, has questioned the political value of their move because "chosen on the franchise and in the conditions which exist," they cannot "speak for the whole people."† The London "Times" is a newspaper of high standing and therefore had its doubts, which by the way were quite justified, whether the Polish

* "Poland, Russia and the War," by Alma Tadema, London, 1914, page 21.

† The "Times," London, August 17, 1914.

nation will be able "to forget 1830 and 1863?" Reality has soon manifested itself in spite of the artificial propaganda made by the press. The Committee of Warsaw supported the Russian plan of organizing a Polish Legion on Russia's side. A most spirited propaganda was carried on for three months and failed completely. The nation did not back up the action, and no army can be raised on paper nor by spilling streams of ink and making a propaganda. Several hundred of misled volunteers were quietly incorporated into the Russian army: thus the entire undertaking failed politically. The Russian intrigue came to a naught and the moral standing as well as the numerical strength of the Polish Legions organized in Cracow was increased considerably.

The reasons for Russia's failure in Warsaw were very grave ones. Russia promised autonomy to Poland but she did not promise independence. While the war that is waged at the present time is conducted for the sake of the liberty of nations Russia only offered autonomy which by the way was only administrative and not legislative. To the Poles it meant only uniting under one yoke instead of under three which was far from being a program of independence. All illusions were swept away by the *Corriere della Sera* of Milano which stated that the Czar has purposely failed to sign the proclamation with regard to the Polish cause.* The "Gołos Moskwy" confirmed this by betraying the fact that the manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas was not backed up at all by the Russian Government and that this was merely a tactical move which was required from Russia by General Joffre. The attitude of the Russian Government during the war gave conclusively justified the suspicions of Poland since Russia did not cease for one moment to exterminate all aspirations for Polish independence. The

* "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 1915, page 23.

Russian Government has forbidden to put the White Eagle, which is the national emblem of Poland, on the flags of the Legion that Russia attempted to organize in Warsaw, and even Polish national anthems were sternly prohibited by the police.* While this was going on the Russian Government abolished autonomy in Eastern Galicia which was then occupied by the Russian armies and began to proceed with the russification of this province.

Eastern Galicia never formed a part of Russia and belonged to Poland ever since 1340. From the ethnographical point of view it has a mixed population the majority of which is Ruthenian in the eastern district of the said province. This, however, does not justify at all Russian imperialism. The Ruthenians and the Russians have just as much in common as the Belgian Walons have with France or the Belgian Flamands with Holland. Does this entitle France or Holland to annex Belgium? The imperialism of Russia, however, did not possess any nationalistic scruples in spite of the fact that international law does not permit a legal annexation of an occupied territory. Count Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of Eastern Galicia, declared right upon his arrival in Lemberg that he "shall introduce here the Russian language, Russian law, the Russian state administration," and that "the Polish Diet shall not be convoked."† In consequence thereof the Polish university as well as all educational institutions, both Polish and Ruthenian, were closed at once. Every possible autonomy has been abolished at once and instead the Russian despotic and anti-democratic system of government was introduced. Tshichatshef, who advocated the separation of the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, in the Russian

* "Nowa Gazeta," Warsaw, November 11, 1914.

† "For a Lasting Peace," page 23.

Duma has with a knowledge of the Russian Government outlined a plan for colonizing Galicia with Russian Orthodox peasants.* Only the defeat of the Russian armies and the liberation of Lemberg has saved Galicia from the activity of the Russian "Bank włościanski" which distinguishes itself from the Prussian Commission of Colonization only by the fact of being older. Besides religious tolerance was abolished and the Greek Orthodox religion was introduced forcibly. The Greek Catholic Church which for centuries was united with the Roman Church was slated as a victim. And Russia attempted to introduce religious persecution into Eastern Galicia after having already made a bloody debut of a similar action in the province of Kholm, in Lithuania and in the Ukraina. History, however, has already passed a sentence on this action of Russia by saying as follows: "In Poland's ancient provinces, inhabited by the united Greeks, the government obliged the people to sign addresses to the Czar, asking him for the restoration of the Orthodox religion. Those who refused to sign were put into prison or deported.† The culminating point of the Russian method of converting to the Orthodox religion, was the year 1875. In Kroże few volleys had been fired into praying crowds of Greek Catholic worshipers, and in other parts of Russian-Poland thousands of people were deported to Siberia, and thus the Greek Catholic Church has been destroyed in Eastern Poland. At once after the temporary occupation of Lemberg by the Russian armies the Russian Bishop Eulogius came on a similar mission to Eastern Galicia. His action has soon manifested itself. The "Russkij Inwalid" published in January, 1915, the news that Bishop Eulogius had submitted to the Holy Synod in Petro-

* "Nowoje Wremia," Petrograd, April 15, 1915.

† M. Seignobos: "Contemporary History," 1910, page 422.

grad a report in which he insisted upon "abolishing in Galicia of the spiritual Greek Catholic hierarchy because the Russian law does not recognize the Greek Catholic Church."*

Sapienti sat.

"Slavic brotherhood and liberating the Poles from Prussian oppression" proved in practice to be nothing else but introducing of Russian oppression into autonomous Galicia which was the last refuge of free Polish thought. The zeal of Russia in this direction unfortunately proved to be a universal one. No voice of protest was raised by anybody in Russia and once more voices became loud suggesting the exclusion of the Polish question from the questions to be decided by the future peace congress. The Russian reactionary party as well as the progressive party joined hands in order to prevent the Polish question to become something else than "an internal problem of Slavdom," which in practice meant nothing else but an internal problem of the Russian Government. It is useless to speak about the reactionary party because its feelings toward Poland were only too well known. It was more painful that even Briantshaninov, a truly liberal Russian politician agreed with the reactionary party that "Europe should under no circumstances take any part in the settlement of the mutual relations between Russia and Poland."† The progressive "Utro Rossiji" went still further, and considered the suggestions of turning over the Polish question for settlement to England, France and Russia, even with exclusion of Austria-Hungary and Germany, as "illegal and criminal," because the organization of future Poland "does not of right

* "Goniec," Warsaw, January 17, 1915.

† "Kurjer poranny," Warsaw, March 11, 1915.

rest with any congresses at all.”* Anybody, however, who would suggest that the fate of Poland should not depend upon the mercy of the victor was threatened with deportation to Siberia.

Independence can either be an absolute one or can acquire the form of a state within a state, as such is the case with Hungary or with Bavaria. Russia is opposed to such either form of independence as far as Poland is concerned. Russia is afraid of an absolute independence of Poland because such an independence of Poland would keep Russia away from Central Europe and would stop Russia's pressure on the road leading through Vienna to Constantinople. Russia is furthermore afraid of Poland as a state within the state under the domination of Russia because the freedom of Poland could turn out to be contagious for Russia herself and particularly for Finland and the Caucasus. The freedom of Poland is a danger to reactionary government and to despotism. The fear of progress prompted Russia to promise Poland in the present war nothing else but autonomy, administrative and not legislative at that.

The Russian plan with regard to Poland created an impression in Western Europe and particularly in America, because it has promised the uniting of the entire Poland under the sceptre of the Czar. The Russian plan has thus promised one yoke instead of three and has thus apparently simplified matters. All these beautiful phrases, however, concealed a truly Byzantinic perfidy. Poland has ethnographical as well as political boundaries: the first ones are boundaries of actual settlement while the other ones are boundaries of the Polish State which has ceased to exist. Russia decided to apply to the eastern portion of Poland the ethnographical principle and to the western portion of

* “Goniec wieczorny,” Warsaw, January 7, 1915.

Poland the historical principle. Acting on this basis Russia has separated before the war the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, and during the war, Eastern Galicia from Austrian-Poland, whereby she assumed the point of view that the territory settled by the Ruthenians in Galicia reaches as far as the upper course of the Dunajec. In contradiction with the historical fact that neither the province of Kholm nor Eastern Galicia have ever formed a part of the Russian State, and in contradiction with the ethnographical fact that the Ruthenians are not Russians, Russia considered the province of Kholm and Galicia as far as the course of the upper Dunajec as Russian territory and endeavored to eliminate them from Polish influence. This meant nothing else but cutting slices away from Poland in the east promising at the same time to extend the boundaries in the west. For Kholm, Lemberg, Przemyśl, and Nowy Sącz Russia promised to Poland, Cracow, Silesia, Posen, Danzig, and Koenigsburg. Cracow used to be the crowning place of the Polish Kings, Posen was the cradle of Poland, Danzig was Poland's harbor on the Baltic Sea, Silesia fell apart from Poland even before the end of the Middle Ages and was not a part of Poland at the time of Poland's partitions, while Koenigsburg was the capital of a feudal principality of Poland and not the capital of a Polish province. Koenigsburg was the capital of East Prussia which was built up in the Middle Ages by the Teutonic Knights during their wars against Slav tribes. The program of Russia in the west agreed, therefore, with the historical traditions of Poland and not with the ethnographical considerations. This program apparently flattered the Polish national pride but in outlining this program Russia was prompted by different and very selfish reasons. The boundaries of historical Poland agree with the boundaries needed

by Russian strategical considerations on Russia's western frontier. These considerations form the question of the Vistula line of defence. The uniting of Polish territories under the sceptre of the Czar would solve very advantageously for Russia the paradox of the Vistula, which before the war passed through three different states. By uniting Poland the Vistula would become an internal river of the Russian Empire and the frontier would move west as far as the upper Oder. In the first year of this war the Russian press has on different occasions stated quite plainly that strategical considerations are pushing Russia as far west as Frankfort on the Oder.

The forcible pushing of the frontier of future Poland in the westerly direction, and at the same time cutting off the genuine Polish soil in its eastern part, raises the relative per cent. of the German element in Poland to the disadvantage of the native element. Eastern Prussia is inhabited by 2,064,175 people, but there are only 16 per cent. of Poles. Eastern Prussia never was a Polish province, but only a principality held in feudal tenure. In Western Prussia the population numbers 1,703,477, but the per cent. of Poles is 35, especially so on both banks of the Vistula River which used to be a road to the sea at the time of the Polish kingdom. The Province of Posen, the cradle of the Polish state, has 2,099,831 people, and in this number there are only 765,000 Germans. The lower, middle and upper Silesias are inhabited by 5,225,962 people. Poles inhabit mostly upper Silesia, their number being 1,158,789. All of these provinces constitute the so-called Prussian part of former Poland, lost by Poland at the time of her partition, or before it, as it was the case with Silesia and Eastern Prussia. The Polish population on this entire area numbers 3,646,446. The German population in both Eastern and Western Prussia is

2,922,699; in the Province of Posen, 765,000; in Silesia 4,067,173, totaling 7,754,822. Consequently there are here twice as many Germans as Poles.* The cause of this preponderance of German element is the fact that Silesia and Eastern Prussia were undergoing a process of Germanization still in the Middle Ages, and they did not belong to Poland at the time of her partition. The Russian plans to make the Vistula an internal river of the Russian empire endangers the Polish ethnographical interests, since they introduce too large a percentage of Germans into the Polish organism.

When the ethnographical data of Russian-Poland, Western Galicia and of Prussian-Poland, which provinces Russia promised to reunite, are compared, the danger becomes very evident. The population of Russian-Poland is 12,467,300, of which Poles number 9,115,220; Germans, 618,590; Jews, 1,660,490. The population of Galicia is 8,025,675, Poles claim 4,000,000, Ruthenians 3,674,000 and Germans 212,000. Russia intends to annex Eastern Galicia up to the line of the lower San, lower Wislock, and upper Dunajec. In other words, for the "United Poland" there would be left only two "governments," that of Cracow and that of Tarnow. In doing this Russia separates ethnographically about 2,500,000 Poles in the middle, and Eastern Galicia and leaves them a prey to russification. This plan allows "United Poland" only 1,500,000 Poles out of Galicia. The ethnographical aspect of Poland thus "United" would be as follows:

Russian-Poland	9,115,220 Poles
Western Galicia	1,500,000 "
Polish provinces retaken from	
Prussia	3,646,446 "
Total	14,261,666 Poles

* According to "The New International Yearbook," New York, 1914, and according to Polish statistics.

The number of Germans on the same area would be:

(1) In the parts retaken from Prussia, 7,754,822 people—if Silesia and Eastern Prussia would also be united with Poland.

(2) In Russian-Poland, together with the Jews, 2,279,080.

(3) In Western Galicia 212,000, and together with those Jews who do not claim to be Poles, about 500,000.

The total number of Germans and Jews in Poland "Re-united," according to the Russian prescription, would be 10,533,902.

It is plain now that such a plan only furthers German interests if the historical frontiers of Poland are extended in the westerly direction, while at the same time its eastern possessions are separated from it. The Jewish jargon is only a corrupted German, and the Jews were always in middle Europe, and especially in Poland, the vanguard of Teutonism. In defining the boundaries of Poland, and using the ethnographical key in the east, and the historical key in the west, Russia would create an ethnographical paradox, a state with a mixed population, where sooner or later a serious internal strife would be bound to arise. That is what Russia is aiming at, since then the Russian government would play the part of a peacemaker. The national strifes would render the normal development of the autonomy impossible, and would soon enable Russia to retake the power to Petrograd. The life of the promised autonomy would be a short one and the triumph of despotism early.

It is hard to assume that Europe would permit of the strategical occupation by Russia of the upper Oder River. Practically this is the only plan of occupation of the upper Silesia and perhaps of small parts of the middle and lower Silesia. Under these circumstances the number of Germans within the boundaries of Poland "United" by Russians

would be lower, but the ratio would be at any rate that of eight Germans and Jews, to fourteen Poles. This is entirely too large a ratio to reflect favorably on the internal conditions of the future state. The Germans constitute a rich, capable and aggressive element. The Jews are by no means inferior to them as far as aggressiveness is concerned, and they represented always, with their culture and language, the vanguard of Germanism in middle Europe. Both of them possess enormous financial resources, which they would throw upon Poland, devastated by war, in order to buy out the land and seize the industry with the help of foreign money. Russia never hesitated in her internal affairs to employ the Germans against the Poles, and still less would she hesitate to use them for the annihilation of autonomy of Poland "United," under the Czar's sceptre. A terrifying picture for Poland! It is by no means an empty phrase that the Jewish jargon is only corrupted German, and that the Jews were and still are, in middle Europe, the vanguard of Germanism. Jewish journalists frequently stated that the Jewish jargon "belongs to the great family of German languages, and that the Jews, despite the 500 years spent in the Slavic environment, preserved the German language, and even to-day belong to the German cultural stock."* As a consequence many of the Jewish leaders, who, up to the time of expulsion of Russians from Galicia, wooed Russia, now look up to the favors of victorious Berlin that it may support Jews against Poles, since the Jews form in Poland a "German cultural island."

There was a sly reservation in the manifesto in which Nicolai Nikolayevitsh promised Poland reunion and autonomy under the sceptre of the Czar—"There is but one thing

* Sonntagsblatt der "New Yorker Staatszeitung," 18, 7, 1915. "Die osteuropäische Judenfrage und der Krieg," by Dr. Malamed.

that Russia expects from you, that you respect the rights of those nationalities with which history has bound you." This was an attempt to check-mate the future of Poland with the Jewish question. The Jewish press of the whole world, basing itself on the above manifesto, started to demand equal national rights for Jews in Poland. Russia is known all over for her antisemitic feelings. Up to the latter days of this war, the Jews were not permitted to settle in Russia proper. The area permitted for Jewish settlement is more or less coincident with the area of the former Kingdom of Poland. The center of gravity of the Jewish question was by means of terrorism and pogroms transferred toward the Vistula. As the result of this partial policy of Petrograd, the percentage of Jews on Polish soil rose to a higher degree than anywhere else. In Russian-Poland the Jews constitute 13.71 per cent. of the 12,464,300 total population. In Lithuania and Polish-Ruthenia the percentage is somewhat higher. It is an artificial result of the antisemitic policy of the Russian government which routs the Jews from Russia proper and takes "fatherly" care of them in Poland. The manifesto of Prince Nikolai struck the same note, although it enveloped it discreetly with an appeal to justice.

The public opinion in Russia saw through it at once. Prince E. Trubeckoi, a recognized authority in Russian political life, published an address in which he expressed his satisfaction and hope that Russia, after the victory, will be able to solve two of her most vexing problems, namely, the Polish and Jewish question.* And Milukoff, the leader of the Liberals in Russia, pointed out very clearly the parallelism of both questions in his daring statement that "the country across the Vistula is not exclusively inhabited by Poles, but that there exists another nationality, the Jews, who have

* "Russkoje Wiedomosti," 10, 31, 1914.

a right to be considered as a separate people, though being in the minority.”* The same Russia which could not afford to grant equal civic rights to the Jews wants future Poland to grant them more, namely, the recognition of separate national rights, which Jews do not possess anywhere else in Western Europe, and in America. Both the philosemitic progressive party and the antisemitic reactionary party joined hands in order to sustain the former Russian policy toward the Jews, the policy which can only bring detriment to Poland. Instead of abolishing the boundary of Jewish settlement in the east, and granting the Jews equal civic rights, Russia wants to expand the area of their settlement to the west in order to create artificially with the aid of Jews and Germans national strife on the Vistula, and be able to abolish under this pretext the promised autonomy. Russia wants to create Judeo-Poland and thus facilitate the final russification and destruction of Poland.

In their attitude toward the Polish question, the Jews joined hands with Russia. “The Jewish press in the Polish provinces welcomed the Polish manifesto with almost hysterical enthusiasm.” The Jewish dailies in Warsaw said editorially that the Jews “are deeply grateful to the Russian commander-in-chief because in his manifesto to the Poles he did not forget to mention the other nationalities whose fate is bound up with that of the Poles,” and it is to be expected “that, in accordance with the manifesto, the Poles will respect the rights of the other nationalities within their provinces.”† Even in America, which was the centre of the anti-Russian-Jewish activity, a definite change can be observed. The same Jewish press, which a few years ago tried to influence the government to break off the commercial

* “The Globe,” New York, March 1, 1915.

† “The Day,” February 18, 1915.

treaties with Russia, is now elated by "Purishkewitsh, the Black Hundred Leader in the Duma, having kissed the scroll of Torah."* They started in this war a general white-washing of Russia and a simultaneous slandering of Poland, intimating that "the pogrom policy *abandoned* by the Russian government was taken up in another form by the Poles!"† A whole machinery of slander and impudent lies was set in motion so as to finish up the unfortunate nation visited by all the calamities of the present war.

With lies, however, one cannot go far.

The note of the Jewish Bund proved beyond doubt that there were never any pogroms in Poland arranged by Poles. In December, 1914, Mr. Herman Bernstein publicly announced that "the Poles resolved to methods of barbarism in their policy of Jew-hatred—their hands are smeared with the blood of the Jews in Poland; a nation of pogrom-makers is unworthy of independence."‡ About a year afterward, when the same Mr. Bernstein returned from Europe, he ceased to speak about the "Polish pogroms," and at the first interview when landing on the continent attested that "for their military defeat on the battlefield, the Russian authorities made military pogroms against their own peaceful Jewish population."§ The main argument that Poles instigated Russian soldiers to the pogroms is puerile and ludicrous. Russia having in her record Kishenieff, Siedlce and Bialystok does not need any instigation. In spite of that, the Jewish press does not stop flirting with Puriskewitsh, although the latter is a deputy from Kishenieff, and endeavors to direct public opinion against the independence of Poland.

* "New York Sun," and "The Day," 2, 18, 1915.

† l. c., Bernstein Herman.

‡ "The Day," December 13, 1914.

§ "The New York Times," October 18, 1915.

These are the facts which show plainly that the Jews aid the Russian project of solving the Polish question and try to subdue the independence of Poland. The Jews themselves do not believe in any change in Russia, and that is the reason why they would gladly welcome the expansion of their settlement in the westerly direction in Poland, remaining at the same time in connection with Russia. In the internal politics they would be certain of the German aid, because in Poland the Jews are always the vanguard of Germanism. As far as commerce is concerned, they calculate on the capture of the eastern markets in Asia. In the wake of the Russian sword, if the latter were capable of opening the gates of Constantinople, Jewish money would pour into China and India where it would displace the capital of the Western European nations and pave the way for the Russian army. Thus the Russian imperialism and the Jewish commercial expansion were brought close together in the present war.

Poland was always friendly to Jews, especially the democratic, aspiring Poland. In the insurrection of 1863 the Jew, Wohl, was the treasurer of the national government, and the banker, Kronenberg, was one of the important personages. Before the very outbreak of the uprising, when the Russian soldiers were shooting at the Polish church procession on the streets of Warsaw as it emerged from the cathedral of St. John, the cross which fell from the hands of a Pole shot dead by a Russian soldier was picked up by a Jew and the demonstration was led by a Jew. It was only due to Russian influence that the friendly relations between Poles and Jews were brought to an end. Russophilism and antisemitism in Poland are but two aspects of the same thing. Roman Dmowski, who in the present war was the main-spring of the Russophilic committee, was, before the war, the leader of the antisemitic movement. The attitude of the

Jews toward the Polish cause proved to be identical with that of the Russophilic antisemites in Warsaw. Democratic Poland fighting for her liberty is just as Anti-Russian as it is not, and never was, antisemitic. This question has been sifted during the present war by Prof. Dr. W. L. Jaworski, the president of the Polish Supreme National Committee:

“Antisemitism, no matter in what form it would appear, might bring only an injury to our national interests. The shortcomings of the Polish commerce and industry can neither be removed by antisemitism nor by national demagogism; they could be removed only by wide reforms that would enable them to establish better hygiene of the inner social and economic relations in general; that would raise the standard of culture among the wide masses, and that would offer new openings for new fields in industry and for general development.

“Only frank and decided declaration that regenerated Poland would not maintain the policy of antisemitism, the policy of chicanery and persecution, might help to make Jews better citizens on one hand, and on the other hand it would check the wide anti-Polish crusade carried on now by Jews abroad. Leaving Russia and turning to Western Europe, Poland must follow the example given by the countries of Western Europe in solving the Jewish question, namely, Poland must gain sympathy of Jews by granting them equal rights of citizens. At the same time, we must emphatically demand of Jews that they become the true citizens of the country—that they act for the interest of the country, and work for her development. This end could be secured only by giving the Jews in Poland access to the sources of welfare and culture. As in Western Europe, Jews have become either good Frenchmen, Englishmen,

Italians or Germans, so we have the right, too, to demand of our Polish Jews to become good Poles and be real good citizens of Poland.”

Poland cannot and will not recognize any hyphenated Poles!

For the sake of historical accuracy, I take the liberty to assert that the attack of the Jewish press on Poland, not only here in America, but also all over the world, was made suddenly and without any endeavor on the part of the Jews to come to an understanding with the Polish Supreme National Committee regarding the policy of future Poland on the Jewish question. The enmity of the Jews against the Poles plainly manifested itself in this country of free speech and free press, by the failure to insert vindications of the Poles against a wave of calumnies thrown at the Polish nation, the first step being made by George Brandes, who wrote an open and most unjust letter. Jewish nationalists were very well aware of the fact that Poland, not being anti-semitic in general as a nation, must, however, be anti-zionistic when the zionism or Jewish nationalism endeavors with Russian or German aid to create the Judeo-Poland.

Those who think that the Jewish question in Poland means an antagonism against the Jews are grossly mistaken. It is something entirely different, inasmuch as the war made on the Polish nation by the Jewish nationalistic party all over the world tends to obtain for the Jews in Poland not the rights of equal citizenship, but a recognition of a distinct national franchise in order to make of Poland a country of mixed nationality and thus to create, with the help of Russia, a precedent for the revision of the entire Jewish question in Europe and possibly also in America in the near future. The following quotation may serve as an illustration: “In order that Jews may be assured of equality in civil and political

life it is essential that they be accorded recognition as a national group in Poland," and "it is hardly probable that any sensible Jew will object to the Jewish demand for equal recognition with the Ruthenians, the Czechs, the Slavs of the Austrian Empire."*

The attitude of the whole world toward the Jewish question can be expressed by the formula of the French revolution: "The Jews as a nation should be deprived of everything, but the Jews as men should be assured of everything."† This is the principle of equal civic rights for Jews without granting them separate national rights. Contrary to this, the Jews demand in future Poland equal recognition for their jargon as a national tongue. Even Western Europe has not as yet grown up to the national concubinage, and Poland is still less ready to outdo the whole world in the Jewish question. Jewish nationalism does not lie within the practical political demands. *Natura non facit saltus*. The development of democracy in Europe must at first separate the idea of national consciousness from the idea of owning the soil. Only then will it be possible for a nation to exist within a nation. At present the whole world stands on the basis of the principle of the French revolution, and Poland, being in the throes of this terrible war, cannot indulge in risky experiments.

Russia understands that in case of her eventual victory over the Germans, there will come a time when the Germans will start the war of retaliation—no matter what key Russia is going to use in making the frontiers of the "United Poland." Both the ethnographical and the historical keys bring Russia closer to Berlin. The victory of Russia would not weaken Germany as much as it would weaken Prussia within the

* "Dos Yidische Folk," New York, November 12, 1915.

† Clermon Tonners, 21, 12, 1789, in the National Assembly.

German empire. Prussia cannot submit to this weakening for any length of time and she will not lack means and cleverness to draw the German empire into her plans of revenge. Russia must take into account that the German war of revenge in the east will have the support of England, since England is the enemy of German ambitions on the sea and in colonial enterprises, but she is not Germany's rival on land, and especially not in Eastern Europe. England, after having defeated Germany on the sea, and having ousted the Germans from Belgium, will gladly attack the victorious Russia with German hands on the first occasion, so as not to permit the excessive overgrowth of Russia. These are the factors which guide Russia's policy in Poland in the present war. Russia must, due to her aggressive traditions, gravitate toward the Oder, and the road to the Oder leads over the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. This tendency is couched in Russian diplomatic language in the phrase—"Uniting Poland under the sceptre of the Czar." In reality it means the securing of her eventual western frontiers, in order to make the best use of her numerical superiority in the future inevitable retaliatory war with Germany and Austria. Politically the Russian plan tries to poison Poland with an excess of Germans and Jews, which process would facilitate the digestion of the occupied territories and absolute conquest of the Vistula.

The game has been going on for a year.

There was no greater strategical mistake on the part of Russia than her victory over Hindenburg at Warsaw. Hindenburg's offensive was merely a strategical provocation to draw the centrum of the Russian army to the left bank of the Vistula, and then to threaten with flank attacks both Russian wings, and not permitting any movement westward for fear of losing the lines of communication. The defence

of Warsaw was the beginning of the defeat of Russia on the Vistula. The paradox of the Vistula, Austria holding the upper course, Russia the middle, and Germany the lower, proved its inherent danger. The strategical road toward the west does not run through Warsaw so long as Cracow and Danzig do not belong to the aggressor. Dragomirow, Hurko and Kuropatkin were right in advising Russia to follow Kutuzow's plan which originated in his combat with Napoleon. With the Mazurian Lakes in the north and the Carpathian passes in the south, endangering both wings of the Russian army, Russia cannot attack successfully either Vienna or Berlin. The Russian offensive movement through Warsaw forces the Russian army to assume an arched position, with the center directed toward the west and both flanks running backwards, one along the Mazurian Lakes and the other along the Carpathian Mountains. Such a strategical position is synonymous with defeat. With Poland divided into three parts and the strategical difficulty of the Vistula created thereby, the only way for Russia to victory is to follow Kutuzow's method and retire beyond the Niemen and Bug rivers. Strategically it means the evacuation of Russian-Poland in the first period of the war. Politically it signifies the superfluity of Russian-Poland for Russia. The Russian rule over Poland has no political, no historical, no moral basis, not even a strategical one. For Poland it means injury, for Russia it means an unnecessary burden of false imperialism. History administered justice to Russia by her terrible defeat, and gave her warning for the future. Only an independent Poland can solve easily the strategical difficulty of the Vistula.

The independence of Poland has not only a historical foundation, but also a strategical one. The partition of Poland renders the Russian offensive westward impossible.

In the present condition of Poland, the road to Vienna or Berlin does not lead through Warsaw; on the contrary, Austria-Hungary and Germany dominate the Russian line of fortresses of Warsaw, Deblin* and Modlin,† as long as they possess the Mazurian Lakes and the Carpathian Mountains, while the road toward the east is open for them. This is the fundamental contrast in the strategical interests of Germany and Austria on one side, and Russia on the other. This contrast can only be removed by the independence of Poland. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Poland will be restored after the present war. In the future war of retaliation, Poland by the power of her existence only will defend Russia against an out-flanking movement from the side of the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. Poland remaining neutral, the territory about the middle of the Vistula cannot be made the field of military operations. It is hardly conceivable, however, that Poland could stay neutral in such a war. It will be the war for the possession of the Vistula line! If we assume that Poland would turn against Russia, then the line of conflict will be formed by the rivers Niemen, Bug and Dniester. In other words, Russia will be free from danger of flank attacks upon her wings and will have the possibility of the frontal attack in the westerly direction. In case Poland would turn against Germany and Austria-Hungary, Warsaw would be in danger of a flanking attack from the side of the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains, which fact equalizes in favor of Germany and Austria the numerical superiority of Russia. The new partition of Poland between Austria and Germany will deprive them of the possibility of the flanking movement, since it will not restore Poland but only remove Russia

* Ivangorod.

† Novo-Georgievsk.

from Warsaw. This will only be favorable for Russia, since it will facilitate her eventual frontal attack on the whole line, leaving her flanks secure in a good strategical position. Only the neutrality of independent Poland may be a factor for insuring a permanent peace, since it will render difficult the Russian offensive toward the west, as well as that of Austria and Germany toward the east. Besides this, a line of Polish fortresses on the Niemen, Bug and Dniester would also materially assist in guaranteeing peace.

There is a difference in power a free nation can display from that of an enslaved nation. The free and independent Poland will soon become the center of Slavic creative power in harmony with the interests of Western Europe, and without political Russophilism. Poland even now neutralizes the Russian influence in the Slavic world, since she is an older historical unit than Russia. The Balkan states are free, but their civilization is inferior to that of Russia and that is why the Balkans are such favorable soil for Russian political propaganda. The equilibrium of Europe can only be maintained by the division of the Slavic world. In Warsaw, the Roman cross and the traditions of Rome; in Moscow, and on the Dnieper, the cross and the traditions of Constantinople. This does not mean the separation of two religious systems only. Two different cultures, sympathies, arts, and finally, two different forms of political law should be separated from each other. Constantinople was the breeding place of the Cæsarian despotism; Rome, on the other side, due to the strife between the Papacy and the Roman emperors, was the source of the emancipation of states and nations and in the last instance of the citizen. All these factors constitute the boundary line between the civilization of Western Europe and that of Russia. Poland al-

ways was the vanguard of the west. Poland was the fatherland of Copernicus, "who stopped the sun in its course." The investigation of Birkenmajer in the archives of Stockholm settled finally the nationality of Copernicus in favor of Poland.* The system of Copernicus forms the basis of the modern conception of the universe. If it had not been for Copernicus, Newton could not have accomplished his work or he would have to be Copernicus first. The physics of Gallileo is also the echo of the work of Copernicus. Poland had no freedom for the last hundred years. Oppression restrained the Polish schools and made it very difficult for the Polish nation to participate in the great work of civilization. Illiteracy and misery are set loose in Poland and have all the prospects of unlimited development which is denied to science and enterprise. Poland is not permitted to study and work. Such is the curse of life in slavery! The Polish creative genius could not, however, be suppressed. Chopin's music and Mickiewicz's poetry already after the downfall of Poland became the common spiritual good of the whole world. Sienkiewicz and Curie-Skłodowski won Nobel prizes. In the scientific circles of the world are known the names of Smoluchowski, Raciborski, Marchlewski, Godlewski, Morozewicz, Romer, Abramowski, Rozwadowski, Zaremba, Olszewski, Kostanecki, Ochorowicz, and numerous others. That is the achievement of a nation of 20,000,000 people and possessing but two universities, one in Cracow and one in Lemberg. As soon as the Russian army occupied Lemberg, one of the first steps taken was the closing of the Polish University. Warsaw, a Western European city in the real sense of the word, in tradition and culture, a city numbering about 1,000,000 inhabitants, the capital city of 20,000,000 people, having a glorious and great

* Expedition of Cracow's Academy of Sciences.

history, did not possess a university! This was a fact which humiliated western civilization, and for this civilization in general has to be thankful to Russia, which proclaimed in this way the "Slavic Brotherhood" on the Vistula. Liberty will stimulate the Polish genius and this will enrich the world with new elements, and the Polish nation will regain the power to "play the part in Europe to which it is entitled by its numbers, its culture, and its genius."*

The Congress of Vienna recognized and based its work upon the principle of legitimism. It was the conservative idea contrary to all the achievements of the Napoleonic era. Legitimism did not recognize the will of the nation; it supported legitimate authority, especially monarchy, on the grounds of hereditary rights. Belgium was returned to the Netherlands, the principality of Warsaw was annihilated, and Italy redivided. This cast the seeds for the revolution in Belgium, and the still more sanguine uprising in Poland. Italy had to have her Garibaldi. May the future peace congress not repeat the mistakes of the Congress in Vienna! Russia still to-day does not recognize the rights of nations in practice, placing the race above the rights of a nation, a principle very much inferior to the principle of legitimism. To Poland Russia promises autonomy in internal administration. This is less than the Congress of Vienna did, and which transformed the principality of Warsaw into a state within a state and did not only make an autonomic province of it. Poland hopes that if ever a future congress should not make it a sovereign state, it will at least deal with her according to the Vienna treaties, and will not allow approaching the Polish problem on the basis of the manifesto of Duke Nikolas. The Congress of Vienna, although taking

* "The Manchester Guardian," 19, 12, 1915.—"The New Poland," by Bruce Boswell, of Liverpool University.

the principle of legitimism as the point of issue, granted Poland the character of a state within a state; a separate diet, an army, it obliged the Russian Czar to crown himself Polish King in Warsaw. Will the future congress, which will assemble under the banner of freedom for nations, have the courage to step below this principle when dealing with the Polish question?

The attitude of Poles as a nation devoid of political liberty was determined by real facts and not by sympathies:

I.—Administrative and legislative autonomy existed in Galicia while Russian and German Poland did not enjoy these advantages.

II.—Private military schools could only be established in Galicia. Consequently, Polish youths from Russian and Prussian-Poland went to Galicia since in the former two provinces any military work had to be secretly carried on, and, consequently, not very effectively. The beginning of this political system dates back to the years 1876-8, when with the unofficial aid of England an uprising against Russia, in alliance with Austro-Hungary, was organized.

III.—Only in Russian-Poland, on the left bank of the Vistula, were there enough recruits for the Polish military representation in the case of European war, since Russia had, for strategical reasons, to evacuate the western governments of Russian Poland with the outbreak of the war, and this prevented the Russian authorities to mobilize in the mining and industrial districts of Russian-Poland.

IV.—During the Congress of Vienna, one hundred years ago, England entered into a secret treaty

with France and Austria against Russia, in spite of the fact that Russia was a faithful ally of England in her war against Napoleon.

V.—At the Congress in Vienna, England supported the Polish interests against Russia, although the Polish regiments were fighting with Napoleon against England.

VI.—Poland wanted and could form a military representation only against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary. That it was practicable was proven by the development of the Polish legions in Cracow and an absolute failure of Russian endeavors in Warsaw to form a competitory legion.

VII.—Russia occupies 80 per cent. of the historical Polish territory, and Warsaw is the capital city of Poland. Under these conditions the war of Austria with Prussia in 1866 could not, and did not revive the Polish question, but the possibility of war between Austria and Russia was always and must always be associated with the preparation of the Polish uprising against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary.

VIII.—The military interests in the present war do not coincide with the political interests, consequently the formation of the Polish legions against Russia, and in alliance with Austria-Hungary, does not free any one from the obligation of supporting the Polish independence.

Poland went along the way of her *ratio status* and of practical possibilities. She could not forget for a moment that Warsaw is not Antwerp, and that Warsaw is not located in front of London on the other side of the Channel. England must fight in order to support Belgium, but England

may limit the support of the Polish question to the war on paper. The Polish uprising in 1830 broke out when Czar Nikolas I, in the name of the reactionary principle of legitimism, wanted to send the Polish army to Belgium in order to crush her struggle for independence. That did not influence England in the following year to save Warsaw from the Russian superior forces, although it was Warsaw which saved Belgium. The blood of the Polish heroes of the uprising of 1863 created nothing more than sympathy in Western Europe. The Congress of Vienna obliged not only Russia but also Prussia to respect the rights of the Polish nation. Prussia at the time of Bismarck adopted the anti-Polish policy in the Province of Posen. Bismarck did not like the sea, so England preferred to keep quiet and to forget diplomatically the treaty of Vienna. On November 9, 1896, a Prussian order was issued, changing the Polish flag of the Province of Posen and substituting it with the Prussian colors. On February 10, 1897, Minister Von der Recke made a brutal speech in the Prussian diet defending the above order. England remained silent; still worse, she preferred to terrorize France in her Fashoda dispute, instead of claiming of Berlin the observance of the treaties of Vienna concerning the Polish rights. England did not forget her treaties with Belgium, but alas, how soon she did forget those concerning the Polish cause. Nobody enters war for someone else's pleasure; nobody sheds the blood of his nation for the other people's interests only. Such is the logic and truth of history. Poland understands it, but she wants also other nations to understand her position. If those, who in the present war proclaimed the watchword of the independence of nations, are sincere, Poland hopes that the future peace congress will adopt one of two alternatives:

I.—Either absolute independence of Poland, or

II.—Restoration of Poland as a state within another state.

Both alternatives prohibit the submittance of Polish territory to another dismemberment.

The union of the Polish provinces under the sceptre of the Czar, and on the basis of the manifesto of the Grand Duke Nikolas, will be, in spite of all appearances, only an injustice to Poland. A Polish state within a federation of German states would be an anomaly. A Polish state in union with Austria-Hungary on the basis of a triple union would be a favorable solution of the problem. But happiness and full justice can only be brought about by absolute independence, since this form of political existence was lost by Poland due to the "crime" of the partition.*

The hurricane of war which at present envelops Warsaw with the cloud of smoke rising from the battlefields, and with rivers of blood spilled in the greatest war of the ages will give birth to Poland's future. And above this blood-soaked soil of Poland the Polish legions unfurled their banner of Red and White, and await the help of all nations having the good will to help.

* Clemenceau.

Chapter V

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

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The war which is waged now is the war of giants: it is a struggle in which both sides do not shrink from anything in order to win. No such recklessness was seen since Napoleon's time when the English fleet bombarded Copenhagen in order to force Denmark to break her neutrality.

No feelings of sympathy nor any diplomatical sophisms can possibly conceal the fact that through Belgium leads a road as well to Paris as to Essen, of Krupp fame, or in other words, to Berlin. Essen is situated about fifty miles from the Belgian frontier. Dire necessity is the law of the war of giants: the determination to win is nothing else but the desire to avoid death. It is the hurricane which destroys, annihilates and undermines every law and has no respect for anything else but for force guiding toward victory. Such a hurricane threatened Belgium from two sides. What choice did Belgium have? To ally herself with Germany and to open a road to Paris meant a war with France and England, while, on the other hand, to ally herself with France and England necessarily meant a war with Germany; in both cases devastation of the country and forfeiting of liberty was to be expected.

Belgium therefore had to choose between the two evils. Under such conditions only the calculation of probability, who is going to be the victor, can serve as a guide. Such calculation is the method of the materialistic policy. London has always excelled in this method and has calculated with perfect calm, long before the outbreak of this war, that

in order to subdue Germany it was necessary to combine a huge superiority of forces. Diplomatic mines were exploded quietly and under ground. Russia, with her elementary power of half of Asia and Europe, the rich and heroic France, the distant Japan on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and finally Servia, Montenegro and Italy, and possibly other allies and brothers in arms became the war apparatus of England, and that was intended for replacing the army that England was lacking on large scale. The war between England and Germany was brewing in Europe ever since 1900, in which year Germany had amazed the world by her powerful naval program. There cannot be two masters of the seas, and there is only room for one, for master of all, or none if there are but equal rights for all. Therefore London prepared for this war everything, because even the English child was perfectly aware of the fact that the war that was to come would be a war for life or death.

Finally the hour of the struggle came.

Nobody entertained any doubt in the first few months of the war as to the fact that Germany is bound to lose. Inspired telegrams made this propaganda quite successful. Newspapers exaggerated small encounters and insignificant battles were given the importance of another . . . Waterloo. The world read this news and became convinced that the end of the war will come soon and that victory will be with England. The same news were also read by the English who expected to join the fray with full force in the spring of 1915 in order to throw their army into the balance for the benefit of France. The English press campaign, however, proved to be a complete strategical failure, because the English were thus taught to underestimate the danger: reading continuously about the crushing of Germany and the victorious march (of the press) on Berlin, Vienna or Budapest,

they began to think that there is no need for them on the battlefields of Europe. Why to go there when Germany is already crushed by the Russian "steam-roller," and may at any time ask for mercy of Sir Edward Grey? The still worse feature of the thing was that this boasting of England was read by the Germans. The haughty answer given in the fall of 1914 by Lord Kitchener, to the question as to the probable end of the war: "I do not know when the war is going to end but all I know is that it is only going to start in May of the next year," was a great victory for . . . Germany. Berlin listened, kept silent and worked full blast. Factories were running day and night, and reserves were drilling without undue haste of being sent to the front. Every German was becoming more and more convinced of the necessity of sacrificing his life for the cause of his country, while every Englishman at the same time was taught by degrees to underestimate the danger. Finally the much heralded month of May came around: it was the month of an enormous triumph for Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. The Russian armies were smashed to pieces in Galicia, and on the western front came a shortage of . . . ammunition. In the Dardanelles the Turkish military glory became once more firmly established after the defeats sustained in the Balkan war. The war, in fact, began in May but it took a turn which was entirely different from the one predicted by the press.

The world continues, however, to believe that the defeat of Germany is a foregone conclusion. This fact explains the situation of Belgium before the war. Belgium knew that there was a hurricane coming from two sides and, therefore, the Belgian Government calculated the probability of victory. The calculation showed that Germany cannot win, and even to-day, after the war has lasted a year, and in spite of

the immense victory of Germany, the calculation of material forces rather justifies the expectations of England than those of Berlin. Belgium has decided not to permit the Germans to go across the Belgian territories and has thus sided with those who had expectations to win. There is no doubt and could not have been at any moment that the war shall violate the frontiers of Belgium, either in the direction of Paris or in the direction of Essen. The line of the Meuse was too strongly fortified for Germany to venture a crossing, but the German line of the Rhine is not any easier to break for a French offensive movement.

English war publications frankly admit that the German offer to Belgium was advantageous for the latter even in case Belgium had to be incorporated into the German Federation on the same basis as Bavaria or Saxony.* These were "alluring prospects," because they could have put Belgium into the world market and double her national wealth. In spite of that Belgium refused the Germans the privilege of passing through her territory but admitted the English to Antwerp. The "world" has passed the sentence of death upon Germany, and Belgium could not therefore accept any offer from an outlaw. The war began and an ocean of blood has separated the nations. Great deeds of heroism became the monuments of mutual hatred: Belgium by her gallantry gained the sympathy and the respect of the entire world and not only of the "world" of the "condottieri" of the press. This, however, does not alter the fact that the road to success led through Belgium, both for Germany and for France as well. It was a dire necessity which nothing could avert.

The attitude of England in the case of Belgium is quite

* "What Europe Owes to Belgium," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 13.

clear. Antwerp in the hands of Germany means another London, but a German London within a few decades. Antwerp lies nearer to the great seas than Hamburg, and once more there is no room for two capitals like London, particularly not enough room on the Channel. It doesn't injure England's reputation at all that her "ratio status" compels England to defend Belgium, because by doing so she defends London at the same time. The fact that England has an interest in defending Belgium does not interfere with the principle of nationalism for which Belgium is fighting nowadays and gallantly spilling her blood. In the battle of Waterloo England, in alliance with Prussia, defended Belgium from France, and in the battle of the Marne she defended Belgium, in alliance with France, against Germany. It has been since the times of Pitt a doctrine of the English policy not to permit any of the European great nations to get a hold of Antwerp. It isn't, therefore, sufficient nowadays to say that the struggle in Western Europe is conducted simply for the protection of "weak" Belgium. This is true to a certain extent, at least apparently, but going to the roots of the matter it can be seen quite easily that the defence of Belgium is the result of other reasons. The actual causes of the war in the west of Europe are entirely different and are just as deep and just as far reaching as in the east: these causes are older and deeper than the mere violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany or the attack of Austria-Hungary on Servia.

Generally speaking the colonial imperialism of Germany is passing as the main cause of the war. There is a great amount of truth in this statement, because Germany is in her evolution which can inspire fear. Germany as a nation counts about 70,000,000 of people in the German Empire alone, whereby the Germans of Austria-Hungary are not

counted at all. The German emigration dropped to a paltry figure of 15,000 of emigrants per year while the yearly increase in population amounts to 800,000. Commerce and industry are developing with unprecedented rapidity. In the years 1902-1907 or, in other words, within five years the exportation and importation increased more than from 1881 to 1902, or, in other words, during twenty years. The amount of German traffic in 1902 amounted to two and three-quarter billions of dollars, while in 1907 it increased to four and one-quarter billions. The annual increase exceeded one-quarter of a billion. In 1912 the total of the export trade of Germany exceeded the huge sum of five billion dollars. Before the outbreak of the war the proportion of German trade and the English trade was 21:27, while as late as 1890 the entire commerce of Germany amounted to less than the importation to England.* The country is half agricultural and half industrial, or in other words it is a world in itself, and is able to provide alone for its needs. Besides the spirit of the nation is highly developed and the Germans can work like ants and fight like lions when their God, that means Germany, requires the sacrifices of the individual. All these characteristic features form the material and moral basis for an expansion on a large scale. The more intensive the life of a nation is, the more territory it requires; this is an old biological law applying both to individuals and to nations. The instinct of the German nation could not possibly help to be influenced by this law, and expressed this by making huge naval armaments intended for the purpose of protecting by them the colonial imperialism of Germany.

Germany, which thus far has kept aloof from the sea, soon entered into a keen competition with England; in this respect

* P. Rohrbach: "Germany's Isolation," Chicago, 1915.

Germany has made great strides forward in spite of the fact that she lacked the great traditions of a sea-faring people. In 1890 German diplomacy succeeded in getting Heligoland from England. London did not anticipate that this small island in the North Sea shall some day become the operating basis for the German Navy. Ten years after acquiring Heligoland the first German Naval program was made public and astonished the world by its extent, its accuracy and its ambitions. Then England, getting nervous, made another mistake which was worse than the selling of Heligoland to Germany, and this mistake consisted of devising a new type of battleships which were the pinnacle of engineering skill. These were the dreadnoughts which are nothing else but floating fortresses. Apparently this step meant a progress for England but in reality it was not progress but retrogression. German engineering proved to be equal to that of England. At the London Exposition of 1881, Alfred Krupp made a successful debut by exhibiting a steel block weighing 2,000 kilgorams alongside of an English steel block weighing 1,000 pounds. Every year thereafter increased the technical capacity of Germany as far as steel industry is concerned, which permitted Germany to outdistance everybody else in land armaments and partly in naval armaments also. German dreadnoughts were soon ploughing the seas just as the English did. Thus Germany has acquired the chance of being a competitor of England because the type of older ships of which England had a large supply could not possibly come into account against the modern dreadnoughts. As far as the number of ships is concerned England is still the leading power; as far as the quality is concerned the dreadnought types gave Germany a chance of entering into competition with England. Germany had very few ships of the old times, but the dreadnoughts have helped them materially,

inasmuch as the older types of ships had to be put back into the second battle line. When the war broke out the proportion of the English navy to the German navy was ten to sixteen as far as the first-class fighting units were concerned. This is the arithmetical way of expressing a mistake made by England in building dreadnoughts. Germany has thus come closer to the shores of England because she changed in their own favor the proportion of the respective naval forces of England and Germany. With regard to submarines Germany has outdistanced the entire world and has even created a menace for England, the danger of a blockade.

A blockade of England?

The history of many centuries is shown in this question. A new competitor began to knock at the gates to all seas which gates were in times gone by hermetically closed by England. The Germans began to look for new territories for their commerce and their industry. Their economical prosperity became the basis for their colonial imperialism which was nothing else but a form of this economical prosperity. Statistics showed every year that as far as commercial and industrial expansion as well as the expansion of naval armaments is concerned Germany was speedily catching up with England. The British supremacy on the seas began to feel the German competition and there can be no two masters of the seas, but only one or none, or all should have the equal rights which in turn means nothing else but freedom of the seas. Thus the war became imminent because Germany could not stop her economical evolution and England could not without struggle give up the inheritance of a long series of generations and could not yield the supremacy on the seas for which they spilled streams of blood. Germany could not stop her progress nor could England betray her historical

tradition. This is nobody's fault, but there are reasons which are far stronger than the desire for peace, and the fault for these conditions should be equally charged to all humanity because the latter's war technique is so much superior to the technique of the peace.

The English supremacy on the seas was based on the inaccessibility of the British shores and the superiority in war vessels. The first pillar of British supremacy was great Britain's "splendid isolation," the second one her naval power. The present war already has, in the first year, shaken the first of both pillars. Above the seas the air fleet made its appearance, while under the sea the submarines began their deadly work of destruction. The system of naval warfare has been considerably changed, and the inaccessibility of the British shores is a thing of the past. The dreadnoughts are peacefully moored in various bays while the war service is done by submarines and scouting aeroplanes: the air fleet on the one hand and the submarines on the other hand made the men-of-war an anachronism. The aeroplane, the dirigible balloon and the submarine accomplished a thing which a year ago still seemed to be a fantastic dream: they made England a part of the European continent. Since February 18, 1915, the date on which Germany began a blockade of the English coasts, by means of submarines, England forms part of the European Continent. The importance of this date was still increased by the fact that on June 1, 1915, a dirigible balloon appeared above London for the first time and dared to throw ninety bombs on the metropolis of one-half of the world. The "splendid isolation" of Great Britain became an empty phrase. This fact is a marking stone of a new epoch in the history of the world. Even the greatest defeat of Germany cannot in any way alter this fact: a new epoch was thus started on the

seas, but it is still an open question who is going to be the author of the first chapter of the new book of the future.

The submarine in the hands of Germany became the same thing that the boats of the Norman Vikings used to be in the Middle Ages. Since the time of the Norman Conquest the British shores did not see any other conqueror. Does not history show at times a tendency to repeat itself?

England became so used to her supremacy on the seas that she cannot give this supremacy up without any struggle. The opportunistic policy shall continue to uphold this conservative attitude of England but England must henceforth take the two following facts into account:

I—The change in the technique of naval warfare exposes England to the danger of a compulsory loss of the supremacy on the seas.

II—The principal colonies of England became already politically ripe, and the abolishing of English supremacy on the seas does not necessarily involve, as it could have been in former times, the loss of these colonies.

Canada, Egypt, South Africa, India and Australia are states within a state and not ordinary colonies. In the present war they demonstrated so much conscious loyalty and spirit of sacrifice for the mother-country that England may remain calm and can look with pride upon the fruits of her colonial policy. Not England defending her colonies but the colonies are defending England in the present war. This may be a paradox but it permits us to see more clearly another real and new fact and that is that the English colonies can and undoubtedly will protect themselves at any time. This is a fact which did not exist actually in international politics although it has existed potentially. The present war is a powerful incentive for a political evolution of the English colonial dominions and creates at the same time guaran-

tees for the safety of England in the future. The supremacy on the seas ceases to be for England a question of life or death. The historical mission of England, based on the supremacy on the seas is, practically speaking, ended with glory and with honor. The colonies ceased to be for England a dead block, a market of slaves, and they became conscious political organisms ; these colonies are states within a state, well prepared for purposes of self-defence, and very well able to increase the armaments should such emergency arise. The sacrifice of the supremacy on the seas for the prize of strengthening of the English colonial dominions would solve the question of the seas without injury to England and for the benefit of the world and of permanent peace.

No phrase nor any sentimental feeling can possibly disguise the fact that the seas are under the control of England, nor can the fact be concealed that neutral countries and particularly the United States are thus exposed to a great loss. The English supremacy grew out of force and was based on force and it is lawful in so far as law is a form of power. The formula of Bismarck is the formula of English supremacy of the seas. The German submarines, however, are directing their attacks on this condition of things and the German system of blockading England is an answer to the English blockade of Germany. Tooth for tooth and eye for eye, and while this goes on the losses of the neutral countries are increasing every day. All sympathies and all grievances should be left aside because the interests of the future generations require that this war should put an end not only to the supremacy on land but also to the supremacy on the seas. The close follower of every privilege, and particularly of a privilege based on power, is jealousy. The German submarines which were specially trained for pur-

poses of blockading England originated on account of the British supremacy on the seas. Improvement of the submarines will bring about the liquidation of the English supremacy on the seas sooner or later, and even a victory of England over Germany in the present war cannot possibly avert this future from England. A naval blockade in the old sense of the word begins to be too expensive since the German submarines have attacked the English privileges on the seas. England, with her great political talent, begins to feel it already and shall not fail to comply with the changed condition of things. Germany also understands the new conditions and advocates the freedom of the seas: Germany feels very well that it can defeat England on the seas only at the price of an expedient which at the same time jeopardizes German ambitions for a supremacy on the seas. The question of a blockade ceases to be what it was in the time of Napoleon and during all the wars of the nineteenth century. Nowadays, the question of the blockade according to the provisions of the English supremacy on the seas brings about disastrous consequences owing to the counter-blockade by the submarines. This is a reducing of the question to an absurdum, but a bloody absurdum after all. The tragedy of the *Lusitania* is not only a monument to German inconsiderateness but also a tombstone to the English system of English blockading. For England it was a political Trafalgar, although from a military point of view it was nothing but a mere trifle. The question of feeling towards Germany should in no way obscure the issue and hatred, or sympathy shall under no circumstances serve as the only guide for shaping the fate or the happiness of nations. Regardless of sympathy for England or for Germany the program of the freedom of the seas should become the

program of neutral countries. The idea of the freedom of the seas is the idea of the progress of the world.

The system of blockading which intends to starve out the civilian population of a country is incompatible with the requirements of modern progress. Germany replied with the tragedy of the *Lusitania*. This is the curse of every evil that it generates still greater evils and the good name of humanity has to pay the bill for these extravagant acts. It is high time to finish these atrocities for the sake of dignity of humanity and of permanent peace. The idea of the freedom of the seas with the exception of artificial canals such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal or the Kiel Canal, is becoming a historical necessity and it should not be tolerated that this great idea be reduced to an empty phrase. It is, furthermore, contrary to the interests of neutral countries, and particularly to the interests of the United States, that the idea of the freedom of the seas should become a political monopoly of Germany. The freedom of the seas should become a real program of neutral countries and not a temporary expedient of diplomatic intrigues. The appearing of submarines increases the actuality of the question. Because of a new fact coming into existence, a new legal formula must be found. The old formulas are not sufficient for the new situation.

Let us hope that the coming peace congress shall not be as late on the question of the seas as the Congress of Vienna hundred years ago was late on the question of land.

According to a well-established version German militarism is together with Germany's colonial imperialism, another cause of the war. This statement is half true and half false. Militarism as a system of universal military service must in the first place be distinguished from the question of military preparedness. As far as militarism

is concerned France was and is the leader because her rate of growth of the population is constantly on the decrease. The return to the three years' term of military service in France was the top notch of militarism in Europe because it has increased in an unprecedented way the accuracy of recruiting. The German system was less accurate because the increase of the population in Germany shows an upward movement. Russia is a giant both as to her territory and her population, and owing to these two factors the militarism in Russia can be less intense than in Germany which is smaller than Russia, or than in France which is losing constantly in population. These few facts already are sufficient to show that the question of militarism should not be confused with the question of military preparedness.

From the statistical point of view the conditions were highly interesting before the outbreak of war. The peace footing of the French army was increased owing to the three years' term of military service to 768,300 men while the peace footing of the German army showed a total of 619,000 officers and men. Germany replied by a new military law and increased the numerical strength of her army on peace footing to 751,000 in total. Russia has at the same time increased her fighting strength from year to year and maintained all the time an army superior in strength to the armies of France and Germany combined. In the winter of 1913-1914 the peace footing of the Russian army in Asia and in Europe numbered 1,870,000 men. In the winter 1915-1916 the peace footing of the Russian army was expected to reach the huge figure of 1,900,000 men in total. All these figures apply to the peace footing of the army and do not include the reserves to be drafted into service in case of a general mobilization or of war.

From the economical point of view the three years' term

of service meant a great burden for France because it deprived the industry of too much labor. The keeping of the huge army in times of peace and equipping this army with up-to-date war material meant a financial burden for Russia far above the country's financial strength. Russia has for many years already contracted enormous loans in Paris in order to save herself from bankruptcy. France has invested in Russia four billions of dollars; the war was therefore for Russia the only way of saving the finances of the country from disaster by winning a victory over Germany. Without a war Russia was confronted by the phantom of bankruptcy while a victorious war opened up prospects of saving the country from financial disaster. Germany did not have to fear bankruptcy because she had enough money of her own and besides her system of armaments did not undermine Germany's economical possibilities inasmuch as the increase of population permitted an expansion of production as well as an expansion of armaments. France had money and a high political culture, but she did not have enough men. Russia on the other hand, did not have either money or culture equal to the culture of the western European nations but she had a surplus of men. Germany alone combined all the elements such as the sufficient supply of money, of men and of political culture. These features show why the danger of German armaments was greater than the danger of armaments of France or Russia, in spite of the fact that the armaments of Germany were on a smaller scale than the armaments of the two other countries. France was the most militaristic country of Europe and Russia had the largest army while Germany stuck to the middle golden road and consequently the greatest military efficiency. This is the secret of German successes.

Since the times of Sedan and particularly since the alliance between Russia and France was formed, the question of armaments became the question of life and death of Germany. The alliance between France and Russia provoked already in the first year of its existence the Fashoda incident and the danger of a war between France and England, but Germany which was just engaged in building her fleet had to expect necessarily that the traditional friendship between England and Germany will soon change into a traditional hostility. Bryce has estimated justly the situation of Germany in the centre of Europe with her frontiers open to the west and to the east and explained the unity of Germany by the "external pressure which the presence of two neighboring powers, France and Russia has applied. An immense and highly disciplined army has been deemed a necessity."* It isn't the fault of France that she re-established the three years' term of military service in order to have an army on peace footing exceeding the one of Germany. Nor is it the fault of Russia that for French money she kept in times of peace an army stronger than that of France and Germany combined. It isn't the fault of Germany, either, that she has brought her army on peace footing to the same strength as France and that Germany had more money than Russia at her disposal. The method of mutual accusations and vilifications only leads astray and does not bring anybody nearer to the truth.

The signal for starting the war came from Vienna where the war against Servia had been decided upon. The logical consequences of alliances and military considerations have at once started a general conflagration. This does not mean by any means that the entire guilt for starting the

* J. Bryce, l. c., page 493.

war should be charged to Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Central European powers have selected the moment of the explosion as well as the place of starting the hostility, but the question of peace or war was not entirely depending on their decision. The superiority of material forces was from the beginning on the side of England, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Servia and Montenegro. The calculation pointed to a disadvantage on the side of Berlin and Vienna, and the weaker side therefore selected the time and the place of the outbreak of the war in order to counter-balance thus the inferiority of their material forces.

In the fall of 1913 France called the recruits of two consecutive years to the colors. This move was dictated by requirements of military nature resulting from the re-establishment of the three years' term of military service. Only one year of older soldiers has been retained under arms because the soldiers who have served full two years in accordance with the law hitherto in force have been discharged. Thus the remaining soldiers had to drill the recruits for two years at once. From the professional military point of view it was unfavorable because it rendered any possible mobilization very difficult and hindered the first strategical moves in case war should break out. The calling of two years of recruits to the colors could be done only by lowering the age limit for enlistment. Thus the age limit was reduced from twenty-one years of life to twenty years. Consequently in the fall of 1914 France had to call to the colors recruits, 20 years of age, and at the same time, by virtue of the new law, had to retain for the third year of service those who trained the first two categories of recruits. France expected to have in 1915 four years of soldiers under arms at the same time and not three as it should be: such a condition greatly facilitated

the mobilization and increased the power of the first attack. In the same year, 1915, the effective strength of the Russian army was expected to reach the figure of 1,900,000 men, which figure by the way meant the strength of the Russian army on peace footing. The fall of 1915 would thus bring to Austria-Hungary and to Germany a disadvantage with regard to the proportion of strength for the first attack. The summer of 1914 on the other hand, presented a favorable term because then the chances for a speedy mobilization of the French army were rather poor. In fact the war hung in the air for a long time already, and all the expedients of peace have been exhausted at the conference of the ambassadors in London during the Balkan wars. Already then a number of questions were left unsettled and over Europe hung the moment of calm which generally precedes a storm. The shots in Sarajevo which killed the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary were the spark which ignited the mine laid long ago. Austria-Hungary and Germany seized the opportunity of selecting time and place in the conflict which was inevitable for quite a few years already. The code of honor has been lived up to because the weaker side selected the time and the place of the struggle. Humanity, however, had to suffer and wade again through an ocean of blood.

The average public opinion charges the full responsibility for the war to the Central European powers. This judgment, however, is very one sided and therefore unjust. Strictly speaking Russia has to bear the brunt of the burden of responsibility. Russian imperialism has since the time of Peter the Great, under the disguise of a religious propaganda, endeavored to crush Turkey in order to transfer the capital of the Czars to Constantinople and fly the Russian flag on the Mediterranean. The Russian imperial-

ism has also wielded the arms of Pan-Slavism, of racial affiliation and of uniting the Slavs for the interest of Pan-Russianism, against Austria-Hungary. These methods of Russian imperialism are old, and stood the test in several wars and innumerable intrigues. The entire world has to pay the bill for these Russian methods in the present war. Russia, bent on the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary has forced the latter, soon after the Congress at Berlin, into an alliance with Germany, although the memories of the Austrian defeat by Prussia on the battlefield of Sadowa were still alive. Intending to destroy Turkey Russia has recently alienated the latter from England and pushed Turkey into an alliance with Berlin. The continental imperialism of Russia which did not end after the Congress of Berlin permitted Germany to increase her power owing to Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and subsequently with Turkey. This condition was the main basis for Germany's colonial ambitions which were developed after the retirement from office of Prince Bismarck. Germany felt safe in Central Europe and this prompted her naval ambitions of later years. Finally the Balkan war broke out in which Russia made the false promise to Bulgaria with regard to Roumanian neutrality only in order to prompt Bulgaria into a war against Servia, Montenegro and Greece. As soon as the second Balkan war broke out the promises of Russia proved to be utterly false and Bulgaria suffered a terrible defeat. Russia was always against any increase of Bulgaria's power because the latter showed herself always more independent from Petrograd than Servia who willingly played the part of Russia's tool. The defeat of Bulgaria at Bregalnitz decided Bulgaria's sympathy for Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus the imperialism of Russian Pan-Slavism opened a road leading directly

from Berlin through Vienna and Sophia to Constantinople, which fact made the attack of the Allies on the Dardanelles extremely difficult in the present war. Thus Izwolskij the Russian Ambassador in Paris was quite justified in his alleged saying that the present war is "his war." It matters little whether Izwolskij actually said this or not: it remains a fact that the continental imperialism of Russia formed the basis for the colonial imperialism of Germany because it pushed Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria into the sphere of influence of Berlin. The actual facts put the blame rather on Russia than on the Central European powers. It would be a political shortsightedness to claim that only a defeat of Germany can solve the question of armaments in a way which would be advantageous to a permanent peace. Petrograd was for many years past by no means a smaller source of a danger of war. Furthermore, who is going to compel Russia to abandon her continental imperialism after she has entered Constantinople and has penetrated into Western Asia over the Armenian Mountains?

The mistake lies deeper.

The responsibility for the war should be charged entirely to the anarchy of armaments and not to militarism. If an individual wants to rule on the basis of the theory "*sic volo sic iubeo*," humanity calls it anarchy. Nations are also liable to fall into anarchy the moment they adopt the principle "*sic volo sic iubeo*." The will of a country with regard to military armaments is a dogma which is respected by international law. Humanity defines independence as the principle of free-hand of the nations or as the principle of anarchy of armaments. The extent of armaments is not subject to any control from the outside but depends upon the determination and desire of every individual nation.

This being the case no permanent peace can be preserved nor can those who apply the aforesaid principle be blamed for doing so. The present war is nothing else but the result of this traditional formula and the armaments of France, Germany and Russia were based on nothing else. It isn't Germany's fault that her population is increasing nor that there is an increase of her national wealth and power which rendered their armaments more efficient and more dangerous than the armaments of other countries. The condemning of Germany and the sparing of Russia or France obscures the issue, although it has many appearances of correctness. The centre of gravity lies in the anarchy of armaments, and the future peace congress will have above all to settle first the question of armaments before attacking those who may, against the will of the world, insist upon sticking to the traditional theory of armies and armaments. The present international law recognizes the principle of the anarchy of armaments, but the future international law must under all circumstances discontinue to acknowledge this principle. This is a program for creating honest, real and genuine bases for a permanent peace, and in compliance with this program the future peace congress will have to take away from the nations the liberty of making armaments, and will have to entrust the making of changes in the rate of armaments to a peace tribunal which will be based on a special international agreement. The future peace congress will have to solve not only the question of naval armaments but also the question of armaments on land; and not only to regulate the danger of supremacy on the seas but also the danger of supremacy on land. These are the two parts of the same question; regulating the one at the expense of the other one will leave humanity in the same plight as hitherto.

Onesidedness generates always the feeling of an injury, and the consequence of such a feeling is the desire for revenge.

Humanity has mastered the technique of the war but was hitherto unable to master the technique of peace. Owing to this, arise certain problems which are beyond the power of humanity and which cannot be solved without bloodshed. Among these problems were also the causes of the present war or, in other words, the continental imperialism of Russia, the colonial imperialism of Germany and English supremacy on the seas. The weight of these complicated questions, burdened besides by the tradition of centuries has broken the dam and caused a flood of disasters. Millions are perishing on the battlefields, famine penetrates the dwellings of the families and hatred has poisoned the hearts of nations. Mothers weep not only in France but also in Germany because the tragedy of war is just in distributing the share of grief. The question is whether humanity will succeed to be just in distributing the share of happiness when the foundations for the peace, let us hope a permanent one, are going to be laid.

This is possible in principle.

The idea of independence does not necessarily require the anarchy of armaments. A nation can be free without having a free hand as to armaments. The future peace congress must not only revise the frontiers but must also revise the international law.

The latter task is the more important one.

Chapter VI

THE PEACE TRIBUNAL

CHAPTER VI.—THE PEACE TRIBUNAL

One hundred years ago the Napoleonic period came to an end at the Congress of Vienna which attempted to save the old order of things in the name of the principle of legitimism. History did not permit of retrogression. Napoleon fell as the god of war, but his armies had crossed Europe from one end to the other, and disseminated everywhere the seeds of the ideas which were originated by the French Revolution. Wherever the armies of Napoleon came, there originated the idea of civic freedom, and national consciousness was awakened. Some nations awoke for the purpose of co-operating with Napoleon, others for the purpose of combating him. This, however, will not alter the fact that Napoleon was after all the one who spread the ideas of French Revolution all over the world. The militarism of Napoleon was defeated, but his democratic ideas and his ideas of nationalism have won an overwhelming victory.

There will come finally a time when the present European war will come to its end. Then humanity will lay down arms and peace, calm and justice will reign once more. Looking at the things from a broader historical point of view, we can perceive already now that German militarism is completing at present the work begun by Napoleon. One hundred years ago the militarism of France was spreading the ideas of nationalism and democracy. German militarism to-day is bringing in the harvest. The burden of the results exceeds the causes and the burden of human deeds grows over the heads of their perpetrators. German militarism

unconsciously forms the prompting element of progress although its purpose is to reach more concrete and selfish results. Napoleon's campaigns also were not always aware of what elements they were bringing into history.

Militarism means universal compulsory military service. This is in other words a return to former times when every member of a community of men was compelled to take up arms for the defense of the community within which he lived. General mobilization nowadays calls to the colors everybody and anybody—poor and rich, educated and uneducated—in other words, all citizens without distinction as to the station of life. Wealth and educational level must come and serve the cause of their country. Militarism made the army a democratic and a national institution. The sword ceased to be the privilege of certain classes of society. The idea of duty towards the country has made all men equal by force of the executive power of the state. The present war is still more completely finishing the task. In the trenches, men of all strata of society meet and a common duty and common sufferings establish between them a tradition of brotherhood. Man is meeting man in close contact on the background of this war, which after all is the war of militarism.

The ways of history are strange.

Militarism accelerates democracy although it does not try to accomplish it consciously and directly. Nothing becomes lost in the chaos of life. The individual does not perceive the subsequent results of his actions, but these results are noticed by history. What becomes lost in the apperception of the individual becomes recorded by the apperception of history. This is the feature of the creative power of history, or, in other words, the feature of progress. The logic of progress is rational, owing to the efforts of an individual,

and irrational, owing to the masses. A pearl can be found even in a heap of mud; while proceeding rationally—pearls have to be looked for at the bottom of the sea. Militarism is not an organization for a purpose of a political propaganda, but in spite of that, militarism does more for democracy than many political parties. The genius of Napoleon was in too many instances looking only for the blind triumph of the brutal material force, but in just as many and in more instances it has brought about the triumph of nationalism and democracy, although not directly bent on doing so. In the battle of Waterloo, the militarism of Napoleon was crushed for the price of a national regeneration of Germany. The casualism of the epoch of Napoleon apparently triumphed over causality. The present war follows the same road. The results will exceed the causes, casualism shall triumph over causality, and irrationalism over rationalism. New lights will shine on the horizon of humanity although the work of wholesale murder on the battlefields is blind. While the flames of the present war are raging, foundations are laid for the twentieth century and possibly even for a longer period of history. Someone may have a hatred for Germany, just as England had a hatred for Napoleon, or the Old World for Rome, but still the armies of Rome carried the sparks of Greek genius from the boundaries of India as far as the Ultima Thule. The figure of Napoleon becomes more and more identified with the history of nationalism and of democracy. When the clouds of smoke obscuring the present battlefields will be dispersed, then real progress will appear from under the iron mask of German militarism.

Militarism as a system of military duties is both democratic and national, consequently progressive. The evil lies not in the universal military duty, but in the anarchy of

armaments, which forces the nations to make too large expenditures for the sake of military preparedness in the time of peace. From this point of view it is not paradoxical to assume, that militarism will be more firmly established in Europe after this war, and that it will even invade England. England became to-day a part of the continent, when the submarine and the aeroplane removed the "splendid isolation." Militarism will cross the Channel and invade England. The system of recruiting will pass into oblivion just as the mercenary armies did. It is delusion to look for the end of militarism after this war. The danger for permanent peace does not lie in militarism, only in the anarchy of armaments. The abolition of militarism and return to the system of mercenaries will not prevent the anarchy of armaments. It will facilitate it. The latter is not the result of militarism—because it is older than militarism. The only way out of it is to form an international law regulating the armaments. A general treaty should oblige all the civilized states not to change the system of armaments or the army on peace footing without the permission of the peace court. This would mean a definite change in the practice up to the present day—a practice which is as old as human misery.

An individual is not an angel—still less a community. As long as criminal acts are committed among the individuals, so long will such acts be committed among the states. It does not mean that the question of peace cannot be regulated by law. The fact of war does not exclude international law, just as the fact of murder does not exclude criminal law. The fact that international law might be violated does not undermine its authority. Even civil law is being violated by the wicked or powerful, but the transgressor is punished while the law remains intact. It is a mistake to minimize the importance and authority of international law by pointing at

its violation. General education is here at fault. The idea that international law is worthless is not true, although it is popular.

Law knows physical persons and legal entities without, however, specifying them; the definition of a person accepted by the civil or the criminal law is of a general nature. In international law on the other hand, the conception of a legal entity is specified as: Germany, France, England, etc. This conception refers to the legal entities vested with sovereign authority or in other words to political organisms, alias states, strictly defined as to time and geographical limits. Under such circumstances the international law necessarily must be a code of treaties concluded between and binding those aforesaid sovereign legal entities. Any other conception of international law is absurd from the point of view of logic.

International law, as any other law, is based upon the general character of culture, morals, science, and social economy. These all constitute premises of the international law. A certain order of international law becomes binding, as soon as the treaties of both parties concerned are ratified by both of them. It is not the formula of the treaty, but the signature of the interested state, that makes a law out of the treaty. International law imitates civil law regulating the mutual relations between the states. The executive power is principally invested, as in any other company, in the hands of other partners, or here in those states in relation to which any state did not live up to the treaty or infringed upon the law. England is the executor of her treaty with Belgium in the present war. The future peace court must be based upon similar principles of executive power if it is to limit the anarchy of armaments and inclinations to war. Although the idea of a perpetual peace is an abstract one, the idea of

a lasting peace is within practical possibilities. The plan of a peace court is to-day only a *pium desiderium*. It has not the signature of all the parties concerned, consequently it is not and has not the validity of law. Let us assume that the horrors of the present war will force Europe to take up this question and realize it. The future peace congress realizing the idea of a peace court will have to define its competency or to give it the form of a law. In other words, to insure executive power, the treaties must be ratified. In order to be on a really working basis, the peace court must, in the interests of peace, make it certain that the system of armaments or the army on peace footing must be approved by and cannot be changed without the permission of the peace court. The peace court can regulate the use of the sword, just as a civil court regulates the use of money. As the civil courts do not eradicate thefts or larceny, so the peace court cannot be expected to remove forever the danger of war. An enormous achievement will however be left; that is the limitation of the anarchy of the sword guarded by the sanctity of the law.

Nations are not immortal but form only transitory forms of existence in the history of human progress. Perhaps there will come a time when nations will resolve themselves in a higher unit of their life. In the dawn of history, chieftains of peoples called states to life. The states became the cradles of nations. Perhaps the nations will create in the future a new form of existence: "mankind," which still is only in the realm of moral and religious dreamland, but not in a concrete, practical and political form.

In the dawn of history, man was the property of the sovereign. As the development went on, he became the property of the state. The state made him a member of the nation, which is a historical brotherhood, founded upon the community of historical traditions and language.

What is the next step?

A permanent peace and cultural penetration will bring nearer the epoch of brotherhood in the name of civilization of all free nations. This will be a new and higher form of political consciousness but as yet it scarcely buds on the tree of history. The nations will join hands in work toward common good and duty. The day will come when the truth of God—“*Treuga Dei*”—will reign among the nations, as it does among the individuals. This is an old and sacred dream, as old and sacred as is human suffering. The pagan Plato worked for it, and so did St. Augustine. Are we, the contemporary generation, now bathed in the blood of the present war, capable of bringing nearer the day of triumph for mankind?

In the agony of the present war the answer to this question is being born. There must be victors and there must be the victims in this war, but there should be no wronged ones, if the future peace is to heal the bleeding wounds.

The coming peace should for the sake of justice accept for a basis the following five principles:

I.—Settlement of the divergent interests of England, France, and Germany by the means of colonial possessions, particularly in Africa, so as to prevent violation of the principle of liberty of nations by territorial changes on a greater scale in Western Europe.

II.—Enforcement of the principle of liberty of nations in the eastern theater of war by reconstructing Poland in the first place, thus preventing Pan-Slavism which, if established, would inevitably bring forth as a reaction a Pan-Germanism or Pan-Romanism.

III.—Re-establishment of the freedom of the seas.

IV.—Submitting the question of land and naval armaments, or, in other words, the question of changing the peace-footing of the army and navy, to the control of the special peace tribunal, the legal authority and executive power of which should be based on a specially ratified, international treaty.

V.—Sparing the vanquished from utter destruction by abstaining from exacting excessive war-contributions.

May the conscience of nations awake!

Cleveland, Ohio, July, 1915.

